

103

U.S. PARTICIPATION IN UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING ACTIVITIES

Y 4.F 76/1:P 31/19

U.S. Participation in United Nations... ARINGS

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZATIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED THIRD CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

JUNE 24, SEPTEMBER 21, AND
OCTOBER 7, 1993

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs



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U.S. PARTICIPATION IN UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING ACTIVITIES

THURSDAY, JUNE 24, 1993

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL SECURITY,
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS,
Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 11:12 a.m., in room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Tom Lantos (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Mr. LANTOS. The Subcommittee on International Security, International Organizations and Human Rights will come to order.

Today, the subcommittee begins a series of hearings on the subject of "United States Participation in United Nations Peacekeeping Activities."

We have found, I think much to the surprise and dismay of many of our fellow countrymen, that the post-cold war world is neither tranquil nor peaceful. Although I do not think there are many in the United States or elsewhere who long to return to the stability of the cold war, it is clear that the United States faces very serious challenges that test our ability and our determination as a nation. It is also clear that in a great many cases the solutions to the international problems we face are multinational and multilateral, and that we must work with many other members of the global community to deal with these problems.

In this context, the United Nations has assumed a vastly more important role than was the case in the past. The United States is, indeed, extremely fortunate in these circumstances to have as our Permanent Representative to the U.N. Ambassador Madeleine Albright, a woman of great distinction and enormous accomplishments in the arena of international affairs. It is also most appropriate that President Clinton has made Ambassador Albright a member of his Cabinet and a member of the National Security Council.

At present the United States is actively participating in U.N. peacekeeping operations in Somalia. We are in the process of placing some 300 American troops in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia at the request of the U.N. We have committed American aircraft to assist U.N. operations in Bosnia to patrol the "no-fly" zone and to provide air capability if U.N. forces there require assistance. We are heavily involved financially in supporting numerous other U.N. peacekeeping operations around the globe.

As the subcommittee begins this important series of hearings on U.S. participation in United Nations peacekeeping activities, there are a lot of questions we will have to consider. What role should the United States play in U.N. peacekeeping, peacemaking, and peace-enforcement activities? What conditions and limitations should be considered with regard to the participation of U.S. military forces in U.N. activities? What role should the North Atlantic Alliance play in international peacekeeping activities? How can the United Nations be organized more effectively to manage and support such a wide variety of peacekeeping activities? How should peacekeeping be financed so that the burden is more equitably shared and the funds are available for peacekeeping operations without the necessity of ad hoc arrangements for every new peacekeeping mission? What role should other nations play in these activities, particularly Germany and Japan, both of which are seeking to play a greater role in the world community, both of which carry historic legacies that have raised questions regarding their full military participation?

In some cases it may be necessary to consider changes in our laws regarding U.S. participation in United Nations activities. In other cases, there are serious policy questions that need to be discussed and debated so that the American public understands and supports the changes that will be necessary in our foreign policy.

We will not answer all of these questions today, but we will begin an important dialogue. Today it is our special pleasure to have as our first witness in this series of hearings Ambassador Madeleine Albright, our Permanent Representative to the U.N.

We are delighted to have you with us today, Madam Ambassador, and we are most appreciative of your testifying in view of your extremely heavy schedule. We look forward to your insights to these problems.

Before we begin with you, I would like to call on my friend and colleague from New York, the ranking Republican member of the Foreign Affairs Committee, Congressman Gilman, to make any opening remarks he would care to make.

Mr. GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I too want to welcome Ambassador Albright as someone with whom we have had a close relationship over the years and who is so highly qualified to take on a new position as our U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations. I want to commend you, Mr. Chairman, for endeavoring to focus attention on our own participation in United Nations peacekeeping activities, which have been escalating over the past few months, and which apparently will grow even more important in the days to come. We look forward to Ambassador Albright's testimony.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. LANTOS. Thank you very much. Congressman McCloskey.

Mr. MCCLOSKEY. No statement, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. LANTOS. Congresswoman Snowe.

Ms. SNOWE. No statement. Welcome, Ambassador.

Mr. LANTOS. Congressman Sawyer.

Mr. SAWYER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I don't have a statement—only to join you in your comments and to welcome Ambassador Albright.

Mr. LANTOS. Thank you very much.

Ambassador Albright, your prepared statement will be entered in the record in its entirety. You may proceed any way you choose.

**STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE MADELEINE K. ALBRIGHT,
U.S. PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE TO THE UNITED NATIONS**

Ambassador ALBRIGHT. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and distinguished members of the subcommittee, I am delighted to be with you today. It is a great pleasure to appear before you and to have a chance to at least begin to answer some of those very important questions that you have posed.

During my last visit to this subcommittee, on May 3, we discussed the American stake in a system of collective security. Much has occurred since early May to make that subject even more relevant today. I am submitting for the record my speech before the Council on Foreign Relations on June 11 because its discussion of collective security and U.N. reform should be of particular interest to this subcommittee.

Mr. LANTOS. Without objection, it will be included in the record.

Ambassador ALBRIGHT. Today, however, what I want to do is review peacekeeping operations in Somalia, Cambodia, and Mozambique, and describe recent Security Council action in Haiti. In addition, I want to spend some time dispelling what I believe are some serious misperceptions about U.N. peacekeeping and the U.S. role in it.

Let me begin by noting that I have spoken in other forums in recent weeks about four categories of states that I see as emerging within the United Nations. The first group are a significant number of states that I believe have a stake in the United Nations and the international community as a whole. A second group are the emerging democracies trying to play a constructive role but struggling with internal political and economic turmoil. A third group are other states and factions that are at war with the international norms and institutions, and I have called these the "defiant regimes." And finally, the fourth group are the failed societies; the ones where effective government has collapsed, or anarchy reigns, or the economy is hopeless, or a humanitarian calamity overwhelms the country and the people are sliding into an abyss. These failed societies cry out for help from the international community.

Much of our credibility as a superpower—and we must, in my view, remain one—will depend upon our ability to manage our approach to these four groups. Though sometimes we will act alone, our foreign policy will necessarily point toward multilateral engagement. However, unless the United States also exercises leadership within collective bodies like the U.N., there is a risk that multilateralism will not serve our national interest well; in fact, it may undermine our interests.

These two realities—multilateral engagement and U.S. leadership within collective bodies—require an "assertive multilateralism" which would advance U.S. foreign policy goals. Preventive diplomacy, I believe, is the linchpin of assertive multilateralism. We are going to have to open our minds to broader strategies in multilateral forums. We need to project our leadership

where it counts long before a smoldering dispute has a chance to flare into the crisis of the week.

Unfortunately we have inherited many conflicts that the U.N. is deeply involved in resolving. In recent weeks several failed societies have required assertive multilateral action in the interest of their people and of international peace and security.

SOMALIA

In Somalia, the U.S. role has been vastly reduced. Other nations' troops carry the greater burden on the ground, as the events of the last 2 weeks have clearly shown. A true multilateral coalition of forces has gathered under the U.N. flag. Rather than pay most of the cost, as we did for the Unified Task Force (UNITAF) operation, the United States now will pay its share of the regular assessment for the U.N. peacekeeping force. The unprecedented and decisive actions of UNOSOM II since June 12 against Mr. Aideed's armed militia, their armed despots, and their strongholds were essential for the restoration of law and order in Mogadishu, the elimination of heavy weapons in the Mogadishu area, the resumption of humanitarian aid deliveries, the eventual resumption of the discussion on political reconciliation, and the fulfillment of Resolution 837's mandate.

If Mr. Aideed and other perpetrators of the June 5 killings are apprehended, the Security Council will ensure that they are held accountable under the rule of law. In any event, the arrest warrant for Mr. Aideed greatly restricts his mobility and effectiveness as a rogue leader, something I believe the vast majority of Somalis desperately want. As Admiral Howe has aptly stated, people are sick of rule by gun and extortion.

As UNOSOM II succeeds in disarming factions and heavy weapons are destroyed, the average Somali will be able to participate without fear in recreating a civil society. UNOSOM's prospects for promoting a durable and political settlement will then improve. There will may be further challenges to the authority of the U.N. peacekeeping force in Somalia. Rebuilding Somali society and promoting democracy in that strife-torn nation are very difficult endeavors; however, after the enormous effort made by the United States and other nations in the UNITAF operation to reverse famine in Somalia, I believe it would be folly now to permit conditions to deteriorate again.

Had there not been a U.N. response to the June 5 killings, the UN's credibility in Somalia would have been fatally undermined.

Turning to Cambodia, the U.N. organized elections in Cambodia were remarkably successful with a 90 percent voter turnout of registered voters. The U.N. peacekeeping operation in Cambodia, UNTAC, deserves considerable credit for this success. We believe that the Cambodian people have spoken with unmistakable clarity in saying they want an end to warfare. They want peace.

The process of reconciliation has already begun. I sincerely hope we have finally reached a stage where Cambodia is beginning to emerge from the category of failed societies.

At our initiative, the Security Council recently endorsed the results of the election, which has been certified as free and fair by the U.N., and requested UNTAC to continue to play its role during

the transition period in accordance with the Paris Agreements. The Council also requested that the Secretary General to report by mid-July on the possible future role for the U.N. and its specialized agencies after UNTAC's mandate expires.

Cambodia and the U.N. have now entered a critical stage in the transition to peace and democracy. We have come so far in Cambodia and it is essential that we stand by the Cambodian people and UNTAC and give democracy a chance to work there. We should anticipate that the U.N. will need to respond quickly and decisively to any attempt by any party to reverse the historic achievement of the elections.

MOZAMBIQUE

The U.N. is also involved in moving war-torn Mozambique toward lasting peace and multiparty democracy. The ambitious U.N. peacekeeping operation in Mozambique, ONUMOZ, is charged with coordinating several major aspects of the transition to peace, including: monitoring of the cease-fire, demobilization of the combatants, preparation for and monitoring of elections, and the crucial humanitarian assistance effort. Despite some early administrative and logistical problems, the U.N. operation is now fully operational, with over 6,000 "blue helmet" forces deployed from two dozen countries.

We are working with the U.N. Secretariat to determine what types of assistance the United States can provide at this very important time. We are encouraged that this devastated society can be resurrected, in large part because of a viable peacekeeping presence.

HAITI

The people of Haiti have waited a long time for the re-establishment of democratic government. The international community's political will to press for a settlement to restore democracy was evidenced in the tough U.N. sanctions resolution that went into effect yesterday. The Security Council acted to stop the flow of oil and arms to Haiti through mandatory, legally binding, worldwide sanctions.

The resolution breaks new ground in a number of areas. This is the first time U.N. sanctions of this kind have been imposed on a country in this hemisphere. It is the first time the Chapter VII sanctions have been imposed on a country not in civil conflict or at war with a neighbor, and it marks a new level of cooperation between the U.N. and regional organizations, in this case the Organization of American States. The United States is committed to seeing that international oil suppliers comply fully with this Resolution No. 841.

These four examples alone, I think, show the complexities and modern requirements of U.N. peacekeeping and enforcement actions. There are many more, but I would like to turn now to discuss some of the misperceptions about the U.N. and peacekeeping that continue to shape, erroneously in my opinion, our public discourse of this country's role in the United Nations.

There are, in short, myths about the U.N. that need to be exposed before they lead us in the wrong direction during this turbulent new era of world politics.

Myth No. 1: U.N. peacekeeping has nothing to do with U.S. national interest. I trust that my testimony before this subcommittee on May 3rd dispensed with that myth. Peacekeeping has become instrumental in meeting three fundamental imperatives of our national interest: economic, political, and humanitarian. As you have said, Mr. Chairman, the world continues to be a dangerous place.

Yet consider for a moment what the world and U.S. defense budgets would be today if there were no U.N. peacekeeping operations and the resultant power vacuums invited intervention by neighbors or would-be regional powers. Increasingly, we are faced with an often violent eruption of local or regional disputes that require the world's attention. And it is in this new world that peacekeeping and the modern responsibilities of collective security are essential to our security.

Myth No. 2: When the U.N. takes over a security operation, the United States can bail out. When the refrain is, "Let the U.N. handle it," that cannot mean a "Pass" for the United States. This country is a part of the United Nations—in fact, we are and should remain a very senior partner—and our participation and leadership are vital to the work of the U.N.

The alternatives—blissful isolation or costly duty as the world's cop—are unrealistic and unacceptable. The Somalia operation is a good example of how a continued U.S. role, minor compared to our initial UNITAF deployment, is part and parcel of letting the U.N. handle it.

Myth No. 3: Peacekeeping operations are consensual, avoid risks, and only prolong conflicts between governments. Many peacekeeping operations, particularly today in connection with failed societies, are deployed into internal conflicts or anarchy and thus are not dependent on conventional notions of consent from each warring party. Nor by any measure are peacekeeping operations risk-free.

Nine hundred and twenty-five peacekeeping soldiers have been killed in action in the course of U.N. history, and 528 of those have died in ongoing operations: 53 British, 49 French, 43 Irish, 35 Canadians, and 10 Americans have died in the line of duty. In the former Yugoslavia, 43 peacekeepers have been killed. One hundred and eighty-six have sacrificed their lives in Cyprus. The Somalia massacre of June 5 was a stark reminder of how exposed some peacekeepers are in the very hostile environments in which they are deployed. Half—14 of the 28 U.N. peacekeeping operations in U.N. history—have been terminated, most within 1 or 2 years of their creation.

While some peacekeeping operations may indeed encourage stalemate, the alternative often would be a bloody and costly conflict with severe risks of escalation that no one desires.

Myth No. 4: Peacekeeping is too expensive and ridden with fraud and mismanagement. I have testified and spoken out often about the ad hoc approaches that dominate peacekeeping operations. "Improvisation" is the single word that might best evoke the problems of peacekeeping. While the potential for fraud and mismanagement

exists, as it does in any large organization, the most pressing problems in U.N. peacekeeping relate to the sheer improvisational character of the system. This produces major gaps in institutional capacity on one hand and inefficiencies on the other.

In fact, the small peacekeeping staff at the U.N. headquarters is superlative and steps are now being taken to increase its size and effectiveness. The millions that are spent on peacekeeping operations, totaling more than \$3 billion in 1993, must be measured against the higher costs that result if conflicts are left to fester and explode.

I would like to add that the administration is taking the lead to enhance U.N. peacekeeping through implementation of important initiatives at the U.N. and within our own government. On May 28 the Security Council reached consensus on a list of peacekeeping reforms and plans for implementing them will be reported to us by the Secretary General in September. Within our Government the administration has been conducting an intensive interagency review since February of both the U.S. role in peacekeeping and the planning and managerial capabilities of the U.N. for peacekeeping. We anticipate that the review process will be concluded soon.

Finally, in September we hope there will be a ministerial level session of the Security Council to review peacekeeping.

Myth No. 5: The U.S. domestic agenda prevents us from leading and shaping a free and secure world. This is faulty logic at best and disastrous public policy at worse. The stability of the world economy and of regional and world politics is deeply integrated with U.S. interests and our economy. If we pursue a domestic agenda with blinders on, refusing to recognize the carnage to our left and the distant conflict to our right, eventually the cost of that disengagement, at a minimum, will be an additional financial burden that we must bear.

More likely, the cost will include U.S. forces with attendant potential loss of life. President Clinton and Secretary Christopher have always recognized that the foreign agenda is inseparable from our domestic agenda. The sooner we all grasp that fundamental fact the sooner we will recognize U.N. peacekeeping as one small but important piece in the overall effort to achieve global stability and prosperity, and to advance democracies and their typically market-oriented economies.

All of this points to the fact that we are engaged in a great dialogue, the conclusion of which no one can yet predict with certainty. In our effort to plot what role the United States should fill in this new era, we cannot abandon the responsibilities of a superpower. We cannot apply "old think" to how we judge peacekeeping operations and missions today and into the future. A whole new platter of issues confronts contributing nations, including deployments into internal conflicts and to protect humanitarian aid convoys. We need more minds pole-vaulting over the conventions of the past and directing this Nation's power into the 21st century.

Thank you very much.

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Albright appears in the appendix.]

PEACEKEEPING IN THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA AND PREVENTIVE
DEPLOYMENT IN MACEDONIA

Mr. LANTOS. Thank you very much, Madam Ambassador, for an excellent statement.

I would like to begin by asking you to comment on the decision of the President to place 300 American troops in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. It seems to some of us that Macedonia provides a perfect place for preventive action. There are no military hostilities going on currently, and by forceful positioning of significant troops we can prevent the Bosnian crisis from spreading.

Some of us would have preferred a NATO positioning, and a more significant one than this symbolic placement of 300 U.S. troops. But in any event, if you could comment on U.N. activities in the former Yugoslavia, we would appreciate it.

Ambassador ALBRIGHT. Yes. Mr. Chairman, I can assure you from the 5 months that I have spent in New York sitting in Security Council meetings, formal and informal, and various subgroupings of the Security Council that the issue of the former Yugoslavia occupies easily a quarter, if not a third, of our time. It is an issue that is troubling to everybody on the Security Council; whether it be the Permanent 5 because of the responsibilities of that grouping, or the nonaligned because of their responsibilities of representing the smaller states within the United Nations, or the non-nonaligned, to use a term that is purely a U.N. term, who are the other five members of the Security Council. So it is an issue that is front and foremost at all times.

At the current time the United Nations is fulfilling a myriad of resolutions that, in fact, are affecting life in the former Yugoslavia, whether it is the unperformed mandate in Croatia or specifically what is going on in Bosnia. The current set of efforts that are of great concern is the continuation of the humanitarian airdrops, the enforcement of the "no-fly" zone, the continuation of work establishing the War Crimes Tribunal, and the continuation of enforcement of that very tough sanctions resolution.

We are also working very hard to fulfill the various parts of what is known as the Joint Action Plan, which was signed in Washington by the Permanent 4 plus Spain, to take some immediate steps to deal with the problems in Yugoslavia and to work toward an ultimate equitable settlement. That has included passing the safe areas resolution and working on a monitors resolution. Those are the issues that are in train.

On the safe areas resolution specifically, we have asked the Secretary General to give us a report on how he would pull together the troops that include—there are to be 7500 troops that are known as the light option for protecting the safe areas. In New York there is a meeting happening either as we speak or this afternoon in which the contributing countries are going to be talking to the Secretariat to try to press them to move forward more actively on making sure that the safe areas resolution goes into play.

That is the current thinking that is going on, as you asked the general question on Yugoslavia.

On Macedonia, the issue of Macedonia is part of the Joint Action Plan. The goal of the Joint Action Plan was threefold: to stop the

fighting, to limit the conflict, and to keep pressure on the Serbs. Placing the 300 monitors into Macedonia is part of containing the conflict, and the Security Council agreed to that and we are in the process of moving forward with that.

On your question about NATO's role there, I think that those are issues that are up for discussion, the whole connection between NATO and the United Nations on those series of issues that I mentioned to you before: "no-fly" zone enforcement, safe areas. There is an increasingly close relationship between the United Nations and NATO in moving forward the agenda.

STATUS OF THE VANCE-OWEN PLAN

Mr. LANTOS. Madam Ambassador, as you know, I had long advocated, long before you took office or President Clinton took office, the use of NATO as a deterrent in the former Yugoslavia, and I am convinced that had NATO been used this tragedy could have been avoided. But I think we need to deal with the situation as we find it. It seems to some of us at least that the original plan, which I think was fairly unrealistic, by Mr. Vance and Mr. Owen, of establishing this very complex 10-canton framework has unraveled as we predicted. Whatever attempt there is to paper over the problems and deal with the facade, it seems to some of us that the Serbian cantons will join Serbia, the Croatian cantons will join Croatia, and there will be a tiny rump Bosnia which is unlikely to be a viable entity.

Are there any negotiations, any behind-the-scene discussions going on about the possibility of establishing a U.N. trusteeship for Bosnia to at least prevent further human suffering in that region?

Ambassador ALBRIGHT. Mr. Chairman, I think that we are all deeply troubled by the horrors of what has happened on the ground in the former Yugoslavia, and I agree with you that had something been done earlier it might have been possible to prevent what is one of the most horrible events in Europe in half a century.

Regarding the status of the Vance-Owen Plan, as you know, there are negotiations going on in Geneva on the options of looking at some other way. Those negotiations are very much in progress and it is very hard to comment on what their ultimate outcome will be. I have to tell you that any number of suggestions have come up about what to do about what might be the remnants, though people don't want to talk about it in that way. I have heard in outside circles, if I might put it that way, the idea that you have raised in terms of a trusteeship, but I have not heard it raised within the Security Council.

Mr. LANTOS. Let me deal with some of the myths that you have raised. The first one is U.N. peacekeeping has nothing to do with U.S. national interests. You certainly have effectively disposed of that myth. Clearly U.N. peacekeeping provides an opportunity for us to involve others in an operation which we would otherwise either ignore for a while at great cost, or would have to undertake by ourselves.

The second myth that you mentioned, which I think is particularly relevant at the moment to Somalia, is that when the United Nations takes over a security operation the United States can bail out. We had on the floor of the House of Representatives a very

lively debate not too long ago where some of our colleagues argued that the time for us has now come to bail out, while others of us maintained that it is our responsibility to continue to play some part in a collective effort so that the initial measures undertaken by President Bush would, in fact, succeed in the long run. I have no difficulty with that.

I do want to deal with your very effective presentation concerning your Myth No. 3, that peacekeeping operations invariably avoid all risks. You are saying that 925 peacekeeping soldiers have been killed in action in the course of U.N. history, and 528 of those have died in ongoing operations. These are tragic figures, as they always are when we are dealing with loss of lives. They must be contrasted to tens of thousands of individuals dying in a single battle during the second world war. They must be contrasted with the 150,000 plus, mainly civilians, who have been killed in the former Yugoslavia alone during the course of the last 2 years.

So I think it is very helpful for you to point out that U.N. peacekeeping, peacemaking, peace-enforcement operations are not risk-free, but the physical tragedies involved in these operations are infinitesimal compared to uncontrolled warfare or ethnic cleansing or civil war, as we have seen.

SECURITY COUNCIL MEMBERSHIP FOR GERMANY AND JAPAN?

Before we have to break for our vote, I do want to ask a specific question concerning Germany and Japan. You have indicated, on behalf of our Government I take it, that we favor Germany and Japan joining the U.N. Security Council, and I take it you are currently exploring that option. Let me advise you, Madam Ambassador, and I suspect I speak for many of my colleagues, that we should not even consider the possibility of Germany and Japan joining the Security Council with our approval unless Germany and Japan assume full responsibility as major global powers both physically and financially in U.N. peacekeeping and peace-making and peace-enforcement operations.

I find it unconscionable that a half a century after the second world war there should still be a major debate in both Germany and Japan as to whether it is appropriate for them to contribute their forces to U.N. peacekeeping operations. I think it is unconscionable to expect the American taxpayer and the American family to continue to carry that load while Germany and Japan for historic reasons choose to stay out.

So I would be grateful if you would comment on this issue because, while we are wide open to exploring modifications in the nature of the Security Council and the composition of the Security Council this will have to be preceded by an unqualified German and Japanese commitment to carry their fair share of the financial and the physical load of peacekeeping operations.

Ambassador ALBRIGHT. Mr. Chairman, we have undertaken the proposals to expand the Security Council because we believe that it is very important generally to make the United Nations reflective of the needs of the current world and to bring it to its founders 1945 hopes and, beyond that, to be able to fulfill its responsibilities as we move into the 21st century.

The Security Council has been the linchpin of the United Nations system, and I won't review the entire history of it with you, but it has at various times been a hamstrung organization or a debating society. It has become increasingly, I think, effective in terms of being able to fulfill its role. It is our sense that because the Security Council is so crucial to the whole functioning of the U.N., it ought to be more reflective of the power structure within the world. Therefore, bringing the major economic powers, Germany and Japan, into that makes a great deal of sense to us.

This proposal is not without controversy because within the Security Council itself and also among other members of the United Nations it is viewed as giving too much power to Europe since, in effect, if you count Russia also as a European power there would be four European countries. So there are questions about it.

The other reason we believe this issue ought to be raised is, as you point out, that those two countries, given their wealth and their prominence, should be made to bear responsibility for the keeping of the peace within the international system. Their problems as you describe them are due to their constitutional arrangements which we had something to do with at the end of the second world war.

As you know, it is very difficult for one country to discuss the internal affairs of another in this particular way. The Germans are going through their political discussion on this, and the German Supreme Court has remanded back to the political system questions about how German troops could be used in Somalia. It is very much a part of the German political debate.

We will certainly keep your comments in mind because the purpose of our proposal is to, in effect, make it necessary and lure, in some ways, Germany and Japan into their roles which we believe are to be responsible contributing members to the maintenance of peace and security.

U.S. SHARE OF PEACEKEEPING COSTS DISPROPORTIONATE

Mr. LANTOS. I appreciate this answer. And let me just say before we take a recess that it is the view of many of us in the Congress that the United States pays a disproportionate share of peacekeeping costs and we will have to ask you as our representative in the U.N. to carry that point of view to your colleagues. I don't think that Congress will long continue paying a share of peacekeeping costs that is disproportionate to the current economic weight of the United States in this world. And we particularly are anxious to see wealthy nations that have been enormous beneficiaries of U.N. peacekeeping, and I have in mind particularly Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, pay their proper share and recognize their unique responsibility of gratitude for the collective action which resulted in their remaining as sovereign states.

The subcommittee will stand in recess for 5 minutes.

[Recess.]

Mr. LANTOS. The subcommittee will resume. Apparently my elevator is faster than that of my colleagues, so I will have one more question I would like to ask you.

"ASSERTIVE MULTILATERALISM"

You make the point, Madam Ambassador, that it is a myth that the U.S. domestic agenda prevents us from leading and shaping a free and secure world, and I certainly fully agree with you. I think we have to walk and chew gum at the same time, and this is no period in human history when we can say "Stop the world, I want to get off." But I do want to ask one more question about what you call assertive multilateralism, which a writer in the *Washington Post* calls almost an oxymoron because multilateralism means, really, the lowest common denominator.

The question was asked whether multilateralism is merely a cover for a new isolationism. Assertive multilateralism was described in the *Post* as only one step removed from being an oxymoron since multilateralism means getting everybody's concurrence and approval which sort of dilutes the possibility of effective action, as we have clearly seen in the Yugoslavia case. The argument against using NATO is that any member nation could have vetoed participation by NATO.

How do you make assertive multilateralism in fact assertive?

Ambassador ALBRIGHT. First of all, I am delighted to be able to say that I totally disagree with the fact that it is an oxymoron. It is an example, I think, of people who are into "old think" rather than looking at things in new ways.

Mr. LANTOS. You did see the op-ed piece in the *Washington Post*?

Ambassador ALBRIGHT. I certainly did. I also figured since Pat Buchanan felt that, on the contrary, multilateralism would engage Americans where they shouldn't be, there must be something right about the definition.

So my sense here is that we are into a new era, and to me multilateralism provides a multiplier effect to countries when they get together for a common purpose, to be able to do more about issues that we generally as an international community find unacceptable.

If I might go back to my four groups.

Mr. LANTOS. Please.

Ambassador ALBRIGHT. What I think has to happen is that the largest group of countries, those that have a stake in the international system, have to do the following things with the other three groups: reform the rogue states, receive the new democracies, and restore the failed states. That, I think, can only be done through multilateralism, because the job is so large it has to be done in conjunction with others.

It has been my sense that the United States has three options here. We can be the world's cop, which frankly most of the world would like us to be because we are so good at it, but all of you that sit up here know full well that our people don't want us to do that alone. We could be an ostrich, which a lot of our people would like us to be because we do have such a very large domestic agenda. That, however, we know from looking at the problems out in the world, is an impossibility. So our option here is to be a partner. The fancy word is "multilateral," but the ordinary word is "partner." I fully believe that it is my job at the U.N. and the job of all of us within the foreign policy structure to put an adjective with

the partner—senior, managing, leading, whatever way you want to phrase it. So the term assertive multilateralism comes from having a leadership role within a multilateral setting to deal with the problems that we have to deal with.

Now part of the problem here, I think, and this is why some of the writers who are not engaged in "new think" are having such difficulty hearing you, is that our problems are very different today. During the last hearing you talked about collective security and today you are talking about peacekeeping, but we also have to talk about preventive diplomacy. That is a whole other part of peacekeeping, peacemaking, peace-building, which requires partners to try to develop the societies so that they aren't involved in these dreadful wars. It also involves working on their environmental problems, their population problems, their health problems—all of which require multilateral action.

It doesn't take a rocket scientist to understand that you can't deal with environmental issues alone. Assertive multilateralism to me is using the new setting of an international community to bring about agendas that are good not only for the United States, but the entire world by asserting American leadership within that particular setting and realizing assertive multilateralism has a multiplier effect, and is definitely not an oxymoron.

Mr. LANTOS. It is an excellent explanation, Madam Ambassador. Congressman Gilman.

Mr. GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Madam Ambassador, with regard to assertive multilateralism some writers have said it is really an excuse for us to duck the problems and to sort of avoid the leadership role. Do you agree with that kind of analysis?

Ambassador ALBRIGHT. No, I do not. I see assertive multilateralism as a way for us to take a leadership role along with others. The arguments against it take, in effect, opposite sides: either that, as Chairman Lantos said, it is viewed as weakening us, or it is involving us in issues that we don't want to undertake. I think that what it does is place us in a position of responsibility along with our partners so that we don't have to do everything alone. It also provides us with the strength of the others and does not engage us in situations by ourselves or withdraw us from situations or isolationists.

I have a serious problem with viewing the United States in the 21st century as either being the cop or having our heads buried in the sand. However, there is no question that cops are needed, therefore I would rather be on that beat with other countries than by myself or not on it at all.

Well then, since we're discussing it, let's talk about the need for cops—the thousands of U.N. peacekeeping forces spread around the world today. Someone said about 90,000 now are engaged in peacekeeping, and yet we have the Canadian general, General Maurice Auriel, the top U.N. military adviser for peacekeeping, saying you can't expect an organization that is already overworked to come up all of a sudden with a perfect new system at the same time it has to develop from within. We also have the comments made by another commander, Major General MacKenzie, who said, "Don't get in trouble after 5 p.m. or Saturday and Sunday. There is no one

to answer the phone." It seems to me we have got a lot to do to have an effective peacekeeping force, a U.N. multilateral assertive force. We are a long way from developing that.

NEED TO IMPROVE OVERALL PEACEKEEPING SYSTEM

Mr. GILMAN. If we are going to be involved in that type of activity, then we certainly need more than just a few civilians back in the U.N. in New York City to direct that kind of an effort. What are we going to do to make it an effective police force? If you want cops out there on the beat, they have to be trained and they certainly need proper leadership back at the home base.

Ambassador ALBRIGHT. No question about that, Congressman Gilman. These are the issues that my mission with the support, obviously, of the entire U.S. Government is very involved in trying to answer. Let me, if I might, take a minute on that.

There are, at the moment, about 80,000 peacekeepers out there. The number of peacekeeping missions has increased radically as there has been a tendency to let the U.N. do it. There is a sense that there are regional disputes and that we the international community believe that the U.N. should do it. There is no doubt in anybody's mind that the peacekeeping system within the U.N. is severely strained. It is overworked and the analogy about using the phone is something that I have discussed. The U.N. has become the global 911 number and we are afraid that either the line will be busy or out of order.

So what we are doing is working hard with the U.N. peacekeeping operation within the Secretariat to try to make it work instead of improvising. A recent speech I gave at the Council on Foreign Relations, which I will submit for the record, describes a whole series of allegations about how they cobble together these peacekeeping operations. They start from scratch every time. The Secretary General literally goes around with a tin cup and says he needs a battalion from here and a brigade from there and cobbles it all together. That is unacceptable. If we are going to have the U.N. play this role, as you said, Congressman Gilman, they have to be properly prepared and staffed.

What I would hope, and I have issued this invitation privately and informally but I do so publicly now, is that all of you would come up to New York to see what the operation looks like and what we are doing as the U.S. Government to help give greater support. We are working on that because we truly do believe what you have said: if they are going to do it they have to be trained, and that is a story in the making.

What, fortunately or unfortunately, is happening is that people are learning from mistakes, so that mistakes that are made in one operation are rectified. It is my feeling as we examine the latest operations in Somalia over the last 2 weeks that people will think it worked pretty well.

U.S. FORCES IN SOMALIA

Mr. GILMAN. Well, I am glad you raise Somalia. I have a question regarding Somalia, Madam Ambassador. At the time this committee and the House were considering whether to authorize a continued U.S. presence in Somalia about a month ago, we received

assurances from the State Department that a plan was in place to gradually drawdown our U.S. forces in Somalia over the next 6 months and to withdraw all of our forces from that country within the 17-month period.

Since that time there has been serious fighting in Somalia that wasn't contemplated at the time that we considered this issue. I also note in your Myth No. 2 you suggest that the U.N. peacekeeping operations will require continued U.S. involvement. In light of these recent events in Somalia and your Myth No. 2, is the 17-month plan for withdrawing our forces still on track or has our involvement truly become open-ended now?

Ambassador ALBRIGHT. No. To the best of my knowledge, Congressman Gilman, we are still on the same track. Obviously, the events of the last 2 weeks were unexpected, but there are 23 other countries participating in UNOSOM II. We expect them to take a greater and greater role in what is going on, and when we were pressed previously to keep troops there longer we declined. So we, in effect, are—to the best of my knowledge—on the same track.

Mr. GILMAN. So we have your assurance that at the end of 17 months we will be out of Somalia?

Ambassador ALBRIGHT. Well, to the best of my knowledge, yes.

Mr. GILMAN. Of course, my resolution said we have done our job, the humanitarian job, and we should get our troops out as quickly as possible now so they will no longer be vulnerable to the hostility that has been ongoing. I hope that we will maintain that limitation at least for a 17-month period.

I thank you for your testimony. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. LANTOS. Thank you very much. Congressman McCloskey.

Mr. MCCLOSKEY. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Welcome, Ambassador. Good to see you again. As an aside, I might just say I respect you so much, so immensely and I am really rooting for you in your work because I think I understand very well your values and at least personal policy preferences and observations.

That being said as an aside, I just want to say I just got back from 2 days in Zagreb. I had a chance for a 2-hour briefing from UNPROFOR at High Command there. Particularly General Gudreau pointed out, and I don't need an answer on this because I want to emphasize—or ask about one or two other things. But I was amazed to hear from General Gudreau that some 70 percent of his forces there have not been paid a dime in compensation for 5 months. So, in essence, we see some units, particularly African units, that are leaving. Obviously, this has implications that are massive for U.N. security and international cooperative efforts. There are some things we need to do. I would love to be able to talk with you later or communicate on those concerns.

But it was interesting to me that Mr. Gilman mentioned General MacKenzie. General MacKenzie has been before the Congress lately, for example, appearing before the Armed Services Committee, on which I serve, with an idea, obviously, toward dampening any idea of endorsing or encouraging the Clinton policy and the stated policy preference of lifting the arms embargo and the air strikes. MacKenzie said early in this testimony that this is just a conflict between serial killers: one has killed 15, one has killed 10, one has killed 5. Therefore why should we help anyone?

At that point, quite frankly—and I have a lot of stomach for give and take—I was so revolted, and I have been through this issue so much, that I had to leave the hearing. I didn't want to deal with a person, that I sensed, of those values. Since that time—also I might say with the implications for facing up to the genocide issue and the fact that the Serbs have been the major aggressors, international aggressors and perpetrators of genocide in all this.

Since that time, lo and behold, from Roy Guttman in *Newsday* we see the verified reports submitted to by none other than MacKenzie that yes, he is on the Serb payroll. Now the former UNPROFOR High Commander in Bosnia is now traipsing the world under false pretenses doing the political work, if you will, of the Serbs. Now Boutros-Ghali, in the Guttman story, when asked about that said there was nothing the matter with that. In essence, no concern. Perfectly proper conduct.

Would you have a concern on that, or would the United States have a concern to be raised within U.N. auspices that this is not appropriate behavior and there may have to be laws or regulations similar to our lobbying statutes with people leaving the Federal Government and the Congress?

Ambassador ALBRIGHT. Well, you raise a very interesting issue. I think that I have no way of knowing about what General MacKenzie, though I certainly take what you say to be correct. I think we would have to look into that. I think you raise a very important point, and may I say that we will look into that.

OPTION OF LIFTING THE ARMS EMBARGO

Mr. MCCLOSKEY. I appreciate that. One other question.

I have been so, at one point, enthused and heartened by the stated, the earlier stated Clinton-Christopher policy of air strikes and lifting the arms embargo. In recent weeks, obviously, with the, I guess—I hate to use the term “failure”—but the overall failure of the Christopher mission, obviously Europe did not go along with this. In recent days we see Kohl bringing up a letter, I guess Monday or Tuesday, from the President at the EC meeting urging him to push lifting the arms embargo, which is fine with me. I sort of wish the President were doing it more forcefully and personally. But when this is voted down with a major statement from John Major backing it up, the State Department is saying, Well, in essence, it was not a matter of major import to us. It was a routine communication and we have had no great stake—and I am paraphrasing but it is all there in a very extensive *New York Times* article, I believe, by Elaine Scialino. It, in essence, made little or no difference. So that is a slight exaggeration maybe for effect or, you know, speaking without notes.

Could you comment on that? It just seems to me that something so important as U.S. policy in lifting the arms embargo, if we are going to continue to state it, should we not state it forcefully and say this is a matter of little, or more than nominal interest to us?

Ambassador ALBRIGHT. Congressman McCloskey, on the issue of the arms embargo, the President, the Secretary of State, and I, as well as other officials have consistently said that our preferred policy has been to lift the embargo. I said it as recently as yesterday afternoon, and it is a policy that we are pursuing.

This came up earlier in terms of how we operate within an international organization. The embargo is an embargo put into place by the United Nations. There we are within the Security Council, a member of Permanent 5, and the others are disagreeing with us on it. That does not prevent us from stating our position whenever and wherever we can, and we are, in effect, doing that, and we will continue to do that.

Mr. MCCLOSKEY. Now that would still be the preferred policy even given this tripartite policy being considered in—tripartition policy being considered in Geneva now?

Ambassador ALBRIGHT. It is our preferred policy; yes.

Mr. MCCLOSKEY. You know this committee has reported out and the House has passed a resolution, or part of the foreign aid authorization bill saying that we would back the President in the event he would, even if necessary unilaterally, lift the arms embargo. So I think if the President were to speak out and act in regard to that policy he would receive very significant backing, Madam Ambassador.

Ambassador ALBRIGHT. Congressman McCloskey, the President addressed this in his press conference when he basically reiterated the fact that this is an international embargo and we are not—

Mr. MCCLOSKEY. I understand that. But I want to steer you to the idea that legislation and the support that he would get for more assertive action in this regard.

Thank you very much, Madam Ambassador.

Mr. LANTOS. Thank you very much. Congresswoman Snowe.

U.S. TROOPS IN MACEDONIA: CONTAINING THE CONFLICT

Ms. SNOWE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to welcome you, Madam Ambassador, to our subcommittee.

I have several questions regarding our role in international peacekeeping and I have a number of concerns. But let me start—and I think the question is sort of a premise to a more general question about the greater role that we will be performing with respect to peacekeeping, how much it is going to cost? I see an evolution of our role and the role of other countries in terms of peacekeeping and the number continues to increase. But let's talk about Macedonia for a moment.

Less than 2 weeks ago the administration has announced sending 300 combat troops to Macedonia, a republic that we do not recognize, in order to deter Serbian aggression. I would like to ask you several questions in that respect because obviously my concern is, and a number of my colleagues have sent a letter to the President indicating this concern, that we don't want to have our troops serving as a human tripwire in Macedonia, and especially since there are so few. I am not suggesting we should have a larger contingent, but it obviously does invite certain problems.

It reminds me of a historical anecdote from before the First World War when the British and the French were first discussing how many British troops should be sent to France to help deter a potential German attack. A British official asked General Foch what the smallest British military force the French would need, and General Foch instantly responded. He said, "One single soldier and we would take good care that he was killed."

Well, the point, obviously, is that the death of one single soldier would be enough to solidify our commitment. That was the indication, obviously, with that quote from World War I. I guess the point is that they are a magnet and we have not yet heard a clear assessment from the administration with respect to the mission exactly what we hope to accomplish. What would be the final outcome should something happen? I think that we, obviously, need to understand the full implications of the mission of these 300 troops.

Will 300 be enough? Are we considering sending more American troops? Will Congress be consulted in the future with respect to sending more troops in this instance or in other instances?

And that gets to the larger question about our role in international peacekeeping, but I would first like to have you answer the questions, if you can, with respect to these troops that have been sent to Macedonia.

Ambassador ALBRIGHT. Yes. Congresswoman, let me just put into context that contingent that went there—they are monitors, by the way. They are there, as I mentioned, as part of our Joint Action Plan program that we signed, or agreed to with our Allies about how to take immediate steps within the former Yugoslav context on three particular areas: (1) to stop the killing, (2) to contain the conflict, and (3) to keep pressure on the Serbs.

The placement of the 300 monitors within Macedonia has to do with containing the conflict. It is very clear, I think, in terms of how international problems develop in the world today to state what the case is and what our position is symbolically as much as anything: we find it unacceptable for this conflict to spread further.

There is a Scandinavian contingent already in Macedonia, and we are going to add 300 monitors there, not to be a tripwire but to symbolize the determination of the international community, of which we are a part, not to allow this to spread. We believe that it is an important act to do this and it is commensurate with our role as members in good standing of the international community.

I think the larger question here, and a question about which I welcome having a dialogue, is how, in effect, the United States as one of the leading members of the community fulfills its responsibilities within an international context. There are troops from a large number of companies within the former Yugoslavia serving in UNPROFOR under mandates of the United Nations. We have not had ground troops in former Yugoslavia, and we do not and will not as the problem is currently framed. We are fulfilling part of what we see as our international responsibility to prevent this horrible conflict from spreading.

We believe, and I know that a number of you do, that the crisis in Yugoslavia would be much worse if it became a Balkan crisis. One of the things that I talked about in terms of peacekeeping, is the part that we have not all paid enough attention to—preventive diplomacy, trying to get at a conflict before it gets worse. That is part of the mandate of these 300 monitors in Macedonia.

NEW ROLES FOR PEACEKEEPERS AND CONGRESSIONAL CONSULTATION

Ms. SNOWE. I understand, you know, making reference to the idea that they will be symbolic. But the fact is ultimately there could be casualties, so it could be a very real situation. And where

do we go from there, I guess, is my concern? I think we understand the need to prevent the spread of the crisis in the Balkans. The point is what do we do in this instance by sending 300 troops to Macedonia and something does happen. We have not heard a clear presentation from the administration with respect to their role. What is ultimately going to be the outcome? If something should go wrong, would we be required to send more? Would we be consulted in that instance if we are to send more, which gets again to the bigger question about peacekeeping? At what point are we consulted every time we have troops sent to areas of conflicts? And that seems to becoming more the direction that we are taking with respect to peacekeeping rather than less.

Ambassador ALBRIGHT. Well, we see Congress as a partner in all the activities that we undertake, but, you probably know this, according to the United Nations Participation Act, as Commander-in-Chief, the President has the prerogative to send up to 1,000 American troops into a particular area to assist in peacekeeping and United Nations activities.

I don't blame you for being troubled. We are all troubled by this conflict. However, as members of the United Nations and as part of an international community, as we look out at what the potentials, and I do speak about potentials, in the Balkans are if this were to spread, we believe that it is a very important symbol on the part of American commitment to make sure—as a part of this Joint Action Plan—that this does not spread.

Ms. SNOWE. Well, I don't know. Maybe I am seeing it wrong, but I see that the mission and the role of our peacekeeping forces have dramatically changed from previous occasions from rather just enforcing peacekeeping, monitoring a truce, for example, that we are now having to take, you know, positions against as we have in Somalia with military groups. So the point is the fact that we are taking different kinds of actions with respect to the peacekeeping role, obviously it has evolved and now we have got the permanent members of the Security Council now involved in peacekeeping by providing our military and their military as part of the peacekeeping forces. So that has changed as well. So I see a different direction altogether that should raise some concerns and a red flag in terms of exactly what do we want as an outcome in each of these missions now, which I think heretofore has been entirely different.

Ambassador ALBRIGHT. Well, perhaps you were out of the room when I said this, but I really do believe that peacekeeping and the American role within multilateral organizations has changed. The world is entirely different, and you and we and the American people are going to be asked to think about this and talk about it, about what our position is going to be vis-a-vis the various potential confrontations in the world.

I think we need to have a dialogue about where it is important to us, why it is important to us, what is the role of the United States. I think there are genuine questions that we all have. There are those people who think that we shouldn't have a role at all. There are those who are critical of the fact that we are not robust enough. To me these are very legitimate questions which come about as a result of the fact that we are still thinking in terms that are of the previous problems and not of the new ones.

As I mention in my testimony, there are myths that peacekeeping per se is always easy. It is not easy. The situations are different. I used to teach about this, and it used to be that you would say as a matter of just kind of the mantra that you never go into a country unless both the sides agree that you should be there, so that you are basically there kind of guarding the borders and keeping people separated.

It is very different scene now. We are going into countries where there are no clear lines of demarcation. The questions that I think we all need to ask ourselves are which and why anyone of these conflagrations is of concern to us. I happen to believe, and I think a number of you do also, that the United States must continue to be a world power, but we cannot, nor do we want to, do it alone.

So to me—and I obviously say this because I sit up there within a multilateral organization—to me the best way to accomplish our responsibilities and to make a better world is with our partners in various operations. Peacekeeping at the moment is the most visible of them, but there are a whole series of others.

This is how we have to begin to think about what our commitments are within the international community. I believe that we should all be talking about it more. This is why I have been giving speeches on the subject, why I welcome the invitation to testify, because we are cutting into new territory here. This is new. When Congressman Gilman asks me about the peacekeeping setup in New York, how fragile and improvised it is, it is because we are cutting out into uncharted, new territory, and I think we all need to talk about it. Your questions are very legitimate ones.

Ms. SNOWE. Thank you.

Mr. LANTOS. Congressman Sawyer.

COORDINATING INSTRUMENTS FOR COLLECTIVE SECURITY

Mr. SAWYER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me just follow on in the direction that your conversation is taking right now. You have spoken several times now about the improvisational character of peacekeeping operations in a changed world and the importance, not just of traditional forums, but peacemaking, preventive diplomacy, and perhaps even early warning systems aimed at a different kind of world.

It has become almost a commonplace to talk about the potential for the spread of the kind of conflagration that exists in the former Yugoslavia. But we have a far larger range of potential disruptions in the world than that alone. What comes to mind immediately is not only the linear extension of Yugoslavia, but an issue that we have had enormous difficulty even talking about here in recent weeks—the conflict in Kashmir on the frontier between Pakistan and India. Another issue that we have talked very little about is Liberia, where the conflict involves refugees, killings, and tortures on a scale approaching that of Yugoslavia.

We have a range of potential activities that is vast. In a world where we cannot afford institutional overload, how do we take those instrumentalities that are within our grasp and begin to structure and target them best and most flexibly to deal with a diverse world.

Ambassador ALBRIGHT. Well, you pose appropriately the complexity of the problem because these are entirely new kinds of conditions which will create the conflagrations where they are. I think that first of all we have to think in terms of the priorities of these issues, which is not easy, because within an international community the priorities are different. I have been speaking about, and I have done this in Security Council meetings, the fact that we focus on what I call the television wars. There are millions of people dying in the nontelevision wars and they are of concern to people, obviously, who know about what is going on in Angola, Liberia, you mentioned Kashmir, a whole series of issues. We have to figure out how we deal with those.

What has been so interesting about the Haitian issue, was that there was quite a lot of discussion within the Security Council about whether it was appropriate for the Security Council to be dealing with Haiti because this was a conflict in one country and that is not something that normally comes under Chapter VII. So we were discussing whether it was a threat to security, and we said that it was because of the refugee impact and in terms of what it does.

So, as I said earlier, we keep building a record here of what is appropriate and what is not. We are starting to figure out who can do what, a division of labor. One of the parts of the discussion that takes place is whether a regional organization could deal with the issue when the international organization cannot. So Haiti is a combination, an interesting one, and in some ways in the eyes of one human being, Dr. Caputo, who was the U.N. negotiator and the OAS negotiator. It is an attempt to meld the responsibilities of a regional organization with the international one.

There is an attempt to try to get the OAU to be more active in certain areas in Africa, to try to have this division of labor. So I think we are going to be looking at ways to kind of cut up the pie, to divide up who does what.

The other part of it is that we have to look at the problems before they hit the screen. The problems of refugees—health, environment, population issues that are there not so far beneath the surface but are creating these problems—there we have a variety of organizations that also have to be beefed up in order to deal with those problems.

Mr. SAWYER. Mr. Chairman, I realize you have been very flexible with the time.

Mr. LANTOS. Madam Ambassador, we are deeply grateful to you for your excellent insights, and we look forward to the pleasure of having you back again before long.

This hearing is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 12:46 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned, to reconvene on Tuesday, September 21, at 1 p.m.]



U.S. PARTICIPATION IN UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS

TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 21, 1993

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL SECURITY,
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS,
Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 1 p.m. in room 2255, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Tom Lantos (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Mr. LANTOS. The Subcommittee on International Security, International Organizations and Human Rights will come to order.

Today the subcommittee holds the second in its series of hearings on U.S. participation in U.N. peacekeeping activities. As the Nation moves toward a redefinition of vital U.S. interests in the post-cold war world and discusses how best to defend these interests, the role of the United States in international peacekeeping has become a hotly contested topic. That is because a determination of the role of peacekeeping in U.S. foreign policy entails reaching decisions on a whole range of fundamental questions.

One basic question is the optimal tradeoff between unilateral and multilateral intervention abroad. Almost everyone agrees that the United States cannot single-handedly take on all of the world's hot spots; that would be neither feasible nor advisable. We need to work in concert with our allies and other members of the international community whenever we can. Yet most Americans would also agree that there will be times when we should be prepared to go it alone, if necessary.

There will also be times, as demonstrated by the Gulf War, when it will take American leadership to galvanize the international community into action. In Bosnia, for instance, where the United States has deferred to its European allies on many key decisions, the muddled and ineffective response has led many observers to wonder if U.S. leadership is an absolute prerequisite for any successful multilateral peacekeeping operation.

Another fundamental question is whether it would be useful to codify the situations under which peacekeepers could be committed to the field or whether these decisions should be made on a case-by-case basis. The administration is in the process of devising guidelines for U.S. troop participation in U.N. peacekeeping, and press reports have stated that in its peacekeeping document, it opts for decisions on a case-by-case basis. Yet, U.N. Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali and others are pressing for member states

to commit forces in advance so that they can be called up rapidly before a conflict becomes widespread. The United Nations also needs to begin practicing triage on requests for peacekeeping missions in order to reign in the exponential growth of this expensive and increasingly dangerous activity.

Other key questions include the role of regional security organizations, such as NATO, in international peacekeeping, and the necessity to reorganize and improve the U.N.'s peacekeeping infrastructure in order to enable the organization to play the global umpire role its membership is increasingly demanding of it. And, of course, given our concerns about our assessed contributions for peacekeeping, we must ask where is the funding going to come from for new operations, let alone for ongoing ones?

The Congress is also concerned about the confusion wrought by the qualitative changes in recent peacekeeping operations. In the past, peacekeeping missions have clear mandates and took place under clear-cut rules of engagement: a cease-fire was in effect, the combatants had previously agreed to the deployment of U.N. monitors, and the U.N. forces acted as a neutral buffer. Those conditions are a far cry from the situation on the ground in Somalia where the U.N. is actively hunting down one of the combatants, or in Bosnia, where the initiation of a U.N. humanitarian mission was seen as a provocation by the main aggressor, who was unwilling to stop the fighting and work toward a settlement of the conflict. As a result, many now ask whether the Bosnian relief effort, though well intentioned, has turned out to be more of a hindrance than a help to the besieged people it was meant to assist.

These experiences underscore the urgent need to revise the rules of engagement and the mandates of contemporary peacekeeping operations in order to make them compatible with the more assertive peace-building and peace-enforcement missions which the U.N. is now undertaking.

On the other hand, many military observers and others question the wisdom of waging war to win peace. Many express unease with the U.N. policy of the graduated use of force, arguing that the decisive, swift application of force would be more effective, even in the pursuit of limited goals.

The continuing dialogue surrounding military doctrine and peacekeeping is also an issue we wish to examine today.

There are now 14 United Nations peacekeeping operations in effect around the globe with about 80,000 troops drawn from 74 separate nations. American forces are in Macedonia and Somalia.

Moreover, in consultation with our NATO allies, we are drawing up contingency plans to provide air support in Bosnia, if needed, and to contribute U.S. troops to a force of NATO peacekeepers which would enforce an eventual peace accord.

So, it is, indeed, appropriate that we discuss these issues today because U.N. peacekeeping is going to loom larger and larger in the policy discussions of our Nation.

We are very fortunate to have with us two eminent thinkers on the subject, Sir Brian Urquhart, former U.N. Under Secretary General for Special Political Affairs, and currently a scholar-in-residence with the Ford Foundation. He was present at the creation of

U.N. peacekeeping and guided its development ably for many years.

We are also delighted to have Colonel Harry Summers, a U.S. Army officer who retired after giving this Nation distinguished service, and was decorated on the battlefield for valor; but whose second career as a distinguished author and columnist suggest that the pen is, indeed, in some respects, mightier than the sword.

We are delighted to have you with us. And before we ask you to make your presentation, I would like to call on my good friend and distinguished colleague from Nebraska, the Ranking Republican of the subcommittee, for any opening remarks he would like to make.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Lantos follows:]

Opening Statement of Hon. Tom Lantos

U.S. Participation in UN Peacekeeping Activities - Part II
September 21, 1993

Today the Subcommittee holds the second in its series of hearings on U.S. participation in UN peacekeeping activities. As the nation moves toward a redefinition of U.S. vital interests in the post-Cold war world and discusses how best to defend these interests, the role of the United States in international peacekeeping has become a hotly contested topic. That is because a determination of the role of peacekeeping in U.S. foreign policy entails reaching decisions on many fundamental questions.

One basic question is the optimal trade-off between unilateral and multilateral intervention abroad. Almost everyone agrees that the United States cannot single-handedly take on all of the world's hot spots -- it is neither feasible nor advisable. We need to work in concert with our allies and other members of the international community whenever we can. Yet most Americans would also agree that there will be times when we should be prepared to go it alone, if necessary.

Moreover, there will also be times, as demonstrated by the Gulf War, when it will take American leadership to galvanize the international community into action. In Bosnia, where the United States has deferred to its European allies on many key decisions, the muddled and ineffective response has led some observers to wonder if U.S. leadership is a prerequisite for any successful multilateral peacekeeping mission.

Another fundamental question is whether it would be useful to codify the situations under which peacekeepers could be committed to the field or whether these decisions should be made on a case-by-case basis. The Administration is in the process of devising guidelines for U.S. troop participation in UN peacekeeping, and press reports have stated that in its peacekeeping document, PDD-13, it opts for decisions on a case-by-case basis. Yet UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali and others are pressing for member states to commit forces in advance so that they can be called up rapidly before a conflict becomes widespread. The UN also needs to begin practicing triage on requests for peacekeeping missions in order to rein in the exponential growth of this expensive and increasingly dangerous activity.

Other key questions include the role of regional security organizations, such as NATO, in international peacekeeping, and the necessity to reorganize and improve the UN's peacekeeping infrastructure in order to enable the organization to play the global umpire role its membership is increasingly demanding of it. And, of course, given our own concerns about our assessed contributions for peacekeeping, we must ask where is the funding going to come from for new operations, let alone for ongoing ones?

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combatants had previously agreed to the deployment of UN monitors, and the UN forces acted as a neutral buffer. Those conditions are a far cry from the situation on the ground in Somalia, where the UN is actively hunting down one of the combatants, or in Bosnia, where the initiation of a UN humanitarian mission was seen as a provocation by the main aggressor, who was unwilling to stop the fighting and work toward a settlement of the conflict. As a result, many now ask whether the Bosnian relief effort, though well-intentioned, has turned out to be more of a hindrance than a help to the besieged people it was meant to assist.

These experiences underscore the urgent need to revise the rules of engagement and the mandates of contemporary peacekeeping operations in order to make them compatible with the more assertive peace-building and peace-enforcement missions which the UN is now undertaking. On the other hand, many military observers and others question the wisdom of waging war to win peace. Many express unease with the UN policy of the graduated use of force, arguing that the decisive, swift application of force would be more effective, even in the pursuit of limited goals. The continuing dialogue surrounding military doctrine and peacekeeping is also an issue we wish to examine today.

There are now 14 UN peacekeeping operations in effect around the world, with almost 80,000 troops, drawn from 74 nations. American forces are in Macedonia and Somalia. Moreover, in consultation with our NATO allies, we are drawing up contingency

plans to provide air support in Bosnia, if needed, and to contribute U.S. troops to a force of NATO peacekeepers who would enforce an eventual peace accord.

So, it is indeed appropriate that we discuss these issues today because UN peacekeeping is going to loom larger and larger in our policy discussions. We are fortunate to have with us today two eminent thinkers on the subject. They are: Sir Brian Urquhart, former UN Under-Secretary-General for Special Political Affairs and currently a scholar-in-residence with the Ford Foundation, who was present at the creation of UN peacekeeping and guided its development very ably for many years, and Colonel Harry Summers, a retired U.S. Army officer, who was decorated on the battlefield for valor, but whose second career as a distinguished author and columnist suggest that the pen is indeed mightier than the sword.

Gentlemen, we are happy to have you here with us today and, we eagerly look forward to your insights as we explore this complex topic.

Before we begin, I would like to call on my colleague from Nebraska, Congressman Doug Bereuter, for any opening remarks he would care to make.

Mr. BEREUTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I congratulate you on, once again, scheduling a timely and extremely important hearing. Almost daily, the United States and the United Nations are quite literally writing new pages in the annals of international cooperation.

Not long ago, U.N. peacekeepers consisted of a few hundred blue-helmeted people, largely Nordics or Fijian, scattered around the globe. Today there are some 90,000 U.N. peacekeepers, including a significant U.S. participation.

We have witnessed remarkable successes in a number of recent peacekeeping operations. In El Salvador, for example, the peacekeepers have been an integral part of the peace settlement. And in Cambodia, management problems notwithstanding, it is undeniably true that U.N. peacekeepers were instrumental in bringing about a solution to that bloody conflict.

On the other hand, there have been some dramatic failures. Angola demonstrates what happens when peacekeeping operations are rushed and poorly planned. And I would argue that Somalia shows what happens when mission objectives continue to shift.

I have tried to be optimistic in my own thinking about the evolution of peacekeeping and peace enforcement, but I hope, also, realistic, about the potential contributions that U.N. peacekeeping can make to international security.

Clearly there are sharp limits to the U.N.'s current capabilities, and there are charges of ineptitude and lack of proper support coming out of New York, and rumors of bureaucratic empire building by certain of functionaries.

It is also clear that some at the U.N. are perfectly willing to deploy peacekeepers in high-risk combat environments where there is no compelling strategic rationale.

On the other hand, if Americans don't want the United States to be the world's policeman, and Britain, France, Germany, and the rest of the EC understandably have no interest in being the world's policeman, we must turn to institutions such as the United Nations to assume peacekeeping responsibilities and we must all take a hand in assuring the U.N.'s effectiveness in that role.

The trick, it seems to me, is to take a very pragmatic view of what the U.N. can actually achieve and don't expect the U.N. to do the impossible.

We know, for example, that the U.N. can be effective in placing itself between factions that have exhausted themselves and are serious about a peaceful settlement, such as Cambodia or El Salvador.

It is also logical, if largely unproven, that the U.N. can, in certain instances, serve as a deterrent in capability in order to prevent a hot spot from exploding. I think what is what the President has in mind with respect to U.S. troops in Macedonia, although they certainly are far fewer and more lightly armed than I think is appropriate.

On the other hand, we need to appreciate the fact that U.N. peacekeepers are not going to bring about a peace if the parties are bound and determined to kill each other. Where there is no peace to be kept, there is no peacekeeping at all. So far that is Yugoslavia.

While, as I said, I am generally supportive of a pragmatic U.N. peacekeeping mission, we are getting mixed signals from the Clinton administration. While it is close to releasing the long-awaited policy decision on peacekeeping, elements of the Clinton administration have released a number of very surprising trial balloons in the press in recent weeks.

These include the suggestions of a U.N. peacekeeping force sent to the former Soviet Union, a proposal that was roundly denounced by Moscow. There has also been a proposal to let U.S. troops to serve under foreign commanders, roundly denounced here in Washington.

I would also note that many in Congress are concerned lest we embrace peacekeeping so enthusiastically that we spread our finite resources too thin, and are unable to defend our genuine, vital interests. That seems to me to be a real problem and one that will be the subject of considerable debate in the coming months.

So we are getting some confusing messages. Hopefully our witnesses today can help shed some light on these matters. Sir Brian has, perhaps, the most international peacekeeping experience more than any other human being perhaps; and Colonel Summers is one of this Nation's most renown military analysts.

So we are, as you said, Mr. Chairman, very fortunate, I think, to have these distinguished witnesses; and I look forward to hearing from them. And I thank you again for the hearings scheduled today.

Mr. LANTOS. Thank you very much, Congressman Bereuter. And let me also express my deep personal appreciation to Beth Poisson of the subcommittee staff who did all of the work in preparation of this hearing, and did an outstanding job.

Colonel Summers, you have a most distinguished military record; and after you retired, you have continued to serve this Nation as a brilliant military analyst in a variety of capacities. Your prepared statement will be entered in the record in its entirety, and you may proceed any way you choose.

STATEMENT OF COLONEL HARRY SUMMERS, U.S. ARMY, RETIRED, SYNDICATED COLUMNIST

Colonel SUMMERS. Thank you very much. I would like to read the prepared statement.

Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to testify on the issue of U.S. participation in United Nations peacekeeping operations.

Within the past month, during my lectures on military strategy at the Army War College, the Marine Corps Command and Staff College, the Armed Forces Staff College, the Inter-American Defense College and the Air University's Joint Flag Officer Warfighting Course, this has been an area of great concern among senior U.S. and allied military officers.

Those concerns were eloquently expressed by General Colin L. Powell, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, during the press conference on the Department of Defense Bottom-Up Review at the Pentagon on September 1st.

"Let me begin," he said, "by giving a little bit of a tutorial about what an armed force is all about. Notwithstanding all of the

changes that have taken place in the world, notwithstanding the new emphasis on peacekeeping, peace enforcement, peace engagement, preventive diplomacy, we have a value system and a culture system within the armed forces of the United States. We have this mission: to fight and win the Nation's wars.

"That's what we do. Why do we do it? For this purpose: to provide for the common defense. And who do we do it for? We do it for the American people. We never want to lose sight of this ethic, we never want to lose sight of this basic underlying principle of the armed forces of the United States.

"We're warriors. And because we are warriors, because we have demonstrated time and time again that we can do this for that purpose for the American people, that's why you have an armed forces within the United States structure."

A major concern within the military is that this basic underlying principle will be corrupted by overemphasis on peacekeeping and other such nonmilitary operations. This concern is well founded, for the example is near at hand.

As Lieutenant Colonel John A. English of the Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry, then on the faculty of the National Defense College of Canada wrote in his 1991 work, "The Canadian Army and the Normandy Campaign: A Study of Failure in High Command," that's exactly what happened to the Canadian military in the period between the two world wars.

Their senior officers were corrupted not by money or power. They were corrupted by their desire to be loved, to be politically correct, in the antimilitary climate of the times. To that end, they involved themselves and their military almost entirely in good works in the civilian sector. Tragically, it was at the expense of maintaining their professional military skills and their battlefield expertise.

They paid for this error with the blood of the soldiers they had been entrusted to command. In Normandy alone, the Canadians took 18,444 casualties, many through sheer military incompetence. As Colonel English concluded, "those who had been paid excessively high wages to keep the military art alive, adopted, instead, the bankrupt policy of searching for other roles. They shamefully forgot that the main purpose of a peacetime military establishment is to prepare for the day when armed forces might have to be used against a first-class enemy."

During that same period, the American military was also involved in such civil relief operations as the Civilian Conservation Corporation, but they accomplished those tasks as an adjunct to, rather than a replacement for, their fundamental military duties. Given what has been called the long and proud tradition of American antimilitarism, they had no illusions about being loved. Their focus remained on the battlefield.

As T.R. Fehrenbach noted in "This Kind of War," his masterful 1963 analysis of the Korean War, "Before 1939 the United States Army was small, but it was professional. Its tiny officers corps was parochial, but true. Its members devoted their time to the study of war."

"There was and is no danger of military domination of the nation," Fehrenbach observed. "The Constitution gave Congress the power of life and death over the military, and they have always ac-

cepted that fact. The danger has always been the other way around—the liberal society, in its heart, wants not only domination of the military but acquiescence of the military toward the liberal view of life.”

“Domination and control society should have. . . . But acquiescence society may not have, if it wants an army worth a damn. By the very nature of its mission, the military must maintain a hard and illiberal view of life and the world.”

Thirty years after those words were written, General Powell addressed that very dichotomy. “Because we are able to fight and win the Nation’s wars, because we are warriors,” he said, “we are also uniquely able to do some of the other new missions that are coming along, peacekeeping, humanitarian relief, disaster relief—you name it, we can do it . . . but we never want to do it in such a way that we lose sight of the focus of why you have armed forces—to fight and win the Nation’s wars.”

Not only are the underlying principles of the military in peril, so is the very foundation of American democracy, for there is a real danger that the current emphasis on operations other than war may end up hoisting America on its own petard.

In medieval siege warfare, the enemy’s fortifications were undermined by saps or trenches extended underneath the city or castle walls. A bomb or petard was then exploded to cause a breach through which an assault could be made. If extreme care was not taken, one could be blown up or hoisted by one’s own bomb.

A powerful warning of such an eventuality was Air Force Lieutenant Colonel Charles E. Dunlap’s award-winning 1992 National War College student essay, “The Origins of the American Military Coup of 2012.”

Written from the perspective of a senior military officer about to be executed for opposing the coup, this takeover “was the outgrowth of trends visible as far back as 1992,” including “the massive diversion of military forces to civilian uses.”

Congress may well be sowing the seeds of its own destruction, for among the examples Dunlap cites is the Military Cooperation with Civilian Law Enforcement Agencies Act of 1981, “which was specifically intended to force reluctant military commanders to actively collaborate in police work,” deliberately undermining the Posse Comitatus Act of 1878 which had removed the military from such sensitive civilian activities.

In 1986 Congress “declared overseas humanitarian and civic assistance activities to be ‘valid military missions’ and specifically authorized them by law.” In 1992, former Secretary of State James Baker pronounced that in airlifting relief supplies around the world, “We will wage a new peace.”

“In truth,” Dunlap wrote from the vantage point of 2012, “militaries ought to ‘prepare for war,’ and leave the ‘peace waging’ to those agencies of the government whose mission is just that. Nevertheless, such pronouncements—seconded by military leaders—became the fashionable philosophy. The result? People in the military no longer considered themselves warriors. Instead, they perceived themselves as policemen, relief workers, educators, builders, health care providers, politicians—everything but warfighters . . . it is lit-

tle wonder its traditional apolitical professionalism eventually eroded."

Those calling for the massive involvement of U.S. military forces in peacekeeping, nationbuilding, and other such operations other than war are unwittingly turning traditional American civil-military relations on its head.

"The ultimate objective of all military operations," emphasized in the May 22, 1941, edition of Field Manual 100-5, the Army's basic operation manual, "is the destruction of the enemy's armed forces in battle . . . concentration of superior forces, both on the ground and in the air, at the decisive point and time . . . creates the conditions essential to victory."

Abandoned during the cold war, this fundamental principle which led to victory in World War II has resurfaced as the military's current statement of purpose. It has been ridiculed, however, by those who claim that it does not meet the demands of the post-cold war world.

The critics, most of whom were vociferous opponents of our Vietnam involvement, would instead return to the statement of purpose that undergirded that tragic misapplication of American military power. "The fundamental purpose of U.S. military forces," said the politically correct 1968 version of Field Manual 100-5 "is to preserve, restore, or create an environment of order or stability within which the instrumentalities of government can function effectively under a code of laws."

This is precisely what some are calling for the U.S. military to attempt to do again. Growing out of civilian academic conceits that one can change the world with the tools of social science, this wrong-headed notion that political, social, and economic institutions can be built with the sword flies in the face of not only of our Vietnam experience but also the centuries-old American model of civil-military relations.

In the British colonies of North America, the civilian government was always in charge and the military subordinate to civilian control. These civil-military provisions were later written into the Constitution of the United States.

On the other hand, in the Spanish colonies of Latin America the conquistadors established law and order and only then turned power over to the civilian government to run. This is more than just ancient history. In a recent lecture at the Inter-American Defense College, a Chilean officer vigorously defended the 1973 overthrow of the Allende government as a legitimate exercise of military power in restoring a climate of peace and stability.

Incredibly, this conquistador model is the model of choice for those who would have the U.S. military intervene in Somalia and Bosnia to "create an environment of order or stability within which the instrumentalities of government can function effectively under a code of laws."

In other words, they would encourage our military to do abroad what traditionally the military has been forbidden to do here at home. This way lies madness . . . and the prophesied American military coup of 2012.

There is no doubt that America has a role to play in attempting to alleviate the terrible pain and suffering wracking much of the

world. There is also no doubt, given the 211-199 vote in the House of Representatives on September 13, 1993, to deny creating a \$30 million fund for peacekeeping operations, that there is considerable public resistance to involving their armed forces in such endeavors.

Ironically, the solution to this seeming dilemma can be found in the Vietnam War experience. Although lip-service was given to the nonmilitary dimensions of that war, it became obvious that by temperament and training U.S. military units were ill-suited for such operations.

In 1967, a new organization, CORDS, Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support, was created to deal with the war's political, economic, and social dimension. Headed initially by Ambassador Robert W. Komer, who was appointed as General Westmoreland's deputy commander, CORDS was composed of personnel from the State Department, the Agency for International Development, U.S. Information Agency, and the Central Intelligence Agency.

Although primarily a civilian agency, it also had a military component to provide security and logistic support. CORDS was one of the most successful innovations of the war, ensuring that U.S. economic aid was properly distributed and enormously improving the infrastructure of the South Vietnamese Government. Overshadowed by the 1975 fall of South Vietnam to the cross-border North Vietnamese blitzkrieg, those successes were soon forgotten and the lessons of how to provide for the nonmilitary aspects of conflict were never learned.

Those lessons need to be resurrected and reexamined. To "wage peace" we need to create a new and expanded peace Corps under the auspices of the Department of State. Like CORDS, it should be headed by a civilian, an ambassadorial-level Foreign Service Officer, to emphasize its nonmilitary character.

And like CORDS, the majority of its personnel should also be civilian, including political and economic experts from State, AID relief workers, USIA communications specialists, and other such "peacemakers." The military would provide such backup assistance as may be required, including moving the relief teams and their supplies into position and providing continuous logistical and other support. Security forces would also be provided as needed to guard against hostile attack. But, as with CORDS, the military would be in a subordinate role.

And that is important. U.S. military intervention abroad, even in the name of peacekeeping and humanitarian aid, raises host nation fears for this sovereignty and independence. A new Peace Corps would ease such misperceptions. If we are going to be the world's nanny, we ought to at least do it right.

Thank you very much.

[The prepared statement of Colonel Summers appears in the appendix.]

Mr. LANTOS. Thank you very much, Colonel. We have a lot of questions to ask of you, but we will hold those for a minute.

Sir Brian, we are honored and delighted to have you. I will not embarrass you by repeating at length what my good friend and colleague has said; you probably know more about U.N. peacekeeping,

international peacekeeping than anybody alive. We are delighted to have you. You may proceed any way you choose.

Sir BRIAN URQUHART. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I apologize for being slightly delayed.

Mr. LANTOS. We fully understand. If you would be so kind and pull the mike very close to you, sir.

Sir BRIAN URQUHART. If I may make just a very few remarks based on the questions that were put to me in your letter.

Mr. LANTOS. Please.

STATEMENT OF SIR BRIAN URQUHART, SCHOLAR-IN-RESIDENCE, INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS PROGRAM, THE FORD FOUNDATION, FORMER UNITED NATIONS UNDER SECRETARY GENERAL FOR SPECIAL POLITICAL AFFAIRS

Sir BRIAN URQUHART. The first point in your letter was the United States in peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations, what is its role?

I think it is worth remembering that the United States has been historically a tremendously important part of the developing of the whole technique of peacekeeping. In fact, of the three countries which provided the military observers in the first U.N. peacekeeping operation, which was the true supervision operation in Palestine in 1948, the United States was one. It provided the largest number of observers. People forget the really heroic nature of that mission. They were remarkable people.

Historically, the United States, as a permanent member of the Security Council, has seen itself as more a supporter in the background than an actual participant in peacekeeping operations. In fact, I think I am right in saying that apart from the observers in the Middle East, the United States has not, until very recently, provided actual forces in peacekeeping operations. I am not talking here about enforcement operations.

However, the United States has been——

Mr. LANTOS. Wasn't that—forgive me for interrupting. But wasn't that a function of the presence of the cold war which, basically, made both the Soviet Union and the United States noneligible?

Sir BRIAN URQUHART. Yes, very much so. That is correct.

Mr. LANTOS. Exactly.

Sir BRIAN URQUHART. Nonetheless, the United States has played an absolutely vital role in getting these operations off the ground, in providing various forms of support, including airlift, logistical support and advice—incidentally, good military advice.

And I think it is also forgotten that peacekeeping operations don't function without a very large degree of political support.

In my experience, which was about 40 years, the United States was extremely helpful always in coming forward with political support if we had a problem on the ground.

Peace enforcement is a relatively new concept. It is somewhere between peacekeeping and the grandiose notion of Chapter VII of the charter, which is actions to deal with aggression. It is a new concept. I think a great deal of study of this is needed, and everything that we see now in Somalia, for example, shows that we need to look at military doctrine, at tactics, at training, at rules of en-

agement and we need to study the role of soldiers who really are playing a completely different role from what they have been trained for.

The British Army—Britain having been a colonial power—did have some experience in what used to be called aid to the civil power.

The U.S. Army, for historical reasons, does not have that experience. A great effort has to be made—and I think is being made—by the military in the United States to look at this relatively new role for soldiers.

And that applies nowhere more than in the area of command and control. I realize this is an extremely sensitive and difficult subject, but I don't think we gain anything by trying to avoid it. Ideally, of course, in a United Nations operation under the Security Council the command and control should be by the United Nations.

But the U.N. does not have, at present, the capacity to assume that responsibility in operations where soldiers are being asked to take combat risks. I don't believe personally that it is impossible to buildup that capacity, but it has to be developed, as in other matters relating to the U.N. and its new role in the world.

There is a considerable difference between operational command and operational control. It seems to me that any country, and particularly the United States, which is a key member of the United Nations, should have a great deal of input at the political level, particularly when an operation is being launched, in devising the mandate which that operation is being given and also during the operation to make sure that the operation is staying more or less on track.

It would be best if the input was at the political level; and in the field, the U.N. command, whoever happens to be selected to command, should have its own integrity in the sense that the orders of the commander would not be challenged. That does not mean that the contingents in a peacekeeping operation or in an enforcement operation are completely cutoff from their home country. But so far we have tried to keep the principle that once there is a U.N. commander, everybody in the force is subject to his operational command and whether that be the United States or anybody else. And I think that if that idea is lost, we shall be in for a great deal of confusion.

Again, a great deal needs to be done to buildup the capacity of the United Nations to really discharge this kind of responsibility.

NATO and regional organizations: In the beginning, there was always an idea in the United Nations that problems should be tackled at the lowest possible level at which they could be tackled, that is to say preferably bilaterally between one country and another. If that didn't work, sub regionally or regionally by regional organizations, and only after that proved to be impossible would they come to the United Nations.

Now, the cold war complicated that rather innocent concept quite considerably; and, of course, it also complicated it in a different way, because NATO was very clearly a military alliance on one side of the cold war, which meant that NATO could not be associated in any way with U.N. operations, because of the Soviet veto and the Security Council—and vice versa for the Warsaw pact.

And often, regional organizations were either weak or divided or, indeed, for some areas of the world, simply didn't exist, for example, in the Middle East. And so the original idea that regional organizations would make the first effort really didn't work out very well.

But these questions now politically are soluble for the first time since 1945. I think it will be very interesting to see, for example, how the world of NATO in the former Yugoslavia works out.

I think that the the Organization of African Unity ought to be able to take on more responsibilities in Africa, though it will need resources and experience to do that. And, of course, there have been partnerships between the United Nations and regional organizations in various parts of the world.

As far as guidelines for peacekeeping, peace enforcement, and preventive deployment are concerned, the trouble here is that, so far at any rate, each case which comes to the United Nations—and you should remember that situations come to the United Nations, which everybody else has despaired of dealing with, tend to be different.

I think it is possible to have basic principles, however. In fact, there are some already governing peacekeeping—for example, the question of total impartiality, not taking sides in a conflict, and not giving advantage to any side in the conflict by what the peacekeeping force does. There are some principles about the use of force which now need to be looked at again, when U.N. operations are more and more required to use force. The idea of using force and the method of using it both need a great deal of study by the military establishment.

Peace enforcement, as I said, is new; and I think we have everything to learn about it. The lessons from Somalia and other places are very important. And I am sure they will be studied.

Preventive deployment, of course, sounds much easier than it actually is. It is extremely difficult to get out governments or international organizations to take action at the point where a very small investment might produce a very large result.

Governments are usually not willing to get involved in things which haven't happened. And, in fact, if they do get involved in things which haven't happened and do a successful preventive operation of some kind, nobody ever hears about it. That is fine, but it is also a problem.

There is a question of the political will to get in to difficult situations before they become critical. There is also a very big problem with the parties involved in those situations. International intervention is not popular with potential conflicting parties until they think they are losing the battle.

There is a perennial difficulty in securing troops for preventive operations in advance of a crisis.

It is the conflict and its appearance on the news media, especially the television, that tends to goad governments into intervening. Intervention also depends on an extremely capable watch capacity, on good intelligence, and on good contingency planning.

The most difficult problem of all is prioritizing among the competing needs for peacekeeping, particularly now that these demands are flowing in almost every day from all over the world.

This is something which nobody knows the answer to at the minute.

It would be wise to start with trying to agree on what the basic concept of the U.N. really is. Is it the organization that was set up in 1945 as a kind of umpire between governments and a method of getting those governments together to resist aggression? Or is it what is now conceived to be, certainly by the public all over the world and by the media—a kind of world emergency service, a police emergency service which can be called in to deal with civil wars, ethnic wars, natural disasters and so on?

Obviously, it is likely to become more and more the latter; indeed it has already become so. I think that if that role is going to be a success at all—and that is very much in doubt, unfortunately, at the moment—we are going to have to get a much greater willingness on the part of all of the member states of the United Nations, not only to participate and contribute but to actually prepare themselves for that sort of participation. There must be training and logistics.

The Security Council often tends to get into situations for irrational or emotional or political reasons. There is very little examination in advance of what they are getting into. I suspect that it will be necessary to develop some means of testing out the situation, testing out the will for a solution of the conflicting parties, testing out whether the conditions exist for a useful international operation.

Finally, controlling the peacekeeping budget. I will be very brief on this, Mr. Chairman. In the committee of eminent persons headed by Paul Volcker and Shijuro Ogata on the effective financing of the United Nations, there was a proposal made for a single peacekeeping budget, plus a relatively modest budget for the beginning of an infrastructure in the United Nations to run such operations.

There are all sorts of disadvantages, which I don't want to go into now, about a single peacekeeping budget. There is one overwhelming advantage, which is that it would mean that the United Nations would not start each operation from scratch and on a shoestring each time, which is unbelievably inefficient, expensive and also subject to failure.

It is essential that the tasks imposed on the United Nations' structure, especially by the Security Council, be accompanied by an effort to provide the capacity to actually implement those tasks. At the moment that doesn't happen, and of course funding is a particularly important part of that problem.

You asked me about lessons from Bosnia, Cambodia, and Somalia; and I am uneasy about giving these. It is important to consider the suitability of the peacekeeping technique for a particular situation before you commit the troops.

It is important that the international community represented in the United Nations should start with a very strong political consensus about the right road to the solution and what that solution, in essence, should be.

Finally, I think it is important not to mix the peacekeeping technique with the enforcement technique. The one inhibits the other, and both tend to fall down.

As far as Cambodia is concerned, it is important to keep our fingers crossed. It would appear that it is a rather unsuccessful operation for the time being.

As far as Somalia is concerned it does seem to me that there must be a better mechanism for considering the true nature of a problem and the task you are giving to an international force before you commit the troops.

There are huge problems of a practical, legal, political, logistical, and financial nature about so-called nationbuilding in a collapsed state. We have almost everything to learn about this. I think that would be the main lesson of Somalia.

All three of those situations show the absolute necessity for the United Nations to have a capacity to deploy a relatively small force rapidly, professionally, and with full political support at the point before a crisis has not degenerated into complete anarchy.

The delays in deploying in Somalia—and I think also in Croatia and Bosnia, and certainly in Cambodia—although, fortunately, there they managed to catch up again—can have very serious results. The United Nations at this point has no capacity for expert, well-trained, well-planned, quick deployment, particularly for troops who are prepared to take combat risks.

That leads me to your last question which is the reform and infrastructure of the United Nations. Quite clearly what is needed in that infrastructure, which was suggested in the Volcker/Ogata report, and some kind of permanent capacity for watch over situations in the world, for contingency planning, for a reasonable degree of reliable intelligence, for a system of training, and even perhaps an inspectorate which ensures that we do not put troops into the field who are manifestly incapable of coping with the tasks they have been given.

That includes staff training and even command training to some extent and, of course, some kind of basic logistical network so that we don't start from scratch each time.

There is now an effort now to get some serious standby arrangements with the broad group of the members, including tying in regional arrangements. I hope that will be pushed ahead, because it is vital if the U.N. is to develop any kind of serious capacity at all to face up to the things which it is going to be asked to face up to in the future.

You mentioned, finally, a suggestion that I made some time ago about a U.N. volunteer force. I made that suggestion not because I believe that everybody is going to jump to it and instantly put it together—though I think a lot of the young people, young men and women, in the world would probably welcome it as a rather remarkable opportunity for service—but because I think it is necessary to highlight the need for rapid professional and impressive deployment before things get out of hand in a situation which the Security Council is interesting itself.

Also, I think we need, if the U.N. is going to pursue the line it is now taking, to have some method of getting around the understandable reluctance of its member governments to commit national contingents to combat risks where national security is not involved. It seems to me that is legitimate concern of any government. But it does mean, in fact, that in some situations the U.N.

is going to have no practical way of implementing the Security Council's decisions.

Finally, let me just say that obviously, the three post-cold war years have posed a whole lot of new problems and a whole lot of lessons which we have yet to digest. And I think that everybody really agrees—though they have different ways of doing it—that we have to start very quickly the long process of constructing some kind of international system which actually works; and it is not going to take a short time or be easy. And of course, the United States, as a founder member of the United Nations and its most important member, is a vital component of that effort.

Thank you very much.

Mr. LANTOS. Well, thank you very much, Sir Brian, for a brilliant presentation.

Let me express, again, to both of you, my appreciation for outstanding presentations. And, quite frankly, I have so many questions that we ought to be ready to serve you some dinner, because I am ready to keep you here that long.

Let me begin with some basic issues. And while I may direct my question to one or the other of you, I hope both of you will feel free to comment.

DETERRENCE AND U.S. MILITARY DOCTRINE

You began, Colonel Summers, your very fine presentation by quoting from one of my highly respected and good friends General Colin L. Powell who says, "We have this mission,"—and he talks about the U.S. military—"to fight and win the Nation's wars."

Well, with all due respect to General Powell, that is not what the U.S. military did during the cold war. The U.S. military deterred the Soviet Union; it didn't fight the war, it won the contest. And I would—if Colin would be here, I would ask him to revise his statement, because it seems to me that at least as important as is the fighting and winning of wars is the deterrence of a military conflict, as the unfolding of the cold war so clearly demonstrates.

And if I may take it from the very broad and sort of central victory of the last two generations, the end of the cold war without a war, let me focus in on a minute the example of this same item with the presence of only 300 U.S. military personnel, Macedonia.

My good friend Congressman Bereuter and I had the opportunity of talking to the President at the White House in a very, very small group many months ago, in the spring, I believe.

Mr. BEREUTER. Two hours and 45 minutes.

Mr. LANTOS. And the two of us were united, as we so often are. There were many others from the House and the Senate urging the deployment of U.S. military forces in Macedonia.

We called for a larger and more heavily armed contingent. If in Macedonia we acquire a NATO contingent or a U.S. contingent going a bit beyond the trip wire structure that we now have, we might be able to prevent the conflict from spilling southward and thereby avoid potentially horrendous scenarios involving Greece and Turkey.

Now if, in fact, the function of the U.S. military is not just to win wars and wage wars, but also to prevent wars and to extend that mission to the United Nations, and if the function of a U.N. mili-

tary participation is not just to win a conflict but to prevent a conflict, to deter a conflict, then if the United States opts out, isn't it very likely that large numbers of other potential participants will opt out and we may be creating a scenario for ongoing chaos in many parts of the world, which will have a very negative impact on U.S. national interests?

I realize, Sir Brian, that we will be moving away from discussing this question purely from a U.S. point of view but from time to time from a U.N. point-of-view. But since Colonel Summers began with Colin Powell's statement, doesn't that statement need an amendment?

Colonel SUMMERS. I would hope that if General Powell was asked that question that he would fall back on fundamental military theory. That is, as it was laid out a century and a half ago by the great military theorist Carl Von Clausewitz, everything depends on battle; even if you never fight, it depends on battle, because it rests on the perception that if you did fight, you would win. That is the essence of deterrence.

Admiral of the Fleet, Sir Peter Hill-Norton said quite wisely that deterrence rests on creating the impression in any potential aggressor that any likely benefit would not survive the inevitable risk.

So I think that the capability for war fighting has to be the very basis of deterrence. Building a capability to fight and win gives you the ability to deter. Conversely, if the perception is you would fight and lose, of course you do not have deterrence; you are encouraging aggression rather than deterring it.

THE AMERICAN PUBLIC'S RELUCTANCE TO ENDORSE U.S. TROOP PARTICIPATION IN U.N. PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS

I would say to President Clinton, as I have said in my writings, that he has, unwittingly, I am sure, laid hostage his reputation to the military efficiency of the Danish commander in Macedonia, who we know nothing about. Because if something goes wrong, if we have indeed unwittingly created a new Beirut and a "marine barracks" disaster, the American people won't blame the Danish commander or the U.N., they will blame the man they elected to be the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. So he has put himself at considerable political risk in doing that.

I think that is a consideration that needs to be thought of, because the American military is a very strange military, as you know. It really is a people's military. I thought of that in conjunction with the difficulty the French military had in fielding their force in the Gulf. Because of political sensitivities at home, their draftees cannot be committed overseas.

Well, all of the American military, in a sense, are draftees. That is, the American people make no distinction between a drafted force and an all-volunteer force. Thank goodness they don't.

And then Army Chief of Staff General Fred Weyand said in the closing days of the Vietnam War, the American people take a very jealous and proprietary interest in the commitment of their military. In a sense, therefore, the U.S. Government is not as free to commit its military forces as many people may think because I think the American people have some very strong views of where their military ought to be committed and to what ends.

So I think that is a constraining factor on our ability to involve ourselves in these international organizations and U.N. peacekeeping operations. I think there is enormous American resistance, for example, to putting U.S. forces under foreign command. And it may be irrational, but my problem with the U.N. is that Boutros Boutros-Ghali doesn't pass the test we laid out on July 4, 1776.

Like King George III, he is not responsive to the will of the American people; and we ought not to put our military forces under the command of people who are not responsive to the will of the people.

How we square that circle, I don't know; but I think it is a very real problem.

Mr. LANTOS. Sir Brian, do you have some comment?

Sir BRIAN URQUHART. Well, I fully understand the Colonel's point of view. I think it would be—if this was taken by other countries as well as the rule, I don't quite know how one would ever do another U.N. operation. So I think it is a problem that needs to be discussed.

I also point out that the United States has something which only four other governments have, and that is the veto in the Security Council, which is a fairly heavy—is a fairly heavy controlling privilege; and also, of course, being one of the major financial contributors, it has a control there.

But I don't think that disposes of Colonel Summers' point, and I think it is a good point. I think it has to be—we have to talk about it.

GUIDELINES FOR UNDERTAKING PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS AND FUNDING CONSIDERATIONS

Mr. LANTOS. It is an extremely valid point.

Colonel and Sir Brian, let me just pursue the general questioning a bit. I suspect we are all in agreement that the end of the cold war certainly does not usher in an era of peace but it ushers in an era of turbulence.

This is about as much of a truism as I think we are going to be able to find this afternoon. If that is so, if we are faced with an era of turbulence, then clearly the United States has one of several options: It may opt out, as some of my colleagues, I think, would like to do; stop the world, I want to get off; I am not participating in it. If things disintegrate in Yugoslavia or Cambodia or wherever, too bad, but it is not our problem.

It seems to me that, in some instances, this is probably quite true. Changes in political control or military balance may not have either a directly, or even an indirectly, significant impact on our national security. But clearly, in many other instances, this is not true.

So turbulence in some parts of the world has an impact on U.S. national security. And if we accept this, as I take it we all do, then our option of participating falls into three categories: unilateral action; participation as part of an existing or ad hoc multilateral arrangement, NATO, for instance, would be a good example, or, as in the Gulf, or as part of a U.N.-sanctioned structure, which was, to a very large extent, a U.S. operation but with U.N. sanction and the participation of others.

If these are the three options open to us, we clearly, for purposes of our discussion, need not deal with the first option. Because if we feel that our national interests mandates unilateral action, we know what to do. You know, we issue congressional declaration of war and we participate.

In the second and in the third options, however, we run into some new difficulties. If we are dealing with an existing multinational structure like NATO, again, we have Rules of Procedure; we know how to function. It happens to be my judgment—and the Secretary General of NATO, Manfred Woerner, claims to agree with this—that had NATO issued a credible threat of force to the Serbs and to all other potential combatants, we would not have seen bloodshed in the former Yugoslavia.

I believe this to be the case because I don't think Milosevic would have moved had he known that NATO was ready to strike. But what do we do in situations like Cambodia, Somalia or Azerbaijan or dozens of others that we could cite?

It seems to me that there are really two sets of issues that need to be decided. One relates to physical participation. The second relates to funding. Clearly, the nation-states of the world, fall into three categories: nation-states that are capable of physically participating and providing funding. For instance, Sweden is capable of doing both. Canada is capable of doing both. The U.K. is capable of doing both.

Then there are nations which are capable of physically participating, like Russia, the Ukraine or Pakistan, but are not capable of funding it.

And the third category are nation-states like Kuwait, which clearly cannot participate physically but can participate in funding.

Kuwait, by the way, at this moment, has an assessment for peacekeeping which is 00.05 percent of the total peacekeeping budget, which I think is a scandal. It is an obscenity. Saudi Arabia has 00.19 percent of the funding responsibility for U.N. peacekeeping operations. And I hope, with my colleagues' assistance and co-operation, to try to work on changing these absurd ratios.

Since Sir Brian made the point, and I believe you did, too, Colonel Summers, all of us are in agreement that the earlier the U.N. moves, NATO moves, or the United States moves, the less costly the involvement. There must be some trigger mechanism. And there must be some decisionmaking structure that enables us, as a Nation, NATO as a collective security arrangement, or the U.N., whichever is appropriate, to move early. Because if we move early, we can move with far greater effectiveness.

Any comments on any of this?

DIFFERENTIATING BETWEEN INTERNAL CONFLICT AND INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES

Colonel SUMMERS. Twenty-five years ago, when I was an instructor at the Command and General Staff College, the perceived wisdom that we were moving away from the nation-state and nationalism toward an era of goodness and niceness and everything else. But what we have seen in the wake of the cold war is precisely the opposite.

We have regressed rather than progressed. We are back to ethnic wars, religious wars, the kind of things that we thought we had put behind us in the 19th century.

And I thought Sir Brian's comment about the U.N. was particularly on target. We created the U.N. to deal with disputes among nations, but now we have come to the point where we are going to deal with the internal problems of nations, a task for which we are uniquely unequipped to do. That is, we know how to deal with national disputes. By and large, there is a large body of experience in how to deal with them, from wars on down; but how do you deal with these, internal disputes?

During the Vietnam War, Professor Chalmers Johnson, of the University of California, had a very good book on people's war; and he pointed out the inadequacy of nation-states to involve themselves in the internal affairs of other nation-states.

And China's Lin Piao in "Long Live the Victory of People's War", made a very famous statement talking about the principle of self-reliance and said that if you can't do it yourself and rely on foreign aid or foreign assistance, that is a sure recipe for disaster.

So, again, this whole body of how do you deal with the Somalians, how do you deal with these internal problems in Bosnia, and how do you deal with them by the use of military force especially is very much up in the air. We don't have much doctrine in that area, and we are not sure, going back to the "just war" theory if it is doable. Is it doable for an outside power to create stability in another nation, particularly not so much in peacekeeping where it is pointed out where there is a general agreement that we want peace, but peace enforcement, which is entirely different, in that it involves ourselves in many of the questions of the Vietnam War that are still not resolved.

Having come from a conference this weekend where many of the Vietnam war participants were there, I just thought it was apropos of all of these statements that unfortunately have been bandied about in the *New York Times* and elsewhere that the magic solution is just air strikes. By God we will solve that problem of 500 years of ethnic war in Bosnia, we will just put in an air strike.

Senator Eugene McCarthy said last weekend that someone ought to develop a theory, an explanation of the amorality of bombing. If you bomb, it doesn't count against you; it is just sort of free play. You know, you just drop the bombs and gravity takes over, so you can sort of blame it on nature.

When we talk about bombing, it is like the first catapult that threw a rock over the wall, we say, "I didn't aim it at anybody; they just got in the way of it."

I thought well, again, the idea that bombing or military force or whatever is kind of a magic elixir to deal with these kinds of problems, I just think is wrong. They are primarily social and economic problems, with a military component. And I don't deny that at all. But I think we ought to put the emphasis on the political, economic, and social problems rather than put the emphasis on the military and ask the military to do things for which they are not prepared nor equipped and may be impossible for them to accomplish.

Mr. LANTOS. I am ready to turn it over to Congressman Bereuter, but I do want to react to your last comment and give Sir Brian a chance to comment also.

Your last observation reminds me of the classical dispute between liberals and conservatives, on how to deal with crime. The liberals invariably say that it is very primitive, it is archaic, to deal with the symptoms because what you need to deal with are the underlying causes, and those are social, economic, educational, cultural. Of course, the liberal is absolutely right, and the conservative is equally right, because unless you deal with the symptoms, you have chaos and bedlam in society.

I don't think the military will be able to get by with your last statement that the underlying issues in the former Yugoslavia are centuries old, and, therefore, you can't deal with them by military means; but rather you should deal with the underlying causes through political and economic means. But you must have military resources to deal with the manifestations of ethnic cleansing, torture, and mass rape because no sociological lectures will solve mass rape, and no cultural experiences can deal with these things in the long-run. They have to be dealt with as domestic crime has to be dealt with, by force, and the only mechanism of force is the military.

Colonel SUMMERS. But we would not turn the District of Columbia Government over to the D.C. National Guard to deal with the crime problem.

We would insist a duly elected mayor and the political leadership use the military assets or the police assets under their control in order to deal with it.

My point is I don't disagree with what you are saying at all.

Mr. LANTOS. I know you don't.

Colonel SUMMERS. Except I believe that the military must be—as is traditionally in the United States, must be firmly under civilian control and that the impetus and the leadership and the responsibility should be in the State Department rather than in the Defense Department for these kinds of operations.

Certainly they have a military component which may, at the outset, be primary. But I think in the long term, the military component ought to be subordinate to the political issues.

And I thought that, as I said in my prepared testimony, I thought CORDS was an example of how to do that. That is, it did have a very strong military component; but it was always under civilian control and the emphasis was on the civilian side of it, which I think in dealing with other nations, and the sovereignty of other nations in particular, we are getting involved in some very sticky questions of involving ourselves in the internal affairs of other nations, which traditionally has been sort of abhorrent but lately has taken on sort of a cachet of the way to deal with things. I think we need to relook at that whole issue.

Mr. LANTOS. Sir Brian.

Sir BRIAN. I just have a few not necessarily very relevant comments. The question is: Are we our brother's keeper or not? And in various circumstances, I think both the public and the media think that we are. That is why we get into all of these things. This would not have happened 30 or 40 years ago when people couldn't

actually see what was going on in some of these less fortunate parts of the world.

I agree absolutely about dealing with the basic causes, but I think that you can't deal with the causes without dealing with the symptoms. You will never get the political will or indeed the physical resources to go after poverty or population or migration or environmental degradation if the foreground is completely obscured by the dust of battle, which it is now in about 20 or 30 places. There are 32, according to President Carter, thirty-two civil wars going on at the moment. And that distracts people's attention.

I just want to come back for a moment to this question of command and control. I think it is a very important question; and I find myself, not for the first time, on both sides of it.

I absolutely sympathize with what you have been saying, Colonel. I think the crunch here is when you ask international missions to take combat risks. Peacekeeping is fine, because the soldiers aren't allowed to use force anyway. And we have never had very much trouble with that.

But it is when you are asking troops to put their lives on the line that this question arises. And it isn't only with the United States. We have had the case of Italy in Somalia and indeed some others which were less publicized, like Saudi Arabia.

And I think that is not something that is just going to go away. We need to have a really serious overtime effort to resolve this question in some way. And one of the main conditions for resolving it is to increase the capacity and the known efficiency and effectiveness of the U.N. itself. And even then, it won't go away.

Let me say again that I think that we are not going to solve these problems in a hurry. We have to develop a new system over time. If you think how long it took to develop most national systems, the 45 years the U.N. has been going is a very short time. And I think we have got to try to systematically develop toward a goal which we are actually agreed on.

I take it that people are agreed, more or less, that we do need, sooner or later, to develop an international system which is capable of acting in time, which is capable of avoiding the worst, which is capable of trying to deal with basic causes.

Actually, that was one of the reasons why I made a perhaps irresponsible suggestion about a volunteer U.N. force. And almost everything Colonel Summers has said has been backing up that idea. If this is not a national responsibility, particularly a responsibility of the United States and yet we have the public and the media telling us that somebody has got to do something about it, who is going to do something about it? And maybe we might look at a slightly different idea, which is that the U.N. disposes of a relatively small volunteer, highly-trained, tested, absolutely first-rate rapid deployment group, which deploys, if the Security Council wants it to, to test out a situation and also to give the pretext if necessary for calling in heavier support.

I couldn't agree with you more about air strikes. I have been listening to that ever since 1939. It is nonsense. But air strikes, combined with troops on the ground and a really solid political consensus, can be quite impressive. I think one of the troubles is that

they have always been invoked as something independent, which is silly.

So I think that maybe in the more distant future we want to look at a U.N. capacity which is not subject to the natural concerns of the Congress or any representative institution in the country concerned, which can test the water out, which can, if necessary, call in strategic support like air support and so on. And maybe that will be more impressive.

I also think that a great deal more attention needs to be given to sanctions. When I was growing up, sanctions were considered to be the alternative to war in the 1920's. That all changed. But it wasn't all that stupid. As a matter of fact, sanctions over a period of time are very effective, and they have proved so. The trouble is they don't act immediately, and I think we need to look at a much closer connection of sanctions to political and, if necessary, military action.

Finally, I think your point about Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, this was one of the things we discussed in the Volker/Ogata meeting, and I think there are recommendations similar to yours, Mr. Chairman, about that.

Colonel SUMMERS. Several months ago, I was privileged to take part in symposium at the Marine Corps University at Quantico addressing the problems of Bosnia.

It may interest you to know that the school solution turned out to be that the action should be taken under NATO auspices, under a chain of command and a functional organization that we understood, were comfortable with, which was acceptable to the American people. As we talked about, the more effective the force becomes, the more concerns, I think, arise in the area of national sovereignty.

We do have existing formations like NATO that I think—and I would agree with your comment earlier, if we had taken action earlier, we wouldn't have the problem.

So there are ways we can use our military force within existing structures that I think we need to explore.

Mr. LANTOS. Congressman Bereuter.

COMMAND AND CONTROL ISSUES

Mr. BEREUTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The testimony and the interaction here has been very stimulating.

The Chairman earlier made reference to the rather extraordinary opportunity we had to visit with President Clinton about the U.S. role in Bosnia. And, Colonel, I think you might find it interesting that, almost unanimously, the 17 Members of the House there from the various relevant committees, leadership, argued about the air strikes as being ineffective, quite ineffective; and the top military advisors, with one notable exception, were giving the same advice.

And yet lift and strike, strike being the air strikes, was the policy that President Clinton attempted to sell the Europeans on. Fortunately, in my judgment, they said no.

Would you agree, Colonel, that there is nothing inherently requiring U.S. forces in Macedonia to be placed under some foreign command?

Colonel SUMMERS. I don't think there is a requirement that they be placed under foreign command. I think that—the President always puts his future on the line when he commits military forces, because, as I said, the American people have some very strong feelings about that.

Mr. BEREUTER. They do indeed.

Colonel SUMMERS. So I think if we are going to commit them, I would rather see it done unilaterally.

But interestingly, at the Joint Flag Officer Warfighting course where I lectured last week, which consisted of 27 flag officers, general officers, and admirals, I made my pitch against putting U.S. forces under U.N. command, something which I feel very strongly about. And interestingly, three Air Force generals challenged me on that. Their point was, when we were paying the piper we could call the tune. But we are not paying the piper today in many places in the world. If we want the support of our allies, we have to be willing to put our forces under their command as they are putting forces under our command.

So it is a very complex issue, there is no doubt about it. But I am certain in my observation that the American people have some very grave reservations on this issue. I think NATO is excepted; that is almost putting them under U.S. command. When you talk about putting them under Pakistani command or Nigerian command or anything else or where the leaders of the armed forces are chosen by intrigue and family connections rather than professionalism, I think it raises some great concerns. I made that comment at the Army War College. I talked about "rinky-dink nations," which I shouldn't have said. Later an officer from Australia stood up and said, "well, as a representative of a rinky-dink Nation", and I had to say, truthfully, that I didn't mean him. I have two sons in the military and, therefore, could make a short list of countries which I wouldn't have any objection to them serving under. But it would be a rather short list. After you go beyond the NATO countries, it gets pretty sparse.

So those are the kinds of questions that I think are open. How do we do this?

What really disturbed me was the comment about, well, we will put U.S. forces under U.N. command; but of course, if they don't like the order, they don't have to obey it.

There is a principle of war called "unity of command" that is vital to battlefield success.

In the war of 1812, there was a disaster where the regular army crossed over the river to fight the Canadians and called the militia to back them up; and they said, no, we will not cross the river and fight outside the State.

So the terrible dilemma of being in a fight and having your allies say, no, we are not going to go today, that just won't work. There has to be some kind of an agreement that whoever the commander is, he does have unity of command and he can depend on the forces underneath his command.

Having said that, we can do that. We did that in the Gulf. Both Britain and France maintained sovereignty under their forces but put them under the operational command of the United States, and that works.

But those kinds of things need to be worked out if we are being serious about it.

PROS AND CONS OF PROPOSAL FOR A STANDBY U.N. ARMY

Mr. BEREUTER. One of the growing perceptions in this post-cold war era seems to be that we need to have some sort of multilateral approval, usually the U.N., in order to take action, even though it is clearly in our national interests, and I am, frankly, concerned about that.

One of the bolder proposals—and a second one that seems to be very similar—was Secretary General Boutros-Ghali's proposal for an agenda for peace for a standby force of designated troops from the member states that could be called upon quickly—and it aroused a lot of opposition in the United States, including from our military but also elsewhere—and then Sir Brian's proposal to create the U.N. volunteer army, which would be small, highly trained, placed under the command of the Security Council as I understand it.

I would like your reactions, Colonel and Sir Brian. I would like to have you say anything that would enlarge upon or correct my description of it and to speak to how it relates to the Secretary General's proposal and how it differs.

Either one of you first.

Colonel SUMMERS. In fact, at a lecture this morning—in several of my lectures recently—one of the themes I have tried to develop is the “keepers” that came out of the Gulf War.

There are four of them: The role of women in the military; the role of the reserve forces, essential for the future; joint operations, taken as a given now; and, finally, combined operations. We are going to fight as part of a coalition, because, as you said, there is a consensus that we need some kind of support, international support, for everything we do.

A very interesting piece by the New Republic's Charles Krauthammer during the Gulf War pointed out that what we have had—traditionally has been pseudo-multilateralism. In Korea, 400,000 U.S., 39,000 U.N. forces. In Vietnam, 500,000 U.S. forces, 47,000 free world military forces. The Gulf was a little more equitable, 500,000 U.S., 200,000 allies. But the point is the numbers are almost irrelevant. The American people insist on, the appearance at least of even the veneer of multilateralism.

We have seen it in the polls in Bosnia. The question was asked: Should the United States use military force in Bosnia as part of the U.N. force or NATO? About 80 percent of Americans say, yes, we should.

Asked the same question: Should we do it unilaterally? Almost the same percentage said, no, we shouldn't.

So regardless of the physical contributions, I think psychologically, the American people insist on this view of multilateralism.

Mr. BEREUTER. You are suggesting it is not new?

Colonel SUMMERS. Exactly. We want to be part of a larger force, and we want to think we have God and the world on our side. I guess that is not surprising.

The business of standby forces, I don't think the Congress would give the President the authority to use force. And, in fact, it hasn't. They want some control over the President's use of force so that the idea that we give the Secretary General of the U.N. authority to commit U.S. forces without prior congressional approval, I think is—

Mr. LANTOS. But these would not be U.S. forces. These would be U.S. citizens volunteering for the French Foreign Legion.

Colonel SUMMERS. I am aware of the proposal that each nation set aside forces under international forces. But I have—again I have no problem from a personal point of view over a U.N. foreign legion.

I think there are some problems involved in it. But, again, I think what it would come to is, yes, it is OK as long as it doesn't threaten our sovereignty.

But if it threatened the sovereignty of the United States, then I think it would be an entirely different issue. But if it is going to be effective, it is going to threaten somebody's sovereignty.

Mr. BEREUTER. From town hall meetings, the giant conspiracy theories are not there in that respect.

Colonel SUMMERS. I am from Ohio, and being from Nebraska—you probably pick up the same thing—but just as an aside, I happened to be in Siagon on the last day, and my South Vietnamese counterpart said to me, "How can you do this, abandon an ally in a time of need?" And I said, you don't understand; I am from Ohio, and not only do they not give a damn about South Vietnam, they are not too keen on New York and San Francisco, either.

So it is a basic attitude in the Midwest.

Mr. BEREUTER. Thank you. How does your proposal differ from that of the Secretary General. Yours is a smaller force, a quick reaction force, I think you called it, or something of that nature.

THE URQUHART PROPOSAL FOR A U.N. VOLUNTEER ARMY

Sir BRIAN URQUHART. Let me just go back to the beginning here. Because one has to remember, I think, to understand the complications of the U.N. as it was set up in 1945. Its main purpose really was to deal retroactively in a way that people didn't do with Hitler, Mussolini, and the Japanese in the 1930's.

And if you read the charter, it is a formula for dealing with major aggressors. And under that charter, there is Article 43, which provides for member states to make available to the Security Council forces to carry out the will of the Security Council.

And I may say that the United States' offer under Article 43 in 1947 was quite big. It was 20 infantry division; I think I am right in saying, 4 battle ships; 200 destroyers; 1,500 fighter aircraft—no, 1,500 bombers; and I think 22,000—2,250 fighters.

That was quite a big offer—the Russians objected to this, because they couldn't match it, and the thing sort of fell down. But this was the scale on which people were talking about U.N. action to defeat aggression at the beginning. Now that all fell down during the cold war.

What Boutros-Ghali has suggested, I think I am right in saying, is two things. One is Article 43 with a view to having more of a preparation for something unexpected like Saddam Hussein invad-

ing Kuwait in the future. And the other thing is peace enforcement units, which would be volunteer units from national forces which would be readily available if the Security Council wanted them to deploy rapidly in an emergency situation.

Mr. BEREUTER. Use of their existing military?

Colonel SUMMERS. Yes. That is right. I don't think anybody suggested this before.

Sir BRIAN URQUHART. But it has a problem, which has become clearer since, which is that governments, as there are more and more demands for troops in the U.N. operations, are increasingly suspicious of being asked to put troops in combat situations which are not directly relevant to their international security. And I think it is extremely understandable.

My proposal was to have a really very small force—certainly no threat to the United States, Colonel—which would be a kind of—a sort of pathfinder force. It would be—and it sounds—I know this sounds very starry eyed. But I don't think it is quite as stupid as it sounds. It would be available; it would be volunteers, individual volunteers, selected under the most rigorous possible process, by professionals; and it would be available to test the waters of, let us say, Sarajevo or Mogadishu or somewhere; and to go in there, to try to show on the ground that the Security Council is serious when it adopts resolutions. Because, at the moment, the Security Council has a very serious problem. It used to have a difficulty in never agreeing on anything. Now it agrees on almost everything, but the trouble is it can't make it stick. It has become a kind of resolution producing machine. And it sometimes, I think, is dangerous to its credibility.

It will have to be an immediate capacity for a small deployment to test out the water. It would conceivably be linked to calling in nonground troops in support, though I think that would be exceptional. But it, at least, would show that the Security Council was serious when, for example, it demands a cease-fire or tells the parties to a conflict they have to respect humanitarian efforts to feed refugees and deal with casualties.

At the moment, that doesn't happen. It takes months for anything to happen. And that is the difference, that this would be a force which would not be subject to the very legitimate restraint of a national legislature which says that the troops of this country are not going to be put under command of the U.N. to risk their lives in a conflict which is of no security interest to this country.

UPGRADING U.N. HEADQUARTER'S PEACEKEEPING INFRASTRUCTURE

Mr. BEREUTER. Well, as I am sure both of you know, there is an article in the U.N. Charter which provides for a military structure, an operational command which has never been activated. Last week, the House voted on something called the Sisisky Amendment, which would have provided some financial assistance authorization for upgrading the capacity of the United Nations to command and control of peacekeeping, peace enforcing forces in the field.

It has been said, with some hyperbole, I am sure, that if you call the U.N. headquarters on a weekend from Somalia and there is nobody to answer. What do you think of this kind of—the creation of

this kind of capacity? Is it essential? It was certainly controversial last week.

Sir BRIAN URQUHART. I would like to, just as an aside, deal with your—with the rather often quoted remark from the press that you don't get an answer on weekends from the U.N. That simply isn't true.

In fact, I can say with some heat that it wasn't true when I was there either. There was always somebody there, but what there wasn't was a kind of military staff room and a huge backup, because we never had the money for that.

I think it is absolutely essential, particularly that there are more troops in the field, that the U.N. begins to develop all aspects of a proper infrastructure for running operations in the field, including a situation and operations room and so on, which are properly staffed.

I think that is essential because, otherwise it is extremely difficult to do it. I believe this is actually now being done. But it still, unfortunately, is, to some extent, a matter of money, and not a very great deal of money, but nonetheless, money. And I think they are going to have to really, you know, make that clear.

Mr. BEREUTER. Colonel, would you like to comment?

Colonel SUMMERS. I think it is important to understand there are two dimension to military power: military capability, and military authority.

The problem with the U.N., we could provide military capability; but the military authority is another matter.

Military authority is the perception on the part of any adversary that you are serious and you have the will to use force.

And what happened to the United States is interesting in that respect after Vietnam. Its military capability was unchallenged. The military authority had reduced to almost nil to the point where countries like Grenada and Panama were pushing us around. In the old days, a President in the United States could say "I am not amused," and that would have been enough to take care of any one of them.

But we were at a point where we had to send military troops to enforce our writ. And I think that was one of the things that encouraged the aggression in the Middle East, that is, as a diplomat in Beijing said, "we thought you were a paper tiger; we always knew you had the capability, but we didn't think you had the will to use it."

I think that notion was disabused by the Gulf War. But, I think we are again eroding our military authority to some degree. And I think that is dangerous.

U.N. PEACEKEEPING AND MILITARY COMMAND STRUCTURE

But, how do you establish the military authority of the U.N.? The military authority of the United States depends, in large degree, on the Commander in Chief; that is, I think President Clinton has now proven that, don't push him too far because he will use force if he has to.

So I think that establishes the military authority of the United States. But can you do it with a collegial leadership such as the U.N. Security Council? I don't know. Who speaks for the U.N.?

Does the Secretary General or is it the Security Council in its entirety? Do we have a military command—the military command structure at the very top who issues the orders? Is it the Secretary General?

Sir BRIAN URQUHART. I think that is a very good point. And I am sorry, I didn't deal with Congressman Bereuter's point about the military staff committee. It is composed of the military officer of each of the five members of the permanent Security Council, and its function was to advise the Security Council on military force and on disarmament, which, in those days, was a very important item on the agenda.

For various reasons it has never been mobilized, and it has never been mobilized even after the cold war. I don't know why that is. It does, potentially, have great capacity. After all, it represents five of the leading military powers of the world, especially the United States. It has not been revived.

Colonel, you said, who commands; and that is a very good point. The idea in the Charter was that the Security Council would designate a unified command. And that is precisely what it did in Korea; it designated the United States. It did, in slightly different form, the same thing against Iraq. And I imagine it would do so in the future, because the United Nations has no military staff or command capacity at all.

MULTILATERAL OPERATIONS AND UNITY OF COMMAND QUESTIONS

Mr. BEREUTER. Didn't we just have some difficulties with the Italian contingent in Somalia, and the U.N. field commander, and New York headquarters, who speaks, what is the conflict? How is it resolved?

Sir BRIAN URQUHART. This, I think, comes of mixing two techniques, peacekeeping and enforcement, at the same time, which is a very confusing thing to do.

And also the command structure in Somalia is quite complicated. You have a U.S. deputy who has special relationships with the U.S. forces and then have all of the other people contributing, and in the very tough circumstances.

In Mogadishu, as I understand it, more than one contingent felt inclined to question the orders they were getting from the U.N. commander and refer it to their own capitals.

And this—as you rightly said, Colonel—this military authorization is a disaster. It is impossible. You can't run anything like that.

Colonel SUMMERS. We forget and we don't talk about some of the darker sides of military operations. In the old days, probably in the days when most enlisted men couldn't read or write, it was a requirement by law that they read the punitive articles of war every 6 months; and you would stand out there at formation, and they would read the punitive articles—and I must say they made an impression on me—disobedience of a direct order, death; on and on and on.

The Congress, by the way, made those laws; and they are still on the books. That is, there are some draconian principles to enforce obedience of orders in any military. I was reading a book of the battle of the Somme in 1914—and you may correct me if I'm wrong—but the author said, when they gave the order for the Brit-

ish troops to go over top at the Somme—the Prouost police went through the trenches and shot anyone who had not gone over the top.

That was sort of an extreme form of nonjudicial punishment, but there are those kinds of rules in any military to enforce discipline and enforce order under fire. It seems to me that the U.N. has got to have some clout if they are going to have a military operation. They have got to enforce a mechanism for obedience. Otherwise the military can't be worth a damn on the field.

Mr. BEREUTER. That is a new technique for the President on NAFTA.

I yield.

TOWARDS A "DUAL-USE" U.S. MILITARY

Mr. LANTOS. I must say I greatly enjoy the hearings as much because both of you are enormously stimulating.

I would like to come back to a basic issue that we dealt with at the very offset. There is the story or the legend, as both of you know, of the guns of Singapore in the Second World War, which were aimed at the sea. The enemy came from behind, and the guns were never fired.

If I accept your statement, Colonel Summers, that the U.S. military needs to do what it was meant to do and we have to create this special body to deal with peacekeeping, peace enforcements, et cetera, then you will clearly run into an enormous budgetary problem here because we are now approving a budget for 1994 for \$260 billion. We are approving that budget for a very unlikely military threat while we are not dealing with the real problems that are so palpably evident all over the globe.

There will be a growing reluctance here to vote these kinds of military budgets even though they are smaller than they used to be. If you talk to Les Aspin or any person in our Defense Department, they are very conscious of the fact that they must make our military dual or multiple use.

Sometimes we find as we try to do this, that it doesn't work. The most recent example was the use of the military in drug interdiction. We have just had a series of findings that claim it does not work. However hard these wonderful people tried, it didn't work.

But my feeling is that, for instance, support for NATO will evaporate unless NATO redefines its mission both geographically and functionally. I don't think most of my colleagues, myself included, will be ready to vote funds for NATO if it is to defend Western Europe against a nonexistent Soviet Union while not being willing to function in the former Yugoslavia.

So it seems to me that we really don't have the option of saying, well, this is the military which, as has historically been the case, will be used to deal with military threats or deter military threats. So, we have to create this whole other mechanism to deal with international peacekeeping, peace enforcement, et cetera.

It won't fly. That dog won't hunt in this Congress. Because the military, to earn its \$261 billion, will have to be able to do a variety of things, some of which historically it has not done, it has been reluctant to do, and maybe it cannot do well.

I am not suggesting anybody here has a formula of how to achieve this. But the problem is going to come down to a budgetary matter, and unless our military can be made to perform a variety of functions, support for defense budgets will drop precipitously. In my judgment, this would be a very undesirable and dangerous phenomenon.

Would you care to comment?

Colonel SUMMERS. I think General Powell addressed that very issue. As I said in my prepared statement, he said because we are able to fight and win our Nation's wars, because we are warriors, we are also uniquely able to do some other missions, peacekeeping, humanitarian relief and disaster relief, you name it, we can do it. But we should never want to do it in such a way that we lose sight of the focus of why we have armed forces, that is to fight and win the Nation's wars.

The problem is probably not as stark as it has been outlined. We have two militaries. We have a combat military and we have a combat support, combat service military. The MASH hospital that is now operating in Bosnia is practicing its wartime skills. It is improving its ability to fight in a war. The airlifters that are lifting supplies into Bosnia or into Somalia are practicing their wartime skills.

But that rifle company in Somalia is degrading its wartime skills. We need to understand that. We need to understand that, as we saw in the Gulf War, the training of maneuver units today is a full-time job. That is why those National Guard brigades were not committed to combat, because there is some question of whether or not you can do it on a part-time basis. It is incredibly complex to train infantry, armor or cavalry units for modern warfare.

I remember my days as a new lieutenant. When I fell out my platoon there were six people on the post pistol team, three people on the post rifle team, and three people running the bowling alley, and on and on. So when you fall out for training maybe you have two squads rather than four squads.

We are doing that to some degree with the military today. We are parceling some out to Somalia, some out to Macedonia and hither and yon. We are going to pay a price for it. As I said, much of the military can be used in a dual capacity anyway, the majority of the military, as a matter of fact. Where we need to be careful is with our combat units. I think we need to look very carefully at that.

Secondly, perhaps allied with what was said earlier, maybe we ought to look at a new Nixon doctrine saying the United States can provide the transport and supplies but maybe we need some help with these front line people, particularly in peace enforcement, and maybe some of these other nations can do it. Our strength is—as President Bush said during the Gulf War, we are the only nation in the world that could have done it because we have the lift and the logistic background.

So maybe that is a way out of some of these dilemmas.

Mr. LANTOS. Sir Brian.

AN EMBRYONIC GLOBAL POLICE FORCE

Sir BRIAN URQUHART. At the risk of seeming unrealistic or whatever, undoubtedly we sort of drifted by surprise into a rather new situation in the post-cold war world. In 1945, whether it was right or wrong, we had a whole world system, mostly set forth by the United States, for trying to make the world a better place than it was in 1939. But we don't have anything for the post-cold war like that because we were taken by surprise.

It is very important, even if it seems not very immediate, to try to develop some new concepts encompassing, among other things, international responsibility and particularly service with U.N. operations. I suspect what we are looking at—if you look back 100 years from now you are looking actually at all these muddles the U.N. gets into and some of the successes that never get half as much attention.

We are looking at the embryonic police force of the world community that politicians are always talking about in their speeches, but which doesn't exist yet. I think it is very important that we get the U.N. operations seen in that real perspective as regards cost, size, and as regards their place in national defense and foreign policy.

Up to now in most countries—and I am afraid it is true of the United States also, the U.N. has always tended to be regarded as a kind of mendicant outfit which is somehow on the periphery, which you occasionally have to fall back on. That is one of the reasons why the organization is having so much difficulty now.

If you look at a much longer perspective of what on earth it is you are aiming to develop over a number of years, here it might be easier. I am sure the military establishment, both here and in other countries as well, see a very important role, which I am sure it has, in our future which is not at all like what we have been dealing with in the last 45 years. We have to think about new concepts and doctrines and how they fit into what eventually will be, if we are going to preserve any reasonable degree of life on this planet, some kind of world system.

We know that what happens in other parts of the world affects everybody. You cannot get away from it. I think it is important to look at it a little bit in that context now and then.

THE DIFFICULTY OF PURSUING A NATION-BUILDING STRATEGY

Colonel SUMMERS. I might add something as a thought.

Congress gave the military three primary commissions: One is the defense of the homelands. Second is to enhance U.S. interests around the world. The third one we don't like to talk about at all, is to provide for the internal security of the United States. That is a mission the U.S. military has always abhorred, and we have tried to force it down to the lowest possible level.

If we have riots in this country, let the local police take care of it. And if they can't, let the State police or the militia take care of it. Only as the last resort will we involve Federal troops in that operation.

Now what we are asking them to do internationally is the same thing they have abhorred internally. Now we are going to intervene in the internal affairs of nations around the world in order to na-

tion-build, whatever you want to call it. We are not very good at that. That is the area we have to look at.

How do you do that? Is it legal, legitimate, morally proper for the United States to interfere in the lives of other nations?

Someone said the other day we have to build democracy around the world. Why don't we declare a Magna Carta and wait 600 years? We have some 40 problems going on now. We have really bitten off an awfully big piece. I think properly this committee is asking itself how can we do that. And then we need to ask ourselves whether we should do that.

Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Bereuter.

Mr. BEREUTER. Do you think there is a set of training or a curriculum of training for peacekeepers? Do you think that some nations should routinely be provided peacekeeping forces for U.N. activities?

Colonel SUMMERS. When the counterinsurgency fad first started in the Kennedy administration General Decker, the Army Chief of Staff, told President Kennedy any good soldier can handle guerrillas. Whereupon he was fired. The fad was counterinsurgency. When I went to Vietnam as a young captain and I was going to practice counterinsurgency, I found myself up against an enemy who was fighting by the old rules. He thought his mission was to close in on the enemy and destroy him by fire and maneuver. He was not thinking about nation building and counterinsurgency and all this crap. He was thinking about killing me.

I think General Decker was right in that sense. Maybe at some level counterinsurgency has some of these components. But at the fighting edge it was a matter of survival.

Peacekeeping is not as difficult militarily because everyone has agreed to keep the peace, and you are sort of the umpire. Peace enforcement however, is an entirely different operation and there you are back to fundamental military skills.

I was at a conference in San Diego for the U.S. Naval Institute. Admiral Jeremiah, the Vice Chairman of the JCS, who I have great respect for, was extolling the peacekeeping role of the Marines in Mogadishu. I privately said to him later, sir, I don't like to disagree; it was not the peacekeeping aspects of the Marine Corps. Otherwise, they would have been hunkered down with those Pakistanis behind the wall at the airport. It was the war-making powers of the Marine Corps that made them effective.

They came in there and essentially said, don't screw with us. We are not going to wait to be fired on. We will take action if necessary and they established a climate of law and order very quickly so that the relief operations could proceed.

The problem was and is, how do you turn it over. I think the thought was we will just turn it over to the U.N. and walk away.

My son, by the way, happened to be part of that task force with the Marines. They had outstanding intelligence. We turned it over to the CIA who believes in high tech and has done away with spies and all those nasty things a long time ago, and their HUMINT capability is almost nil and suddenly we can't find Aided. He uses runners rather than electronic warfare. So again I think we need to look hard at what we are doing and I think we need to look hard at how we do it and what skills we are talking about.

We are not talking about the peacekeeping skills of the U.S. Military because I think those are not hard to come by. The difficult problem is peace enforcement in the internal affairs of another nation. Vietnam, it seemed to me, was evidence we are not very good at that sort of thing.

That is why I thought the one ray of light during that whole experience was CORDS, which was an attempt to deal with that sort of nonmilitary aspects of the conflict that had at least some initial success. And maybe we ought to build on that success and understand precisely what we are talking about, not peacekeeping but peace enforcement and war fighting on a very small campaign within another country. That is a difficult operation. There is no doubt about it.

Mr. LANTOS. I am most grateful to both of you gentlemen. You have given us an enormously stimulating afternoon and many insights. We look forward to having both of you back.

This hearing is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 2:50 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

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U.S. PARTICIPATION IN UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS

THURSDAY, OCTOBER 7, 1993

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL SECURITY,
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS,
Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 9:30 a.m. in room 2200, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Tom Lantos (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Mr. LANTOS. The Subcommittee on International Security, International Organizations and Human Rights will please come to order.

At the outset, I would like to express my appreciation to Beth Poisson, the leading staff person on this hearing, for doing her usual outstanding job; and Dr. Robert King, staff director of the subcommittee; as well as to Mike Ennis of the very fine Republican staff.

Today the Subcommittee on International Security, International Organizations and Human Rights will hold yet another hearing, in our current series, on the subject of U.S. participation in collective peacekeeping activities.

Our previous witnesses have included Sir Brian Urquhart, former United Nations Under Secretary General for Political Affairs; Ambassador Madeleine Albright, a member of the President's Cabinet and our permanent representative to the United Nations; Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick; Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski; and others.

As our Nation moves toward redefining U.S. vital interests in the post-cold war world and as we engage in a national debate over how best to defend our interests, the role of the United States in international peacekeeping has become a hotly contested topic. The tragic death of 13 young Americans and the capture by hostile Somali forces of at least 1 American service man during U.S. participation in the U.N. peacekeeping effort in Somalia further sharpened this debate.

While today's hearing was scheduled well before the events of this past week and while it is not our intention to focus specifically on these tragic events, U.S. participation in U.N. peacekeeping activities in Somalia highlights the dilemmas that our Nation faces as we redefine U.S. foreign policy.

I think it is also important that we clearly understand that while our immediate concern is to see to it that American servicemen in

captivity be returned safe and sound, there will be long-term, very important consequences resulting from the way we handle the Somalia crisis.

You must also consider the tradeoff between unilateral and multilateral action. Clearly, there are occasions when vital American interests will require unilateral intervention. On other occasions, we will work through established organizations like NATO; but occasionally, multilateral action, under United Nations auspices or otherwise, may be more appropriate.

It was evident in the Gulf War that when multilateral effort is desirable, it usually takes American leadership to galvanize the international community to action.

As we consider the circumstances under which the United States should commit our military forces, there are fundamental questions we must consider. We must clearly define conditions under which our Nation's military may be used. There are conflicting constitutional prerogatives—the President is the Commander in Chief of our armed forces, but our constitution delegates to the Congress the decision to make war.

In addition, in the post-cold war world, we are beginning to move beyond the traditional role of peacekeeping. In the past, United Nations peacekeeping missions have only been undertaken when there has been an end to hostilities between the fighting parties and the belligerents have agreed to the involvement of peacekeeping forces.

The Cyprus peacekeeping mission of the United Nations is a perfect example of that. Lately, there has been serious discussion of U.N. peace enforcing action—the commitment of forces, to end hostilities, and to compel the belligerents to seek peaceful solutions to their differences.

The operation in Somalia is clearly such a peace enforcing activity. The United Nations Secretary General and various other international leaders have proposed the creation of some type of United Nations stand-by force in order to give the U.N. a quick-response capability. Further serious questions have been raised about how U.N. peacekeeping operations need to be funded.

There are currently 14 United Nations peacekeeping operations under way around the globe involving about 80,000 troops drawn from 74 nations. American forces are in Macedonia, as well as Somalia. In addition, we are now consulting with our NATO allies regarding our participation in air support activities in Bosnia, if needed, and the contribution of U.S. troops to a force of NATO peacekeepers in Bosnia once the three factions in that country have reached agreement on a truce.

Since I suspect that many of the key questions we will be facing today will involve Somalia, I would like to call attention to the fact that, from the beginning of our involvement, Somalia has been a bipartisan effort. By last November, civil war in that country had resulted in anarchy and mass starvation, with 1,000 people dying everyday and nearly 1 million refugees forced into exile. On December 4 of last year, President Bush stated that the United States would intervene under United Nations auspices, and I now quote, "to create a secure environment . . . so that food can move . . . to the people in the countryside."

The Bush administration envisioned that U.S. troops would be withdrawn as soon as humanitarian relief operations could be carried out and a multinational United Nations operation could take over the process of long-term development and national reconciliation.

The Clinton administration has continued that policy with the withdrawal of about 80 percent of the U.S. forces that were in Somalia and the adoption of U.N. Security Council Resolution 814 in March of this year. Under President Bush, 28,000 U.S. troops were sent to Somalia. On Inauguration Day last January 20, there were 25,000 troops still in Somalia. Today that number is under 5,000; and even with the additional force deployment that was just announced, there are now only about one-fifth as many American forces in Somalia as there were at the height of the operation.

We are enormously fortunate today to have as our witness a major participant in the Bush administration's decision not only to commit U.S. military forces in Somalia but also in the key decision to commit U.S. forces to the Persian Gulf War. He is Secretary Lawrence Eagleburger, Senior Foreign Policy Advisor at the firm of Baker and Worthington, our former Secretary of State.

Secretary Eagleburger has played a pivotal and distinguished role in U.S. foreign policy for over a quarter century. He was a career Foreign Service Officer who served on the National Security Council staff as Executive Assistant to Secretary Kissinger; as U.S. Ambassador to Yugoslavia; as Assistant Secretary of State for Europe; as Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, the highest career position in our Department of State; as Deputy Secretary of State; and he culminated his public service as Secretary of State, ably serving in that capacity until January 20 of this year.

Mr. Secretary, few individuals have had such a prominent and successful and distinguished career in the Foreign Service as you have, and few individuals have given our country the great service that you have provided. We are all grateful to you and delighted to have you with us.

Before turning to you, Secretary Eagleburger, I would like to call on my friend, the Ranking Republican of the subcommittee, Congressman Bereuter.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Lantos follows:]

Opening Statement
Honorable Tom Lantos
Hearing on U.S. Participation in U.N. Peacekeeping Activities (3)
October 7, 1993

The subcommittee will come to order. Today, the Subcommittee on International Security, International Organizations, and Human Rights will hold the third hearing in our current series on the subject "U.S. Participation in United Nations Peacekeeping Activities." Our previous witnesses have included Sir Brian Urquhart, former United Nations Under Secretary General for Special Political Affairs, and Ambassador Madeleine Albright, a Member of President Clinton's Cabinet and the Permanent United States Representative to the United Nations.

As our nation moves toward redefining U.S. vital interests in the post-Cold War world and as we engage in a national debate over how best to defend these interests, the role of the United States in international peacekeeping has become a hotly contested topic. The death of 12 young Americans and the capture by hostile Somali forces of at least one American serviceman during U.S. participation in the U.N. peacekeeping effort in Somalia have further sharpened that debate.

While today's hearing was scheduled well before the events of this past week and while it is not our intention to focus specifically on the tragic events this week, United States participation in the U.N. peacekeeping activities in Somalia highlight the dilemmas and conflicts that our nation faces as we redefine United States foreign policy.

We must consider the trade-off between unilateral and multilateral action abroad. Clearly there are occasions when vital American interests will require unilateral intervention, but on other occasions, multilateral action may be more appropriate. As was evident in the Gulf War, however, when multilateral effort is desirable, it may take American leadership to galvanize the international community to action.

As we consider circumstances under which the United States should commit our military forces, there are fundamental questions we must consider. We must clearly define conditions under which our nation's military will be used. There are conflicting constitutional prerogatives — the President is the Commander in Chief of our armed forces, but our constitutional delegates to Congress to decision of making war.

In addition, in the post-Cold War World, we are beginning to move beyond the traditional role of peacekeeping. In the past, United Nations peacekeeping missions have only been undertaken when there has been an end to hostilities between the fighting parties and belligerents have agreed to the involvement of peacekeeping forces. Lately there has been serious discussion of U.N. *peaceenforcing* action — the commitment of forces to end hostilities and compel the belligerents to seek peaceful solutions to their differences. The operation in Somalia is such a *peaceenforcing* activity. The United Nations Secretary General and various other international leaders have proposed the creation of some type of United Nations stand-by force in order to give the U.N. a quick-response capability. Further serious questions have been raised about how U.N. peacekeeping operations should be funded.

There are now 14 UN peacekeeping operations underway around the world involving nearly 80,000 troops, drawn from 74 nations. American forces are in Macedonia, as well as Somalia. In addition, we are now consulting with our NATO allies regarding our participation in air support activities in Bosnia if needed, and the contribution of U.S. troops to a force of NATO or UN peacekeepers in Bosnia, once the three warring factions have reached agreement on a truce.

Since I suspect that many of the key questions we will be facing today will involve Somalia, I would like to call attention to the fact that from the beginning our involvement in Somalia has been a bipartisan effort. By last November civil war in that country had resulted in anarchy and mass starvation, with one thousand people a day dying and nearly one million refugees forced into exile. On December 4, President Bush stated that the United States would intervene under United Nations auspices "to create a secure environment . . . so that food can move . . . to the people in the countryside."

The Bush administration envisioned that United States troops would be withdrawn as soon as humanitarian relief operations could be carried out and a multinational United Nations operation could take over the process of long-term development and national reconciliation. The Clinton administration has continued that policy with the withdrawal of 80 percent of the United States forces that were in Somalia and the adoption of U.N. Security Council Resolution 814 in March of this year. Under President Bush, 28,000 U.S. troops were sent to Somalia. On Inauguration Day last January, there were 25,000 troops still in Somalia. Today that number is less than 5,000 and even with the additional force being announced

by the President last night, there are still only about one-fifth as many American forces as there were at the height of the operation.

We are fortunate indeed today to have as our witness a key participant in the Bush Administration's decision to commit U.S. military forces in Somalia. He is Lawrence Eagleberger – Senior Foreign Policy Advisor at the firm of Baker-Worthington and former Secretary of State. Secretary Eagleberger has played a pivotal role in United States foreign policy for most of the past quarter century. He is a career foreign service officer who served on the National Security Council Staff with Henry Kissinger, as U.S. Ambassador to Yugoslavia, as Assistant Secretary of State for Europe, as Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs, Deputy Secretary of State, and finally as Secretary of State until January 20th of this year.

Mr. Secretary, few individuals have had such a prominent career in the foreign service as you have, and few individuals have given our country the distinguished service that you have. We are delighted to have you with us today.

I would now like to recognize our Ranking Republican member of the Subcommittee on International Security, International Organizations and Human Rights, Congressman Doug Bereuter of Nebraska.

Mr. Secretary, please proceed.

Mr. BEREUTER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I want to congratulate you in scheduling yet another timely and important hearing. It is tragically opportune.

I can truthfully say over the last 9 months this subcommittee has benefited from a stellar series of witnesses on diverse subjects.

Yet, as we read today's headlines of plans for more troops to be deployed in Somalia, you can scarcely see a topic of greater importance than international peacekeeping and the U.S. role in that activity. There is perhaps no more knowledgeable person that we can call before us than our witness today.

In 1963, as I understand it, a young American Foreign Service Officer named Larry Eagleburger secured his reputation when he was given responsibility for organizing the Western response to a horrible earthquake in Central Europe. I raise this because the earthquake occurred in Macedonia where we now have 300 peacekeepers stationed to deter further Serbian aggression. I would like to see many more heavily armed personnel there, as would the Chairman. It is likely Secretary Eagleburger knows more about Macedonia leaders, political organizations, and security threats than any other American. I hope he will share his thoughts on that subject today.

Clearly, there are other peacekeeping matters occupying our attention at the present time. I was among those who supported President Bush in his decision to provide humanitarian relief to Somalia. But I also agreed with President Bush when he said our assistance should be of short duration and we should not be participating in a longer term peacekeeping or Nation-building operation.

Yesterday I went back to look at what specifically was said and the key language was "... provide a secure environment for delivery of food to starving people"; and immediately after that, there was a clamor inside and outside government to begin to expand that role.

Unfortunately, during this administration, we have seen that role enlarged. Delaying, accepting the delays the Secretary General asked for until he had U.N. forces there, and then agreeing to participate directly.

The Nation has very, very strong views about what happened in the last 2 days. That is understandable. Seventy to 80 percent of the people in this country want our troops to be withdrawn immediately. Seventy to 80 percent want us to use whatever force is necessary to pull out United States and other prisoners that might be held out of Somalia.

I cannot recall many instances, even Vietnam, where we had 80 percent of our troops in an engagement as casualties. To sit there for 7 hours because no response to extract them could be marshalled, that flies in the face of what Admiral Howe said the other day, that this was a remarkable demonstration of participation in this U.N. peacekeeping force. I could not believe he said that.

I think Secretary Aspin bears a large share of the responsibility for what happened, because, in fact, he did stop adequate armored personnel carriers and weaponry from going to support our personnel there, if that is what it took to extract them. Apparently, that is the case.

I distinctly recall, as I said, what President Bush said our mission was there. I hope Secretary Eagleburger, who played a major role in the decision to deploy in Somalia, could spend some time addressing that initial deployment.

I think there is rewriting of history being attempted right now. I do want to call attention to what I think was an important statement by President Clinton at the United Nations General Assembly. He spelled out four questions which amounted to criteria about when U.S. forces should be involved in peacekeeping operations. I think those are very appropriately stated. I think they should be applied to Somalia retroactively.

I have been on the floor calling for a rapid and orderly withdrawal of our personnel since March; and, in fact, our Policy Committee on the Republican side has been calling for that formally since April 1. We sent the President a reminder yesterday of what we precisely said that is just as relevant today, now tragically more relevant, in fact, than it was then.

Also, I hope that the President may consider one additional criteria to what he said at the United Nations. That is: Is it in our national interests to be involved in that particular area since we have anarchy, civil war, at least taking place at least in a dozen locations around the globe?

Adding that criteria, our involvement in peacekeeping activities in Somalia fails on all five counts.

Mr. Secretary, I look forward to your testimony. I commend you for your tremendous service to the country over the years. It goes back to 1963, as I understand it.

Mr. LANTOS. Thank you very much.

Congressman McCloskey.

Mr. MCCLOSKEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I must say it is an honor and pleasure to have Mr. Eagleburger here and to see him again. He is so knowledgeable in so many areas that we could spend hours talking today and never run out of materials.

Mr. Bereuter may well be correct in that opinion polls show that 70 to 80 percent of the American people want U.S. troops out of Somalia. That is the way polls are.

Think, however, that a pullout now would leave American policy, not to mention respect for it and our status, in a state of disarray, with the mission unaccomplished and with people in increasing peril. I would hope that, even as we are informed of and probably accept an exit scenario, we do give that some thought. As we all know, there are hostages in Mogadishu, and many brave military personnel have made a commitment and sacrifices.

I would also say it is fine to have 20-20 hindsight and make judgments concerning the actions of any Secretary or major governmental official—and Larry knows I have some strong views as to some of the decisions he made or did not make as Secretary of State—but, I daresay, given all the decisions that Secretary Aspin has to make, both militarily and otherwise, I would hope that the Congress would not focus on the downside of one particular decision.

I think he is eminently capable, and I think this is the time, above all, for the Congress to pull behind the administration with

a reasonable policy and to help lead the American people and not just be driven by opinion polls.

I do hope, Mr. Eagleburger, we do have time to get into Bosnia.

Mr. EAGLEBURGER. I was afraid you would say that.

Mr. MCCLOSKEY. Particularly, I might say, where should we be going from here? What are the implications of the present partition plan as to international policy and U.N. resolutions?

Another unresolved and rapidly emerging area is Russia and what it calls the "near abroad." Just what is the Russian military and political leadership up to in places like Georgia? What does that bode for us?

It is good to have someone like Mr. Eagleburger here. This is going to be a wonderful hearing.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. LANTOS. Congressman Smith.

Mr. SMITH. I want to add my voice in welcoming you to our subcommittee and say, having worked with you very closely in the past, I have deep respect for him and look forward to his views.

Mr. LANTOS. Congressman Sawyer.

Mr. SAWYER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Let me reiterate my gratitude to you for this series of hearings and particularly for the timeliness of this hearing. I look forward to Mr. Eagleburger's testimony.

I yield back whatever time I have.

Mr. LANTOS. Congresswoman Snowe.

Ms. SNOWE. I want to add my welcome to Mr. Eagleburger. I think the committee is fortunate today to have the benefit of his expertise and experience and to have him provide his opinion and positions on these issues with respect to peacekeeping.

I think we have seen the tragedy in Somalia, and it raises a larger question about the overall role of peacekeeping and the U.S. participation in peacekeeping forces and expansion of that mission by the administration as well as the United Nations and what are the implications for future U.S. policy, the military, and the men and women serving in those peacekeeping forces.

Welcome, Mr. Eagleburger.

Mr. LANTOS. Congressman Martinez.

Mr. MARTINEZ. Not to be redundant, welcome. We have not had the pleasure of meeting, but your name is synonymous with the issues we are talking about today.

I want to add a word to what Frank has said already about casting the shadow of blame on anyone. People in places like Mr. Aspin have decisions to make. They are based on the best available information at the time. Also moving into it is the idea of judgment. If judgment in one instance is bad, it is not bad in every instance. It happens that way. Sometimes you cannot predict what people of evil mind and spirit will do in particular situations.

I think in the time I have been back home this last weekend, I heard all kinds of comments on this particular situation from, we ought to go in with a sizable force and just knock the devil out of Aided and all his people and get out very quickly after setting up a perimeter of defense so we can get those people out safely.

I also heard the comment, let's get out right away; let's cut our losses and move. Other people say, hey, why are we there in the

first place? We went there with a humanitarian effort in mind; and instead of cheering us for that, they are cheering the death of one of our people. It doesn't sound like they are very grateful for the U.N. peacekeeping force that moved in to be able to get the food and medical supplies to the people that needed them.

It leaves a lot of questions for—with people and a lot of questions that are unanswered yet. Hopefully hearings like this, Mr. Lantos—and I commend you for holding this hearing—might bring forth some of the answers the American people need to have before they can firmly answer a poll with any kind of intelligence.

I have never really believed too much in polls because it is the way you frame the question and the questions you ask. I could draw up a poll that would get any kind of response I want. I don't really depend on polls. I think we know for a fact there is an anti-being in Somalia feeling by the majority of the American people now but with different spins on that. So I hope we can, in Congress, where we are supposed to be leaders, help educate the American public so they can make a better decision.

Again, I commend Mr. Lantos for holding this hearing. I have to excuse myself before too long. I have to go to another hearing. I am very interested in the testimony to be given today. I will read it in full.

Mr. LANTOS. Thank you very much.

Secretary Eagleburger, delighted to have you. You may proceed in any way you choose.

STATEMENT OF HON. LAWRENCE EAGLEBURGER, SENIOR POLICY ADVISOR, BAKER, WORTHINGTON

Mr. EAGLEBURGER. Mr. Chairman, I do not have a prepared statement. When I was in the government, I had lots of people to write it for me. I always had one. Now that I am unemployed, it is a little more difficult.

What I would like to try—

Mr. LANTOS. We welcome the absence of a prepared statement.

Mr. EAGLEBURGER. I am relieved.

What I would like to try to do is just think aloud with you for a few minutes and then go to questions.

What I want to focus on for just a couple of minutes is not any individual issue such as Somalia but a little philosophy about the question of peacekeeping, and really peacemaking; because I think now we are seeing, in the Somalia case at least, that that is going to be on the agenda. We are going to have to recognize there is a difference between the two.

It ought to be, I think, very obvious to everybody by now, that with the end of the cold war and the bipolar confrontation, that it has removed the sword of Damocles of nuclear holocaust perhaps, but what we are also seeing as a consequence of that, to the surprise of some, is a much more unstable global situation, not simply around the periphery of what was the Soviet Union, but I think generally we are seeing increasing instability of a whole host of different kinds—some of it ethnic—but whatever the cause, with the end of the cold war, to some degree the constraints the cold war imposed on the superpowers has gone and with that has gone some of the constraints on a number of smaller nations that stood be-

tween the two superpowers and, in the case of what was the Soviet Union, substantial instability as a consequence of the collapse of the Soviet Union.

That is not going to go away. My personal view is we are in for several decades of more of the same. Bosnia is an example but so is Nagorno-Karabakh, Abkhazia, and Georgia. It is not going to stop.

I think it ought to be equally obvious that the international community and the United States, in particular is not, at this stage, structured in a very rational way to begin to deal with these kinds of problems. Indeed, what we have seen as these kinds of problems develop is ad hoc attempts to answer each particular case.

We can argue whether we should or should not be in Bosnia. The fact of the matter is it has been a matter of debate and principally a matter of debate because, as far as the United States is concerned, it depends upon what the United States decides to do whether or not there is effective peacekeeping in a place like Bosnia or in Somalia or if we are going to become engaged in Nagorno-Karabakh, others will follow. My point being here, at the present stage, given the fact there is no institutional place to repair, in each particular case when these issues become important, we go through or will go through a national debate on what our response ought to be and how we ought to organize, if we should, the international community to deal with it.

We are on the hot seat every time. We may make wise decisions, or we may make unwise decisions as to when to intervene and what kind of coalition to put together; but the fact of the matter is we are going to face, for some years to come, these kinds of questions put to the body politic and to you Members of the Congress and to the President for a long time. And there is no given structure at this stage to which we can repair to try to have some sort of institutional answer.

It is in that regard I would like to talk for just a few minutes and I will give you ideas I have. I do not claim that they are by any means an answer. They are an attempt on my part to try to lay out at least a possible beginning of an answer to the development of an institutional structure that would make some of these decisions easier.

I happen to be one of those people who does believe that in cases like this, the creation of sensible institutions makes a difference. The creation of NATO has made a difference. The creation of the OECD made a difference in other cases. The point is we spent 50 years developing a host of international institutions which, to some degree at least, have permitted the United States, while in a leadership role, not to have to bear all the responsibility for the decisions. As things now stand with regard to peacekeeping and perhaps peacemaking, that sort of an institution doesn't exist.

I am going to say to you that if you look around the field, maybe we could create some new institution. But at this stage, I am going to say to you something I would never have said 5 years ago. I am not sure I am as convinced as I will sound in what I say. I see no other place to go and to look than to the United Nations. But let me make it clear at the beginning, I am not talking about some supranational institution. I am not talking about a Secretary General

who can order American troops around or anything of that sort. But what I am suggesting to you is that, given the kind of world I think we face and will face, there is at least some sense to say to ourselves if we assume for a moment that there is an international decision joined by the President of the United States, that there should be a peacekeeping operation in Country X, then we need to have the kinds of institutions in place that will make the effect of carrying out those decisions more effective clearly than they are today.

I would suggest to you several things that could be done. First of all, it seems to me that we ought to be coming to grips with the question that the forces that are used in peacekeeping, much less those that may have to be used in peacemaking, are cobbled together in each case without much thought about how they relate militarily to each other. Often they have not practiced together.

We have even seen cases, I gather in Somalia, where they cannot communicate because the radio systems do not intermesh. It would seem there is wisdom to thinking about having all possible contributing countries earmark forces which could be used if and when the national authority decides to use them, that those forces then could begin to maneuver together, could begin to practice together, could begin to do the kinds of training that would mean that when they are put in the place in any particular instance, they have worked together, they can carry on a far more effective operation than is now the case.

I would also suggest to you, if this can be done over time, it can relieve the United States, to some degree, of the degree to which it would have to be involved. I would say to you, as far as I can look into the future, the United States in any peacekeeping operation, is going to have to provide the logistic and transportation support. There is nobody else that can do it. That does not mean we have to become involved with forces on the ground in combat roles as often as is the case. I would suggest to you one thing that could be done is, in fact, for potential contributing countries to earmark their forces, and we find ways in which they can begin to train together, find ways in which their equipment can be made inter-operable and so forth.

I would suggest, as well, that the Secretary General need a far more effective and beefed up military planning staff. When we were dealing with Boutros-Ghali on the question of going into Somalia—and I was up there talking to him—he was at his wit's end because his planning staff—there were few of them—were engaged in planning operations at the same time. In effect, we have to provide planning staff to the Secretary General to take care of the Somali operation.

Again, the United Nations is always the place to which we all repair when there is no other alternative. I am saying to you there are some alternatives we ought to be trying to build that would take some of the responsibility off of the United States.

Command and control assets ought to be beefed up with regard to the Secretary General. All of this, Mr. Chairman, with a clear understanding that if there is a proposal for a peacekeeping operation, it must be approved, obviously, by the command authorities in the United States and approved by the Security Council.

So I am not asking for any additional authorities given to the Secretary General. I am saying that the authorities that are there and the ability to carry out decisions once they are made by the Security Council can be substantially beefed up in ways that could make the operations more effective and I think, over time, reduce the degree to which the rest of the world looks to us to provide most of the wherewithal for these kinds of operations.

I would suggest to you as well—and I think Somalia is just the first example—there is increasingly going to be a demand to think about whether we want to engage in peacemaking operations. There is a real distinction here. The question—and, again, I have no specific answer to the issue. I would suspect, however, that there will be times in which the international community and the President of the United States and the Congress are prepared to say this situation is so bad that we have to go and see what we can do multilaterally to begin to enforce a peace.

Let me say to you in this regard, it would seem to me one of the things that needs to be thought about and I think can be developed is, I think it is also fairly clear that NATO could, in a number of cases, be the executive agent for the Secretary General. They have 50 years of practice. If nothing else, NATO could be used to help train the kinds of forces I am talking about that would be earmarked for the future. I think we have to be careful how we move NATO into those roles because, obviously, there will be problems in Moscow and other places with regard to that. But NATO provides a resource that I think could be invaluable in making the U.N. itself more effective as a peacekeeping operation.

Very briefly—and I am prepared to talk about this further—but my point is simply that we are not internationally organized to deal with the kinds of challenges that I think we will face in the coming years.

One possible way to become more effective is, in fact, to look at ways we could make the U.N. more effective as an agent to carry out the will of the member states so long as everybody understands it is the will of the member states and not the will of the Secretary General that must be governing.

With regard to the question of the principles that I think have to apply in terms of peacekeeping or peacemaking, and again the demand right now with regard to Somalia, is to provide a strategy to provide some sense of objectives and so forth. All of that I think is relevant.

I think it is also important to recognize that while you can establish some general principles with regard to when peacekeeping ought to be engaged in, you have to be very careful not to be too precise. I do think, for example, just to give you some examples of what the President is going to have to face, number one is the obvious question of, is it in our national interests?

You cannot define that other than to say at the time that the issue arises, people are going to have to take a look at the particular challenge and see whether, in fact, namely, to engage in a peacekeeping operation would have a deleterious impact on the national interests of the United States.

One of the questions that simply has to be asked—and it is where you get into differences over whether we ought to do some-

thing in Bosnia or Somalia—one of the questions that has to be asked is not, is the particular crisis terribly dangerous; it may well be. But part of the answer that has to be arrived at is, what are the costs of trying to deal with it? Can it be dealt with effectively; at reasonable cost? If the costs are too high, then you have a much more difficult question of deciding whether or not you want to engage.

While I am perfectly prepared to talk about Bosnia—and it is a classic case, one of the places that Congressman McCloskey and I have talked about before—I am personally of the view that engaging in peacekeeping in Bosnia potentially is so expensive that it at least deserves careful consideration.

When we decided on Somalia, the judgment was under the circumstances of the objective that we went in for in the first place that the potential costs were not great and the potential benefits of saving half a million people from starving to death were worth the risks. The balance of risk and cost, risk and benefit, is one of the issues that will have to be looked at specifically in each individual specific case. I know of no way to establish a set of principles that answers that question for you in the absence of an examination of the particular question.

I want to end here. But let me make a couple of remarks with regard to Somalia.

I need to say to all of you, first, that I am a deep believer that when the country is in trouble and the President is in trouble, I don't care who he is, we ought to be looking for answers. We have to understand that the President and the country have got to get through the particular crisis.

So while I am prepared to discuss how we got into Somalia and whether mistakes were made, I also must tell you that in the end, the President—and I will disagree with him, I have disagreed with him on where we are in Somalia—the President deserves consideration and support in terms of trying to get us out of this mess. So I would be a little bit careful in my comments.

Let me make one comment which will not make me popular with lots of people. I happen to believe there were mistakes that led to the situation we are now in in Somalia.

That having been said, I must tell you that I think how we resolve the crisis now will have a substantial impact on the future of peacekeeping and how it will be looked at by us and by the United Nations. We need—unless we are prepared to say we are never going to engage in it again, we need to understand that how we deal with extracting ourselves from the Somali situation will affect the way we and the United Nations and its member states look at the future of peacekeeping.

I would say another thing: If in reaction to the killing of Americans, awful and tragic as that is, is that it leads to the quick and immediate or almost immediate withdrawal of the United States from the peacekeeping operation and if we are intending to engage in future peacekeeping operations, that reaction to the killing of these Americans is simply an invitation the next time to the pip-squeak, the future Aideed, that if you kill Americans, you will get them out.

We must be very careful not to give the next Aideed the impression that all he has to do is murder an American or Americans and that leads to our withdrawal.

So as we try to think through the difficult task of getting out of Somalia—and we must get out—we need to think as well about how we do it and the consequences for the next time.

The tragedy of these kinds of cases when you get into them and when you change your objectives and do not change your means at the same time and, in fact, maybe do not understand you changed your objectives or the means need to be changed as well, is when you run into the kind of problem we are now in in Somalia, the difficulty of extracting yourself is there because there will be the other considerations, two of which I tried to mention today: the future of peacekeeping in general, and the invitation to murder Americans the next time around.

Please understand, I don't like the situation. I don't like where we are. I think we need to withdraw. You know, I can give you ideas on how I think that ought to be done, but I am not prepared to tell you I think they are necessarily the sensible answer.

But please understand the consequences of how we extract ourselves from this.

Let me say to you, in the end, we Americans need to learn from the past. On our watch, when I was in the government, we lost some Marines in Lebanon that I don't think we had to lose. We lost them because we lost sight of the criteria. We lost sight of the means. We lost sight of what we were trying to accomplish.

One of the things we must be disciplined about when we get into these kinds of operations is to define the objective. Congressman Bereuter, you, Mr. Chairman, read what George Bush's basic objective was. It may be you have to change the objective. You better understand when you do it the consequences of changing the objective, understand the need, perhaps, to change the mix of forces necessary to accomplish the adjusted objective.

This is not a partisan issue. It really is not, in my judgment, at least. I am saying to you, I was involved in government when we made that kind of mistake. We ought to learn from the past. We must be careful in the future not to slide from one objective to another without knowing what we are doing.

I apologize for the stream of consciousness here, Mr. Chairman. That is the best I can do for you this early in the morning.

Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Secretary, we are deeply grateful to you. We are particularly pleased it was a stream of consciousness rather than a carefully prepared and polished bureaucratic statement.

Mr. EAGLEBURGER. Which is what you are telling me you used to get from me.

Mr. LANTOS. No, I am not saying that. I am saying we get it from some others who have big staffs.

Mr. EAGLEBURGER. OK.

DETERMINING WHEN IT IS IN THE U.S. NATIONAL INTEREST TO INTERVENE IN FOREIGN CRISES

Mr. LANTOS. Let me begin by sort of reviewing some of the very key issues you have raised to be sure we begin with the same common denominator.

You are suggesting, Mr. Secretary—and I fully agree with you—that with the collapse of the Soviet empire, we have gotten rid of the danger of a nuclear confrontation but we have moved into a period of turmoil and instability and fragility and conflict, and this is likely to stay with us for years, most likely decades to come.

If anybody assumes that the collapse of the Soviet Union meant a risk-free world, he needs quick psychiatric help, because it is self-evident from Bosnia to Somalia that there is turmoil, that there is bloodshed, that there is danger. And this is likely to continue for the indefinite future.

Given this as a fact, on which I suspect all of us in the Congress agree, the United States basically has three options: It has the option of wanting to get off, stop the world, turn to isolationism. Bosnia is not our business. Somalia is not our business. Cambodia is not our business. What goes on in Moscow is not our business. We return to a position of isolationism.

I think American history has amply shown us that a policy of isolationism, both in blood and in treasure is the most expensive foreign policy, because a policy of isolationism can be conducted just for a very limited period of time. And a Nation with global interests, military security, commercial economic, cultural, you name it, cannot function with an isolationist foreign policy.

The second option is for the United States to become the policeman of the world, which is an option that I, for one, reject, although I know some favor. The opportunity of becoming policemen of the world provides for no need to cooperate with anybody. It is clear-cut. But I think it is an option that both the Congress and the American people will overwhelmingly reject. We do not wish to be the policemen of the world.

Which leaves us, really, one realistic avenue, that is, to recognize that in some instances our national interests are so severely involved that whether we have any allies or not, whether we have United Nations blessing, resolutions, umbrella, we will act, because it is in the U.S.' interest to do so.

The second pattern, under this only viable option, is to use existing international institutions like NATO, redefine the function of NATO because, clearly, NATO can no longer operate for long if it continues to look at the Soviet Union as its mission, the Soviet Union which does not exist, although Mr. Ruskoi would have liked to have resuscitated it a few days ago, but failed.

So we will have to redefine the function of NATO, the geographic scope of NATO, and operate within NATO.

The third option, and this is a murky and difficult arena, is to have multilateral peacekeeping, peacemaking, peace enforcement activity, whether under United Nations auspices or not, and to involve many other nations.

This uncertainty, this lack of precision, is obviously behind much of the anxiety, concern, and criticism in the country today. I suspect you will agree with me that the United States' national interest in Somalia was not one iota greater or smaller when Mr. Bush decided to move into Somalia than when Mr. Clinton decided to pull out of Somalia. Somalia's strategic position has not changed. Somalia as a military or economic power has not altered its shape. So the U.S. national interests to date in Somalia is precisely the

same as little or as big or as non-existent as it was when George Bush ordered 28,000 U.S. troops into Somalia.

What has changed is the cost of our participation. And what we react to, I certainly react to, with both fury and anguish is that American servicemen—who have been sent on a largely successful humanitarian mission to deliver food—instead of being greeted with gratitude and appreciation are greeted with hostility, violence and death.

That is what the outrage of the American people is directed at, and I think all of us in the Congress on a bipartisan basis share this.

You made a very significant point at the conclusion of your remarks that a superpower cannot allow its foreign policy to be determined by a two-bit dictator like Aidedd, or by a terrorist act because if we allow U.S. foreign policy to be determined by terrorist acts against U.S. civilians or U.S. military personnel, we will abandon control of our own foreign policy and turn it over to the Aidedd's of this world, which no one, I suspect, in his right mind would recommend.

THE FEASIBILITY OF THE ADMINISTRATION'S CRITERIA FOR U.S. PARTICIPATION IN MULTILATERAL PEACEKEEPING

What you are suggesting, Mr. Secretary, is that there really are no criteria to determine U.S. involvement in peacekeeping and peacemaking and each of these individual problems will have to be debated fresh with, one hopes, as little partisanship as this body can muster.

But I must admit to you that I find that approach—although it may prove to be the only realistic approach—very disappointing, because what that means is that this body and much of American public debate will be paralyzed by an unending series of ad hoc debates on whether and under what conditions we should be or should not be in Somalia, Bosnia, or any other place.

So it seems to me that we have to do better than that. And the President, in his speech at the United Nations, outlined some criteria that he feels are necessary before the United States participates in peacekeeping and peacemaking.

I wonder if you care to comment on how realistic President Clinton's criteria are, whether you feel that others need to be introduced, or whether you think that the general criteria are simply not applicable?

Mr. EAGLEBURGER. I think to start with, Mr. Chairman—although in a very, very general way I suppose I could accept an articulation of some criteria—I think—

Mr. LANTOS. Could you pull the mike closer?

Mr. EAGLEBURGER. I think you are in a real danger of putting yourself into a straight jacket if you are not careful. I think most cases are going to be close to sui generis and are going to have to be examined in the light of international events and, therefore, are going to have to be decided, basically, case by case.

Having said that, you asked me to talk about the President's U.N. speech. Again, I am uncomfortable, because I am not here to push a particular partisan point of view, although everybody knows what my partisan views are.

But I will say to you this: The President's listing of criteria, in my judgment, moved us a bit, but it was largely negative. It was what we will not do. That is fine, except we may find ourselves in a situation where we will do what we said we will not do because the immediate circumstances are such that we feel we have to.

NEED FOR A MECHANISM THROUGH WHICH THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY CAN ADDRESS PEACEKEEPING DECISIONS

What I was trying to say in my opening remarks is that, while I think a set of criteria that say we won't do this and we won't do that is marginally helpful, I far prefer to see some careful thinking about a creative answer to the fact that, at this moment, the international community and the United States simply have no structure to which they can repair to begin to try to deal with these issues and to some degree, Mr. Chairman, remove all of the heavy weight of the decision from the United States.

I don't mean by that to get us out from under making decisions, but rather why should we have to be the focus each particular time. And unless the United States makes up its mind, nobody else is prepared to act.

So what I am saying was I would like to have seen in that speech—or I would like to see at some point an examination of, first of all, at least if I am correct, a recognition of the fact that the—that at the moment, with the change in the world situation, the world scene—there is no structural answer or partial structural answer to how we begin to deal with the question of peacekeeping.

Therefore, what is it we can build internationally that at least builds some substantive response and makes—when we do decide to make a peacekeeping operation, makes it somewhat more effective?

I am not saying my ideas with regard to the U.N. are, first of all, necessarily the right answer. There may be other answers.

What I am saying is none of us are spending enough time thinking about what it is we can do to provide a more institutionalized answer to the question of peacekeeping in a world that has changed substantially and where I do not believe we ought to be faced with an ad hoc decision each particular time on how we are going to put together a coalition to deal with it.

I do think we are going to have to be very ad hoc with regard to the particular decisions on whether we engage in a peacekeeping operation. I would like to know when we make that decision, there is a mechanism that means when you decided to do it, it will be done effectively. That mechanism is not there. These operations are nowhere near as effective as they should be.

Congressman Bereuter is correct: When it takes 9 hours or 7 hours to get in to try to relieve these GI's who are in trouble, something is wrong. It need not have been wrong if, in fact, the planning had been done properly and we had the forces, United States or otherwise, that could move in a rapid fashion.

That is not an answer to your question, Mr. Chairman. I don't object to the speech. I thought it was—I would have preferred to have seen something more—less negative and more positive in terms of, here are the things we ought to be trying to do to make

it work, rather than, here are the things we ought not be doing, though those are also relevant.

Mr. LANTOS. Henry Kissinger, whom I believe you know——

Mr. EAGLEBURGER. I have met him, yes.

KISSINGER'S SINE QUA NONS FOR SUCCESSFUL PEACEKEEPING

Mr. LANTOS [continuing]. Wrote in a recent op-ed, and I quote, "In practice, U.N. multilateralism can work only if all nations share a common perception of a danger, are willing to run the same risks and agree on a common strategy. Unless each of these three conditions is met, multilateral machinery becomes paralyzed and, indeed, is likely to favor the side capable of creating fait accomplis as happened from the Italian invasion of Abyssinia in 1935 to Serbian depredations in Bosnia and Croatia."

What is your reaction to his statement?

Mr. EAGLEBURGER. He is partially correct, but only partially.

I think you can make the case that Canadian peacekeepers in Cyprus, in a period in which there wasn't—there was not a common view of what ought to be done, were at least reasonably successful.

There have been a number of peacekeeping operations generated during the period of the cold war where the Soviet Union, for example, didn't object to it but was not particularly in favor of it either.

So I think there were cases in which I think that could go forward. I think Henry is right—and this is one of the problems of going to the U.N., but I know of no other mechanism at the moment—if you got either Russia or the People's Republic of China opposed to the operation, they can veto it. Nothing moves forward.

I cannot solve that problem for him. If you carry through Henry's to the end, it, in effect, says, therefore, we cannot do much of anything because often you will not find the conditions that he has set forth. I think that that is true. That doesn't mean I don't believe you cannot, on the edges—and I think beyond that—begin to deal with some of these problems.

PEACEKEEPING CANNOT CONTINUE ON AN AD HOC BASIS

Let me take the Bosnian case as an example. I thought about this one a lot.

If we had had in place, when the Yugoslav Federation began to break up, an effective peacekeeping operation—structure to which we could all go, it might have been possible—all I can say is "might have been possible"—to have persuaded, even then, what was the Soviet Union, not Russia, and the other members of the Security Council that because the structure was there, the forces were available—and they might have included Russians—Soviets and Americans, as far as that is concerned—it might have been possible to have a U.N. decision to go in and separate the parties. I don't know. I do know the institution was not there. It would have had to have been put together, ad hoc again. There was no community view. It would have been terribly difficult to obtain one.

I don't know if it would have made a difference. I do know because there was no instrument available to us, it was a far more difficult issue to try to deal with and still is.

I am not saying that the creation of these institutions will solve the problem. I am simply saying they provide an opportunity for all of us that is not there at the time, at the moment. That is the best I can say for it.

Let me make my point a different way. We—the international community—are going to have to feel our way over the course of the next decade or two because, as sure as I am sitting here, these problems will continue.

As sure as I am sitting here dealing with them on an ad hoc basis in which individual countries try to come to grips with whether they can put a coalition together or put some gerrybuilt U.N. operation in under way in a situation in which the opponents are better organized than the U.N. organization itself, that is not an answer.

It will, over time, kill the whole ability of the United States for public and popular reasons to engage in peacekeeping. What is going on in Somalia now, you and I both know, undercuts the public support for the concept of peacekeeping.

All I am saying is, peacekeeping as an operation, will have to be available to us. We better find ways to make it more effective than it now is. I don't think that that is an easy task and I don't have a final solution to it. I think we have to feel our way toward it. But I think it is important. We need to understand what will work and make it easier.

THE ROLE OF DETERRENCE IN PEACEKEEPING

Mr. LANTOS. Before turning to my colleagues, I have only one final question: During a period of many decades, U.S. foreign policy on a bipartisan basis was very successful in deterring the mighty Soviet Union from making a move of a single millimeter in Europe. The Soviet Union knew that if they moved across a line, there would be massive retaliation of unacceptable proportions. Despite the enormous military might of the Soviet Union—nuclear, conventional, otherwise—despite all the changes in the Kremlin, they respected the threat of deterrence.

My question is: Is there any room for deterrence in collective peacekeeping? It happens to be my judgment, Mr. Secretary—and I know that you and I may disagree on this—that had NATO's deterrent force been used in the former Yugoslavia, none of the players would have taken the military moves that they did, in fact, take. If there would have been a clearcut and credible threat of immediate, massive NATO retaliation, then the forces would not have moved.

Maybe deterrence is feasible in some collective peacekeeping situation and not in others. But I would be grateful if you would comment on the general concept of the role of deterrence in peacekeeping and peacemaking.

Mr. EAGLEBURGER. I think, Mr. Chairman, you have a point.

I would argue in the Yugoslav case, in order for NATO to have been active, you would have had to have had agreement on the part of all the members of NATO.

I think it is no secret that we and the Federal Republic of Germany, amongst others, had different views on how to deal with

Yugoslavia. But, yes, I think deterrence has a point to be made. If I may say so, I will now step way out on a limb.

In the Somali case, there is something to be said for massive retaliation, if you will, as a deterrent to the next time. I am uncomfortably aware I am not well enough acquainted with the military facts to know how that would be accomplished, if it could be; but I think there is a point to be made that when you kill 20 Americans, it is not cost free and it is, indeed, terribly expensive. And if the point can be made effectively, I certainly would like to see that done. I think it could have an impact and a deterrent value for the next time.

I will also say this, which is relevant to this case and others: If I learned nothing else in the course of too many years of plodding around the U.S. Government, I have come away with one absolute conviction which is, if you are going to use force, you better use enough to make sure that you get your point across. And I mean by that, you are better off doing a lot more than necessary than trying to cut it too fine and doing just what you think is enough. So if you are going to use force, use a lot of it.

I would think at this stage that is at least one alternative that ought to be looked at in the Somalian case.

Mr. LANTOS. I fully agree with you. I think the concept of gradualism is a concept that is not viable in this situation.

Congressman Bereuter.

Mr. BEREUTER. I agree with you. We learned something from Grenada, Panama, and Desert Storm because we had leaders that insisted on using available overwhelming force. It was not three helicopters in the desert. It was not an adequate kind of response capable to protect our troops in Somalia.

As a former infantry officer, I find it outrageous, I must say, to have a hundred men in a shooting gallery for 7 hours and no capacity there to respond to rescue them. I am sure their field commander understood precisely there was no capacity because he had been given no capacity within that theater of operations.

Mr. Secretary, I will have just a couple straightforward information seeking questions here. I'd love to talk to you about Macedonia where I think we do not have enough forces—

Mr. EAGLEBURGER. I agree with you by the way.

FINANCING THE U.N. PEACEKEEPING BUDGET

Mr. BEREUTER [continuing]. enough armament, we do not have the right rules of engagement.

If peacekeeping is to become a core of U.N. activity, shouldn't the support be financed from the regular U.N. budget which, of course, would reduce the U.S.' contribution?

Mr. EAGLEBURGER. The answer to that in the abstract, Congressman, is, yes. But I don't know, and you cannot predict, how much it is going to cost in a given year. There has to be a little flexibility.

Yes, basically it ought to be. Yes, it ought to come—to the degree it can—it ought to come out of the normal contribution.

I think one of the things that is terribly important and one of the reforms the U.N. will simply have to make is the United States is paying too much as it is. That number has to be reduced.

INTEROPERABILITY CONCERNS AND PEACEKEEPING

Let me say the other side of that coin, however, sir, which is that we ought to pay what we owe.

Mr. BEREUTER. You mentioned the need to beef up the command and control capabilities. I think that that is certainly the right recommendation. Our colleague, Mr. Sisisky, from Virginia, attempted to do that. Perhaps the mechanism or the timing wasn't quite right, but he didn't get the kind of response to that effort that I wish he had received on the House floor.

I guess it shows about the confusion we have on this subject and perhaps about timing and executive legislative branch coordination. I am not sure.

But as a person who follows NATO a lot, I think about the very valid subject you raise on interoperability and common principles of training. I agree NATO has that advantage. But even up to the collapse of the cold war, we still had interoperability problems in NATO. Nobody was better at it except the Warsaw Pact. They were better at interoperability, of course, in common weapons systems, ammunition supply, and so on. It may mean if we need interoperability it is: one, difficult to achieve; two, they are more likely to rely on NATO nations for peacekeeping operations because we are the only group of nations with something approaching interoperability.

Is that a concern?

Mr. EAGLEBURGER. I don't think it necessarily drives you just to NATO. But, basically, I agree with your point.

As I say, I think NATO can provide a useful purpose as an executive agent for the U.N. in certain circumstances. But there are moves that can be made that even though you do not get interoperability, you get into a better situation than now.

First of all, I find it incomprehensible that anybody thinks you can put Pakistanis, Malis, the United States, Turks into one force and expect they will have the vaguest idea of how to deal with each other. They have never met, much less practiced.

I think there is a lot to be accomplished by earmarking forces, training them together and, if nothing else, getting radios that can communicate with each other.

In terms of weapons systems and so forth, it is more complex, Congressman. That is a long way down the line.

There are very simple things that could be accomplished that I think would substantially improve the effectiveness of a peacekeeping forces. They are not there now.

PEACEKEEPING MISAPPLIED IN BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA

Mr. BEREUTER. I think that that is a correct conclusion.

By the way, I appreciated your testimony. I think you have given us a lot of important insight today and have been very candid.

Final question, in order to cut my time down here, John Ruggie, Dean of the School of International Affairs at Columbia University commenting about what has happened in Bosnia thinks the U.N. has misapplied a perfectly good tool of peacekeeping to an inappropriate circumstance.

He spells that out. He says, "Having been employed in a security environment in which the peacekeeping mechanism was not desired, the presence of these forces end up deterring not the service but the international community itself from undertaking more forceful action."

Is that an appropriate commentary?

Mr. EAGLEBURGER. Yes, sir, it is, but, there is no question the forces on the ground, the U.N. forces on the ground now, have been used as an excuse—and I think probably a legitimate excuse—on the part of the British, the French, and so forth. The people who own the forces are arguing that if we now get tough in Bosnia, the object of the affections of those against whom we get tough is going to be those forces. They are not now adequately armed now to defend themselves. Yes, I think that that is absolutely correct.

The "but" is only in this sense: We all wandered into this one. And with the best purposes in the world, I think these troops were put in there, again, partly to try to feed Sarajevo and so forth.

It gets again to the question of what is your objective; what are you trying to accomplish? We were all fuzzy on that one with regard to the Yugoslav case and the Bosnian case.

In part, I think that that is excusable because it is such an awful mess. The issue was, do you do nothing? Do you at least try to do at least something to ameliorate the suffering? Then the issue is, how much do you do? We had a real debate on that question. The alternative of putting those forces in was to either do an awful lot or nothing at all.

Again, we ought to be learning from all of those examples. We are in a new world. I am prepared to say things have gone wrong or we have learned some lessons on all of this. I am not blaming anybody. But what I am saying is, what have we learned from the experience in Bosnia?

One of the things we learned is you don't put troops in under those circumstances unless you are prepared to accept that they then become hostages. Maybe you have to make that choice some time. I think they have become hostages. I think for me the whole Yugoslav mess, Bosnia in particular, is the most difficult of all of the peacekeeping operations we would talk about. Not trying to prejudice one side or the other, it is the most difficult one to think your way through in terms of what the international community ought to be prepared to do.

I know where I am on it, which is we ought not to do very much. But I also understand those who argue that that is an absolutely foolish answer, and we must not let these kinds of cases continue.

Mr. BEREUTER. I think most of us would agree it is among the most difficult issues.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. LANTOS. Congressman McCloskey.

Mr. MCCLOSKEY. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Eagleburger, Mr. Sawyer asked me to apologize to you because he had to leave. He also asked me to commend you for your statement and, particularly, your concluding remarks.

I also would like to commend you for your insights into the Somali situation and prospects for an immediate or, perhaps, overly speedy exit. I hope your ideas on that get some coverage.

We talked about Bosnia a little bit, and you and I talked about it previously. As you just alluded in response to Mr. Bereuter, there are some guiding principles and policy insights we can take out of, in your words, that particular mess to help us in the future. We can draw lessons from the present situation with the shelling and the slaughter of civilians going on in Sarajevo and elsewhere. And as the winter comes and Mr. Izetbegovic and the Bosnian government, as you know, for the time being, have rejected, as you know, the latest partition, the partition two, three, four, whatever it is.

What particularly can we learn from Bosnia regarding U.N. principles vis-a-vis extraterritorial aggression, genocide, and the London Conference declaration?

In essence, in pragmatic, realpolitik terms, isn't the outcome in Bosnia going to set a devastating precedent in many ways?

For example, I am of the belief that the trouble will go on. The Serb-Croat conflict has not been resolved, and, before too long, Serb forces could be moving into Zadar. I would appreciate your comments on that.

I would also appreciate it if, for a couple of minutes, you could give us your observations and best insight on Russia in the near term, particularly the Georgian-Abkhazian situation?

What are the prospects, the opportunities, and the dangers? Could you comment on, now that this parliamentary imbroglio is at least physically resolved, the prospects for stability in Russia in the near future, particularly as winter comes and they have their own economic problems?

There are, I guess, losers under the new freedoms. It will be tough to hold together Russia itself, no matter what.

Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

Mr. EAGLEBURGER. Congressman, do you have plans for lunch?

Mr. LANTOS. We will have dinner sent in.

Mr. EAGLEBURGER. Let me start at the rear and move up.

With regard to the events in Moscow and what does it mean, I know what it does not mean. What the events in Moscow don't mean is, at least, that Mr. Yeltsin has removed the single most immediate impediment to proceeding to a process of economic and political reform. And the nattering at him about democracy, with all respect, is, I think, nuts. I mean by that the parliament was not democratically elected. We can go through all of that. I suppose Pravda ought to have a chance to publish all sorts of things.

The fundamental question is—here you either have confidence in Yeltsin or you don't. The fundamental question is: Can he establish a situation in which he can, in fact, now get back to the business of reform?

I think as long as the parliament was there, it was simply impossible for Yeltsin to carry out—if he can; and it is going to be a tough job under any circumstance—the kinds of reforms that are absolutely necessary if, in fact, democracy will succeed in Russia. I am not at all sure that he will. It may well not.

I can tell you there was no way it could work as long as the parliament was there. He enjoys, I think, now that we look back on it, one specific fact, which is, I have never seen such a collection of dumb, stupid people in my life that were sitting in the par-

liament. They gave him the one excuse he needed to go in and straighten it out. It was kind of dumb. He was lucky that his opposition was not very bright.

The question now is, can the reform process go forward in a manner sufficiently effective that the unhappiness of an awful lot of Russians, with the fact their economic life is worse than it was under the Soviet Union, can be improved?

And in my judgment the danger for Russia is far less that Yeltsin will be followed by some Russian imperialist nationalist on a white horse; that it is, in fact, that the Russian Federation will, in fact, fragment. That may look to the real politicians, including my friend Henry, like that is the way we ought to want it to go because then they are no longer the kind of threat that is a unified Russia, maybe.

I have to tell you if you think about the instabilities that will come with the fragmentation of the Russian Federation, it makes everything we are having trouble dealing with now pale into insignificance.

So to me, Yeltsin is reform. There may be another reformer out there somewhere, but I don't know who he is. I think he deserves our support. If that includes taking a deep breath and saying you may have to be what appears to be undemocratic in order to get to a situation where you can be democratic, I think we have to give him time.

I used the example before. I will use it again. An awful lot of people didn't like it when Abraham Lincoln suspended the writ of habeas corpus in the middle of the Civil War. Once we got away from the event, everybody realized it was not a dumb thing to do. We are facing a thing in a country where they know democracy not at all.

I think what has happened is prologue. It was absolutely essential prologue. Reform may succeed in Russia. It may not. I think that is a 5- to 10-year question.

I think what is important is that if in the next year the average Russian gets a sense, if I may quote from Spiro Agnew, that there is light at the end of the tunnel, there is at least a chance. I think in that sense what happened in the course of the last week or two is historically very significant.

I must tell you with regard to Abkhazia, Georgia, there is no question in my mind there are, at a minimum, some Russian military leaders, most of whom have been stationed in that area for a long time, who are playing games. Shevardnadze has, I think, a perfectly legitimate complaint against the Russians for the games played there. Whether Yeltsin knows about it—knows about it, surely—whether he can control it or has directed it, I don't know. It is, in fact, one of the worrisome things we will have to deal with.

We are also going to have to understand there are a lot of Russians—not all of them are Rutskoi and Khasbulatov—who are unhappy with the fact Russia is not what it once was. Some will be unhappy because there are Russian minorities in these countries whom they feel, need protecting. That doesn't excuse it. We must do everything we can to let the Russians know it is an activity that must not go forward. That does not mean, it seems to me, that until they stop all of that we must march off away from Yeltsin

and say, we are not going to support you in your fundamental efforts to reform. You have to balance things off here. To me what is going on in Russia is the major arena. You said it in a hearing the other day.

BOSNIA

Bosnia. This one—look, I can say things more clearly now maybe than I could a year ago. In my judgment, the whole issue of Bosnia and Yugoslavia is a historic tragedy. If you want me to be blunt about it, in my view, taking a realpolitik view of it, I think there is very little that we can do to prevent what is an unholy mess from taking place.

I should have said there is very little we can do at a cost that I think we, the American people and the West, are prepared to pay. This is where the Chairman, you, and I disagree. I mean it in this sense: I don't think air attacks, indeed, I don't think anything short of troops on the ground in very large numbers are going to be able to prevent the kind of slaughter and killing that is going on.

I will also say to you there are no heroes in this one, in my judgment. Again, I spent 7 years in that country. I love them dearly. I think I understand them. I may understand them too well which maybe has led me to decisions I otherwise would have been more prepared to make. I concede that.

But I can assure you Bosnian Moslems, Croats, Serbs, they would all be doing to each other what the Serbs are now getting away with if the rest of them could get away with it. I don't think there are any heroes in this one. There are victims, women, children, the people in the middle. That is awful.

As to the question of: Is there a precedent here? I don't know that I think there is. I guess I would say to you if the West had been prepared to do whatever was necessary to bring about an end to all of this, it would have made others a little more hesitant. But I must also tell you, I think these ethnic conflicts, whether in Abkhazia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Nagorno-Karabakh, are so irrational in their basic causes that rationality does not play much of a factor here.

If we had been able to stop it in Bosnia by coming down on them like a ton of bricks, maybe it would have made a difference. I think the converse is also true; however, that if we had come down on them like a ton of bricks and stopped them in Bosnia and it occurred somewhere else, in order to carry out the precedent, we well would have had to do in Armenia what we did in Bosnia. The question being, in other words, where do you draw the limit on how much you are prepared to do around the world in order to bring these things to an end.

I don't like that answer, Congressman. You and I talked about it before. I must tell you, I think the dangers of consequences to U.S. forces would make Somalia look like a picnic.

THE IRRATIONAL NATURE OF THE CONFLICT IN THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA

Mr. McCLOSKEY. If ground troops went in. I disagree, as you know, with much of what you say. I am not even going to bother

to state all that for the record right now. I think we have tremendous goodwill for each other.

Just one question, though. This is not a political or governmental or policy question. It is with respect to you and the fact you are so expert in that area. You know all the players, the language, the cultures.

Is there anything—you know, if you were in control of things—that you could communicate to Karadzic, Milosevic, those people, that would convey the utter horror, the ultimate futility, for their own interests as to what they are doing?

Mr. EAGLEBURGER. I don't think they care. I don't think Karadzic cares. I don't think Milosevic cares. I can go on with the long list of them. They are not all Serbs. I don't think most of them care.

They live in a world of their own. And one of the characteristics of these people is you shove them into a corner and they tend to get more belligerent, not less so.

I think they know what we think. I don't think they care. I think—look, what the Serbs have done is wreck the Serbian economy for the next 50 years. I don't think they care. I don't think they care.

Mr. MCCLOSKEY. Yes.

Mr. EAGLEBURGER. Remember—again, the history of that benighted place tells you a lot. In the Second World War, Yugoslavia lost more people per capita than any other country but Poland. Half of those people were killed by other Yugoslavs. It goes back and back and back.

When you get into a situation—see, this is particularly—I think the issue when you get into these kinds of centuries, old ethnic conflicts, they are not amenable to rational discussion; and the hatreds go so deep that for somebody from the outside to try to get in there and straighten it out, I think, is unlikely to work. That does not mean you cannot go in there and hit them over the head with a baseball bat and make them stop.

I suspect, however, Congressman—and this is one of my concerns about if there is an agreement and we put troops in there—if nothing else, when we pack up and leave, they will go right back at it again.

This is a problem for which I don't have an answer. I suspect there are a lot of those around the world. This one is very clear, to me at least. I understand—I also am prepared to concede to you that if we were to try the kinds of steps that you advocate, I cannot tell you that they wouldn't work. I can just say I don't think they would work. We haven't tested it. You may be right. I don't know.

U.S. PARTICIPATION IN A PEACEKEEPING FORCE IN BOSNIA

Mr. LANTOS. Before turning to my colleague from New Jersey, may I follow up on this issue?

Assuming that there is settlement among the three parties in Bosnia and assuming that NATO undertakes a peacekeeping mission, what is your view of U.S. participation in that mission in terms of scope and duration?

Mr. EAGLEBURGER. I dislike all of the assumptions, Mr. Chairman. But if there were—I don't see how we can avoid being involved since we said we would be. All I can say is I would like to

see the numbers as small as possible. I would like to see it as much in terms of logistic support and so forth as possible.

But I think, on the basis of what we have said, we would be prepared to put in some tens of thousands of troops, ground troops. I don't like that.

But I will also say to you when the United States has given its word and made its commitment, you have to carry it out. I think it could prove to be painful. I think we have to do it if we have to.

I think the assumptions are less and less likely. Every time we think we are about to get an agreement, off it goes. It may be a long time before we have to face that issue. But if we get an agreement, the United States has said it will participate. We will have to do what we said we will do.

I cannot say anything more than that.

Mr. LANTOS. Congressman Smith.

LESSONS FROM SOMALIA FOR FUTURE U.S. PARTICIPATION IN MULTILATERAL PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I think, particularly in light of Somalia, Americans and Congress are beginning to become much more vigilant and much more questioning of what potential deployments might be. I think those, perhaps with added measure for the Bosnian deployment of some 25,000, while the President may speak and enunciate foreign policy and actually craft it, the Congress obviously has some say, as it ought to, in whether or not that deployment takes place.

Part of the troubling aspect of all of this is we may be calling on American troops to police what is essentially an unjust partition of the area coupled with the fact that we are indeed rewarding the acts of genocide that have been committed.

The other side of the coin, of course, is that it may bring an end, at least temporarily, to the hostilities or may exacerbate them.

Mr. EAGLEBURGER. Let me say you are absolutely correct. Whatever peace settlement is arrived at, it is clear it will have rewarded aggression, rewarded murderers; and that is awful. But that is what is going to happen.

Mr. SMITH. I mention that you—in a comment to Mr. Bereuter, you indicated—I thought I heard you say—with regards to Macedonia, there are too few forces there.

Mr. EAGLEBURGER. I get very nervous with trip wires. That always gets you in trouble.

Mr. SMITH. If you could elaborate on your views on Macedonia. In one sense you already made your views known on the deployment in Bosnia. But also speak to Haiti and Liberia; all the relation to the lessons learned in Somalia.

These are all decisions, Mr. Secretary, that will have to be made if we do not begin applying those lessons of Somalia, if too little, those men on the ground not being able to adequately defend themselves, the objective is changing in the heat—the middle of the night when nobody is looking.

Although I have to say there were many members of our committee, including Mr. Gilman and Mr. Bereuter, who kept repeatedly calling for a clear delineation of what we were talking about. What

are our objectives there? Have they changed? It seems as if there was a drift toward the new objectives. If you could try to apply some of those lessons.

Mr. EAGLEBURGER. The first lesson is not just to Somalia, as I say. I don't mean this in a partisan way. I think on Somalia, where we got in trouble was we changed the objective and didn't think through the consequences. I don't mean that as a criticism of anybody. It is just a fact. I will also say, as I indicated to you, I think we did the same thing in Lebanon. There is not a disease unique to one particular administration.

But what it ought to tell us, every time——

Mr. LANTOS. May I stop you there for one-half a second?

Mr. EAGLEBURGER. I thought you might.

Mr. LANTOS. I want to read to you——

Mr. SMITH. If you could continue, Mr. Chairman?

Mr. EAGLEBURGER. Come on, gentlemen. I am here as long as you want.

Mr. LANTOS. I just——

Mr. SMITH. Haiti——

Mr. EAGLEBURGER. I will come to it.

DISCUSSION OF WHETHER U.S. GOALS IN SOMALIA HAVE CHANGED

Mr. LANTOS. Because you said the objectives have been changed. I would just like to read, again, President Bush's statement of December 4, 1992, and ask in what sense the objectives have changed. President Bush stated, United States would intervene under United Nations auspices, and I am quoting now, "to create a secure environment so that food can move to the people in the countryside."

Now, it was President Bush who used the phrase "to create a secure environment." It may well be that that goal is an unrealistic goal, given the turmoil in Somalia. But I think it is very important because over the course of the last few days we have had a systematic misquoting of the original objective, namely just to deliver food. The misquoting was not by my two colleagues on this panel but by others. That is not what President Bush said. He may have been right in setting this goal. He may have been wrong in setting this goal. But what he said was that we will intervene "to create a secure environment so that food can move to the people in the countryside."

In what sense has that changed, Mr. Secretary?

Mr. EAGLEBURGER. All right. I understand. Mr. Chairman, I am going to answer the question. But I want to come back to one point I made which is I am not particularly wild about beating up on somebody in the middle of a crisis.

Where I think it has changed and changed very clearly, at least as I read what President Bush said—and certainly I know what he meant—was the issue is, you are going to feed people and create whatever environment is necessary to get them fed.

That doesn't mean you are going to try to build a new government in Somalia. It doesn't mean you are going to try to create a stable situation in Somalia that is relevant to anything other than getting people fed.

I think—particularly if you take a look at the rest of the countryside right now—I think we Americans, Democrats, Republicans, ac-

complished the objective of feeding people; and, outside of Mogadishu, by and large, the country is stable and people are being fed.

I think it is an important argument and point to make—let me back up. Under the circumstances, as I understood what we intended to do, when we were still in office, was to feed people. To do that, you have to get a secure environment to be able to feed the people. We got that done because we got them fed; turn it over to the U.N.; basically get out.

What has happened since—and when I say “get out,” I also understand that that could mean it could deteriorate, again in Somalia, to the point that we would then be faced with the same problem we had. But at least we would then be judging what more we were going to do from outside, not inside.

What I think has happened—and I really am not trying to blame somebody, except to learn the lessons from it—is we decided—first of all, I think it was a mistake—we decided that Aideed was public enemy number one and we were going to get him. Now he is not a nice man. But there is a question of whether we couldn't have negotiated with all these people, you know, gotten out. If Aideed takes over the country, he takes it over. I don't really care. At least I don't know enough about the situation, political situation in Somalia to be able to make a judgment for Somalia.

I think we then went beyond that, particularly as articulated by the Secretary of Defense, to say, in essence, what we are trying to do is build a stable government in Somalia. I don't have the exact words. But I think you know the statement I am talking about. I am not trying to blame him. If that becomes the objective—what I am really saying is, I do think there was a different objective articulated by President Bush and what happened thereafter. Good or bad, I am not arguing that.

But I am saying when you change the objective, understand you changed it; take a look at what it means in terms of commitment of forces to carry out the new objective. All I am saying is we ought to learn from this.

Mr. LANTOS. I fully agree with you.

Mr. EAGLEBURGER. At the same time, we have to understand—I will use the term, but I don't like it—to cut and run presents to us a whole host of problems thereafter. We have to get out, but we have to do it in a way that preserves the fact that we may want to do peacekeeping again, and we have to remember we do not want a written invitation from everybody that if they kill an American or two, we get out. That is an invitation to murder.

Mr. LANTOS. I thank my friend.

U.S. PARTICIPATION IN A U.N. PEACEKEEPING OPERATION

Mr. EAGLEBURGER. Haiti, these others.

Look, in the Haitian case, I guess—not I guess. We have to try it. Certainly, it became very apparent that if anybody was going to succeed at doing something there, it wasn't the OAS; it was the U.N. The OAS wasn't up to it. I don't know whether it will succeed or not. Aristide is going back. How he will conduct himself once he is back, I think, is an open question.

If he decides he is going to get the people who have—shoved him out for a couple of years, we are back to a real mess. We will find ourselves as peacekeepers in the middle of an internecine conflict. That is always bad. So there is a danger to all of this.

I suspect there is less danger there than in Somalia, because I think most Haitians, at least at this stage, would welcome anything that is different from what they are living with. But I must tell you in each of these cases there is always—Somalia is another one, Lebanon was. We are welcomed with open arms. When I say “we” it is not just the United States. But we are welcomed with open arms.

Then these people find out these peacekeepers stand in the way of their particular narrow objectives, and we become targets. I think that is also what happened in Bosnia by the way. That is neither here nor there. Each one of these is fraught with specific dangers we do not understand, nor should we be expected to, the particular cultural, political factors that may exist in Haiti or Somalia.

Therefore, while I think we need—again when we have committed to do it, we need to do it. In the Haitian case, we need to keep our fingers crossed that it does not deteriorate. And it could. If it does, then we had better decide again whether the objective is one that is worthy of continuing whatever necessary cost to get it done or not.

A lot of—again, Congressman, my point is we are feeling our way into a world we have never dealt with before. I don’t know what the answers are, except I do know sitting back and not trying is also wrong. But we are going to get our fingers burned a number of times on these things as we go along. We will learn some lessons from it.

My ultimate concern with all these cases, we never understand—and I don’t think we should necessarily—we almost never understand the society into which we are going and the consequences of our becoming involved.

THE NEED FOR BETTER ADMINISTRATION-CONGRESSIONAL CONSULTATIONS ON PROPOSED PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS

Mr. SMITH. Thank you for your comments, Mr. Secretary.

Yesterday the United States voted yes to authorize U.N. force in Rwanda. Liberia, obviously, a couple of weeks ago got a similar affirmation. While these may be justified, we need the kind of dialogue that has been missing with the Congress and the executive branch.

When we had that meeting 2 days—a day ago—two days ago with Secretary Christopher, Les Aspin, others, both Democrats and Republicans were very disgruntled and upset because we have not been part of the process. We have been left out.

It is reminiscent of what is happening with the health plan, although I don’t want to get into that. There have only been a select few involved in that. It is the kind of operation where we are called upon to affirm, after the fact, after Americans are losing their lives in a situation where we would have liked to have had input. Mr. Gilman tried desperately to have amendments made with regards to Somalia.

I say that we need an united front. Bring us in. Don't keep us out. That goes for Democrats as well as Republicans left out in the cold. We need better consultations. I hope the administration gets that message.

Mr. EAGLEBURGER. Let me say one thing to you. I think I said early on in one of my comments that one of the things that will be essential as we try to develop a more effective means is there will have to be much more careful analysis of those cases into which we ought to put those forces.

There has been a tendency—and in the past I understand, because it wasn't particularly full of risks. But there has been a tendency of somebody saying we need a peacekeeping force, we do it. Rwanda. Liberia. In this sense the President's speech was absolutely correct: We have to be much more demanding in our establishment of the criteria that lead us in. I have no argument about that at all. I think each one has to be examined carefully.

Let me say to you, having spent too much time on the other side of the fence and thinking about the agonies of consulting with the Congress—and you people can make it difficult sometimes—but I have learned a real lesson there in the Desert Storm/Desert Shield operation where I can say to you there were a lot of people in the administration who, in effect, were saying to the President, go ahead and do it because you cannot risk being defeated by going to the Congress. The President took the other choice. We had to work hard at it, but we did consult. We did get it done.

Once it was done, to put it bluntly, you people were in a far more difficult position to come at us and tell us we weren't doing it well, for one thing, because you were part of the decisionmaking process.

It is hard sometimes for those of us who spend our lives in the executive branch and really would like you to go on—out of session until maybe Christmas. I learned very much in that case that, if you do it right, if you have time—that is also a problem sometimes—but if you do it right, you are far better off to have consulted than to have ignored the Congress. I hate to admit it, but that is true.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you.

Mr. LANTOS. Well, just to follow up on your last comment with you, which I am in full agreement—

Mr. EAGLEBURGER. I thought you might be, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. LANTOS [continuing]. for that process to work, however, there must be a very high degree of bipartisanship on the part of the Congress. You would not have succeeded without Democrats—

Mr. EAGLEBURGER. Of course.

Mr. LANTOS [continuing]. Supporting the position of President Bush.

While clearly the most sickening aspect of this tragedy in Somalia has been the outrageous behavior of Aideed and his mob, I find it almost as sickening to see the degree of partisanship that has been whipped up on this Hill by some individuals because this is, in fact, a bipartisan issue. It is an operation commenced by one President, a Republican, which will be terminated by another President, a Democrat. We ought to be able to function in as bipartisan a fashion as possible.

Mr. EAGLEBURGER. May I make one comment on that, sir?

Mr. LANTOS. Please.

Mr. EAGLEBURGER. First of all, it is my experience that the advocates of bipartisanship are usually the ones out of office rather than the ones who are in.

But anyway, having said that, I don't argue the point except, you will concede to us, it was a pretty tough and difficult debate. We could not possibly have done it without democratic votes. No argument about that. But it was a tough and very difficult debate.

My recollection of it is that bipartisanship was not something that was shared by all Members of the Congress. It was a tough time to get there I am not arguing your point. We all have to recognize in the end these sorts of issues will not work unless there is bipartisan support. But we had a hard time getting there.

Mr. LANTOS. As one who was part of the bipartisan majority, I feel strongly that on foreign policy issues, we must transcend our partisan preferences and judge things by the national interest.

You mentioned an issue, Mr. Secretary—and I know we are keeping you too long.

Mr. EAGLEBURGER. No, that's all right.

THE NEED TO LIMIT THE NUMBER OF U.N. PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS

Mr. LANTOS. We will wrap up before too long.

The United Nations Security Council votes one peacekeeping operation after another without there really being the resources available to implement these resolutions.

Once the resolution is passed, then the U.N. runs around begging votes, trying to pull enough people, money, and equipment together. This clearly is not the right way to do it.

President Clinton, in his speech at the U.N., said, if the U.N. expects us to say, yes, it will have to learn to say no. So far it has not learned to say no.

Do you think it may be necessary, in some instances, for our Ambassador to the U.N. to exercise a veto over proposed peacekeeping operations?

Mr. EAGLEBURGER. Sure.

Mr. LANTOS. Or, minimally, to abstain?

Mr. EAGLEBURGER. Absolutely.

Mr. Chairman, when the U.N. says yes, the United States has said yes. If we do not think it should go forward, we can say no. I am not even sure if we feel strongly enough about it. I don't know that we should abstain if we think it is an unwise move. We ought to vote no. That is a veto I suppose.

But the point is when the U.N. says yes, we have said yes. So I have no problem with that as a concept.

U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL REFORM

Mr. LANTOS. In this connection, I find it somewhat inconsistent—not on your part—I find it somewhat inconsistent that some are advocating giving Germany and Japan Security Council seats with a veto before Germany and Japan accept their responsibility to be full participants in any peacekeeping, peacemaking, and peace enforcement structure.

I wonder if you would care to comment?

Mr. EAGLEBURGER. It is a very good point. I happen to be one of those who believes the Security Council system is going to have to be reformed in one way or the other.

At least Japan—and probably Japan and Germany are going to have to be on it. If you ask me to describe how we get there, I haven't the vaguest idea.

Mr. LANTOS. Do you think we should get there before they make a full commitment to be full players?

Mr. EAGLEBURGER. I am coming to that.

My point, in the first instance, is, even if they have committed to being full players, the thought of how you reform the charter, how you change the charter to get them on is one—while I think, intellectually, they should be on. I am not sure I know how you get there.

I can tell you there will be 15 other countries lined up arguing that they should be on as well. I also think it is a legitimate point to make that three Western European countries on the Security Council system is a bit of an anomaly. I think there are real problems.

Having said that, again in the abstract, I accept your point. They have to be prepared to play their full and complete role. There is a caveat here, however, which, as you and I both know, that if German troops were part of a U.N. force going into Yugoslavia, there would be a very serious problem in Yugoslavia. History hasn't gone away, in other words, in some of these cases, or Japan in some places in the Pacific.

Mr. LANTOS. To be full players does not mean to be full players everywhere, but to be full players in principle.

Mr. EAGLEBURGER. Yes. There are will be places for historic reasons where both Japan and Germany would not be particularly welcome.

There is another factor. That issue is the Japanese and the Germans need to understand very well that their contributions to the financial well-being of the U.N. needs, really, substantial revision as well. A part of becoming a member of the Security Council, even before that, is they ought to be paying more than they are now paying.

Mr. LANTOS. Absolutely.

Mr. Secretary, are there any concluding comments you would like to make?

Mr. EAGLEBURGER. No, Mr. Chairman, other than to say it is a real relief to be able to come up here and testify and not worry about the consequences of what I said.

Mr. LANTOS. Well, let me, on behalf of the subcommittee, thank you for an enormously enlightening and helpful testimony.

This hearing is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 11:20 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]



APPENDIX

AMBASSADOR MADELEINE K. ALBRIGHT
U.S. PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE TO THE UNITED NATIONS

STATEMENT BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL SECURITY,
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS, AND HUMAN RIGHTS
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Washington, D.C.
June 24, 1993

"MYTHS OF PEACEKEEPING"

Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the subcommittee:

It is a great pleasure to appear before you again. During my last visit to this subcommittee, on May 3rd, we discussed the American stake in a system of collective security. Much has occurred since early May to make that subject even more relevant today. I am submitting for the record my speech before the Council on Foreign Relations on June 11 because its discussion of collective security and U.N. reform should be of particular interest to this subcommittee.

Today, however, I want to review peacekeeping operations in Somalia, Cambodia, and Mozambique and describe recent Security Council action on Haiti. But I want to spend some time dispelling what I believe are some serious misperceptions about U.N. peacekeeping and the U.S. role in it.

Let me begin by noting that I have spoken in other forums in recent weeks about four categories of states that are emerging at the United Nations. They include (1) a significant number of states that have a stake in the United Nations and the international community as a whole, (2) emerging democracies trying to play a constructive role but struggling with internal political and economic turmoil, (3) other states and factions that are at war with international norms and institutions and which I call the "defiant regimes," and finally (4) the failed societies--the ones where effective government has collapsed, or anarchy reigns, or the economy is hopeless, or a humanitarian calamity overwhelms the country and the people are sliding into an abyss. These failed societies cry out for help from the international community.

Much of our credibility as a superpower--and we must, in my view, remain one--will depend upon our ability to manage our approach to these four groups. Though sometimes we will act alone, our foreign policy will necessarily point toward multilateral engagement. But unless the United States also exercises leadership within collective bodies like the United Nations, there is a risk that multilateralism will not serve our national interest well--in fact, it may undermine our interests.

These two realities--multilateral engagement and U.S. leadership within collective bodies-- require an "assertive multilateralism" that advances U.S. foreign policy goals. Preventive diplomacy is the linchpin of assertive multilateralism. We are going to have to open our minds to broader strategies in multilateral forums. We need to project our leadership where it counts long before a smoldering dispute has a chance to flare into the crisis of the week.

But we have inherited many conflicts that the United Nations is deeply involved in resolving. In recent weeks several failed societies have required assertive multilateral action in the interests of their people and of international peace and security.

Somalia. In Somalia, the United Nations took over from the U.S.-led UNITAF operation on May 4. From a peak of 25,800 American troops in mid-January, the U.S. contingent now comprises a ground logistics force of about 3,000 troops in the U.N. peacekeeping force in Somalia, UNOSOM II, and a separate quick reaction force of about 1,100 troops. The total multinational force in UNOSOM II is currently about 20,000 troops from 22 countries. The United Nations has troop commitments from additional countries which should permit it to reach its target of about 28,000 troops by the end of July.

The U.S. role thus has been vastly reduced in Somalia. Other nations' troops carry the greater burden on the ground, as the events of the last two weeks have clearly shown. A true multinational coalition of forces has gathered under the U.N. flag. Rather than pay most of the cost--as we did for the UNITAF operation--the United States now will pay its share of the regular assessment for the U.N. peacekeeping force. UNITAF cost \$750 million, while in its first year of operation UNOSOM II is projected to cost the United States \$470 million, its 30% share of the preliminary U.N. estimate of \$1.55 billion for the total cost of UNOSOM II.

The brutal attack on U.N. troops on June 5 left 23 Pakistani peacekeepers dead and 59 wounded. Three American soldiers also were wounded. This occurred while the U.N. troops were carrying out operations specifically within their mandate authorized in Security Council Resolution 814 of March 26th. The Security Council determined, in Resolution 837 on June 6, that law and order must be restored in Mogadishu and that the perpetrators of the killings of June 5 be apprehended, detained, and prosecuted. The U.N. envoy in Somalia, Admiral Jonathan Howe, issued an arrest warrant for General Aideed in connection with the shooting of Pakistani troops.

The unprecedented and decisive actions of UNOSOM II since June 12 against General Aideed's armed militia, their arms depots, and their strongholds were essential for the restoration of law and order in Mogadishu, the elimination of heavy weapons in the Mogadishu area, the resumption of humanitarian aid deliveries, the eventual resumption of discussion on political reconciliation, and the fulfillment of Resolution 837's mandate.

U.S. forces participated in the U.N. action with critical air and limited ground support. We can all be proud of our soldiers' measured and professional performance as part of the U.N. operation. About 1,400 U.N. peacekeepers from four other countries--Morocco, Pakistan, Italy, and France--were heavily engaged on the ground earlier this month. Four Moroccans and one Pakistani lost their lives, and dozens of peacekeepers were wounded.

If General Aideed and other perpetrators of the June 5 killings are apprehended, the Security Council will ensure that they are held accountable under the rule of law. In any event, the arrest warrant against General Aideed greatly restricts his mobility and effectiveness as a rogue leader, something I believe the vast majority of Somalis desperately want. As Admiral Howe has aptly stated, "People are sick of rule by the gun and extortion." As UNOSOM II succeeds in disarming factions

and heavy weapons are destroyed, the average Somali will be able to participate, without fear, in recreating a civil society. UNOSOM's prospects for promoting a durable political settlement will then improve.

There may well be further challenges to the authority of the U.N. peacekeeping force in Somalia. Rebuilding Somali society and promoting democracy in that strife-torn nation are difficult endeavors. But after the enormous effort made by the United States and other nations in the UNITAF operation to reverse famine in Somalia, it would be folly now to permit conditions to deteriorate again. Had there not been a U.N. response to the June 5 killings, the U.N.'s credibility in Somalia would have been fatally undermined.

Cambodia. The U.N.-organized elections in Cambodia were remarkably successful with a 90 percent turnout of the registered voters. The U.N. peacekeeping operation in Cambodia (UNTAC) deserves considerable credit for this success. Many UNTAC personnel--civilian and military--died in the line of duty in recent months to ensure a successful electoral process. Their ultimate sacrifice was not in vain. We believe that the Cambodian people have spoken with unmistakable clarity in saying they want an end to warfare. They want peace. The process of reconciliation has already begun. I sincerely hope we have

finally reached a stage where Cambodia is beginning to emerge from the category of "failed societies."

At our initiative, the Security Council recently endorsed the results of the election, which has been certified as free and fair by the United Nations, and requested UNTAC to continue to play its role during the transition period in accordance with the Paris Agreements. The Council also requested the Secretary-General to report by mid-July on the possible future role for the United Nations and its specialized agencies after UNTAC's mandate expires.

The newly-elected constituent assembly has begun its work of drawing up a constitution, and will transform itself into a legislative assembly with the establishment of a new government for Cambodia. We believe Prince Sihanouk is playing a vital and constructive role working with the leaders of the political parties which won seats in the elections. Last weekend the government party (CPP) and the royalist opposition (FUNCINPEC) tentatively agreed to a power-sharing arrangement during the transition period.

Cambodia and the United Nations have now entered a critical stage in the transition to peace and democracy. There remains a serious risk that the Khmer Rouge will continue attempting to

disrupt the peace process. The elected Cambodian leaders must ultimately decide on the composition of their own government. It is difficult, however, to see how the international community could support a government that included the Khmer Rouge or others who would seek to disrupt the peace process by means of violence.

We have come so far in Cambodia and it is essential that we stand by the Cambodian people and UNTAC and give democracy a chance to work there. We should anticipate that the United Nations will need to respond quickly and decisively to any attempt by any party to reverse the historic achievement of the elections. Finally, we must also work with the United Nations and others to create the economic and social conditions under which peace and democracy can flourish.

Mozambique. The United Nations is also involved in moving war-torn Mozambique toward lasting peace and multi-party democracy. The ambitious U.N. peacekeeping operation in Mozambique (OMUMOSZ) is charged with coordinating several major aspects of the transition to peace, including monitoring of the cease-fire, demobilization of combatants, preparation for and monitoring of elections, and the crucial humanitarian assistance effort. Despite some early administrative and logistical problems, the U.N. operation is now fully operational, with over 6,000 "blue helmet" forces deployed from two dozen countries.

We have been encouraged by the commitment of the government and RENAMO to uphold the cease-fire. However, we are concerned about delays in beginning the all-important demobilization process. We are urging both parties to overcome differences over details so that demobilization can begin smartly and preparations can get under way for elections, which are expected to be held before October 1994.

The United States participates actively in three U.N.-chaired commissions overseeing implementation of the Mozambique peace agreement. We are working with the U.N. Secretariat to determine what types of assistance the United States can provide at this very important time. We are encouraged that this is a devastated society that can be resurrected, in large part because of a viable peacekeeping presence.

Haiti. The people of Haiti have waited a long time for the re-establishment of a democratic government. The international community's political will to press for a settlement to restore democracy was evidenced in the tough UN sanctions resolution (841) that went into effect yesterday. The Security Council acted to stop the flow of oil and arms to Haiti through mandatory, legally binding, worldwide sanctions. The resolution breaks new ground in a number of areas. This is the first time

UN sanctions of this kind have been imposed on a country in this hemisphere. It is the first time Chapter VII sanctions have been imposed on a country not in civil conflict or at war with a neighbor. And it marks a new level of cooperation between the United Nations and a regional organization--in this case the Organization of American States. The United States is committed to seeing that international oil suppliers comply fully with Resolution 841.

These four examples alone show the complexities and modern requirements of U.N. peacekeeping and enforcement actions. There are many more. But I want to focus now on some misperceptions about the United Nations and peacekeeping that continue to shape--erroneously in my opinion--our public discourse on this country's role in the United Nations.

There are, in short, myths about the United Nations that need to be exposed before they lead us in the wrong direction during this turbulent new era of world politics:

Myth No. 1: U.N. peacekeeping has nothing to do with U.S. national interest. I trust that my testimony before this subcommittee on May 3rd dispensed with this myth. Peacekeeping has become instrumental in meeting three fundamental imperatives of our national interest: economic, political, and

humanitarian. I elaborated on those imperatives in my recent speech before the Council on Foreign Relations. The world continues to be a dangerous place.

And yet consider for a moment what the world and the U.S. defense budgets would be today if there were no U.N. peacekeeping operations and the resultant power vacuums invited intervention by neighbors or would-be regional powers. Increasingly, we are faced with an often violent eruption of local or regional disputes that require the world's attention. And it is in this new world that peacekeeping and the modern responsibilities of collective security are essential to our security.

Myth No. 2: When the United Nations takes over a security operation, the United States can bail out. When the refrain is, "Let the U.N. handle it," that cannot mean a "Pass" for the United States. This country is a part of the United Nations--in fact we are and should remain a very senior partner--and our participation and leadership are vital to its work. The alternatives--blissful isolation or costly duty as the world's cop--are unrealistic and unacceptable. The Somalia operation is a good example of how a continued U.S. role--minor compared to our initial UNITAF deployment--is part and parcel of letting "the U.N." handle it.

Myth No. 3: Peacekeeping operations are consensual, avoid risks, and only prolong conflicts between governments. Many peacekeeping operations, particularly today in connection with failed societies, are deployed into internal conflicts or anarchy, and thus are not dependent on conventional notions of consent from each warring party. Nor, by any measure, are peacekeeping operations risk-free. 925 peacekeeping soldiers have been killed in action in the course of U.N. history, and 528 of those have died in on-going operations. 53 British, 49 French, 43 Irish, 35 Canadians, and 10 Americans have died in the line of duty. In the former Yugoslavia, 43 peacekeepers have been killed. 186 peacekeepers have sacrificed their lives in Cyprus. The Somalia massacre of June 5 was a stark reminder of how exposed some peacekeepers are in the very hostile environments into which they are deployed.

Half (14) of the 28 U.N. peacekeeping operations in U.N. history have been terminated, most within one or two years of their creation. While some peacekeeping operations may indeed encourage stalemate, the alternative often would be a bloody and costly conflict -- with severe risks of escalation -- that no one desires.

Myth No. 4: Peacekeeping is too expensive and ridden with fraud and mismanagement. I have testified and spoken out often

about the ad hoc approaches that dominate peacekeeping operations. "Improvisation" is the single word that might best evoke the problems of peacekeeping. And while the potential for fraud and mismanagement exists, as it does in any large organization, the most pressing problems in UN peacekeeping relate to the sheer improvisational character of the system. This produces major gaps in institutional capacity on one hand and inefficiencies on the other. In fact, the small peacekeeping staff at U.N. Headquarters is superlative, and steps are now being taken to increase its size and effectiveness. The millions that are spent on peacekeeping operations--totalling more than \$3 billion in 1993--must be measured against the much higher costs that result if conflicts are left to fester and explode.

I would like to add that the Administration is taking the lead to enhance U.N. peacekeeping through implementation of important initiatives at the United Nations and within our own government. On May 28th the Security Council reached consensus on a list of peacekeeping reforms, and plans for implementing them will be reported to us by the Secretary-General in September. Within our government the Administration has been conducting an intensive inter-agency review since February of both the U.S. role in peacekeeping and the planning and managerial capabilities of the United Nations for peacekeeping.

We anticipate that review process to be concluded soon. Finally, in September we hope there will be a ministerial-level session of the Security Council to review peacekeeping.

Myth No. 5: The U.S. domestic agenda prevents us from leading and shaping a free and secure world. This is faulty logic at best, and disastrous public policy at worse. The stability of the world economy and of regional and world politics is deeply integrated with U.S. interests and our economy. If we pursue a domestic agenda with blinders on, refusing to recognize the carnage to our left and the distant conflict to our right, eventually the cost of that disengagement, at a minimum, will be an additional financial burden we must bear. More likely, the costs will include U.S. forces with attendant potential loss of life. President Clinton and Secretary Christopher have always recognized that the foreign agenda is inseparable from the domestic agenda. The sooner we all grasp that fundamental fact the sooner we will recognize U.N. peacekeeping as one small, but important, piece in the overall effort to achieve global stability and prosperity and to advance democracies and their typically market-oriented economies.

All of this points to the fact that we are engaged in a great dialogue, the conclusion of which no one can yet predict

with certainty. In our effort to plot what role the United States should fill in this new era, we cannot abandon the responsibilities of a superpower. We cannot apply "old think" to how we judge peacekeeping operations and missions today and into the future. A whole new platter of issues confronts contributing nations, including deployments into internal conflicts and to protect humanitarian aid convoys. We need more minds pole vaulting over the conventions of the past and directing this nation's power into the 21st century.



BIOGRAPHY

Madeleine Korbelt Albright

Madeleine Korbelt Albright was appointed by President Clinton on January 21, 1993 as the United States Permanent Representative to the United Nations. President Clinton elevated this position and made the Ambassador a member of his Cabinet and a member of the National Security Council.

Prior to her appointment, Ambassador Albright was the President of the Center for National Policy. The Center is a non-profit research organization, formed in 1981 by representatives from government, industry, labor and education. Its mandate is to promote the study and discussion of domestic and international issues.

As a Research Professor of International Affairs and Director of Women in Foreign Service Program at Georgetown University's School of Foreign Service, she taught undergraduate and graduate courses in international affairs, U.S. foreign policy, Russian foreign policy, and Central and Eastern European politics, and was responsible for developing and implementing programs designed to enhance women's professional opportunities in international affairs.

In 1981-82 Ambassador Albright was awarded a fellowship at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars at the Smithsonian following an international competition in which she wrote about the role of the press in political changes in Poland in 1980-82.

She also served as a Senior Fellow in Soviet and Eastern European Affairs at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, conducting research in developments and trends in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.

From 1978-1981 Ambassador Albright was a Staff Member on the National Security Council, as well as a White House staff member, where she was responsible for foreign policy legislation.

From 1976-1975, she served as Chief Legislative Assistant to Senator Edmund S. Muskie.

Other professional experience includes Board Member of the National Endowment for Democracy, Board Member of the International Media Fund, Senior Foreign Policy Advisor to Presidential Candidate Michael S. Dukakis, Foreign Policy Advisor to the Mondale-Ferraro campaign, Vice-Chair of the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs, Member of the Board of Directors of the Atlantic Council of the United States, Member of the Board of Trustees of Wellesley College, Member of the Board of Trustees of the Black Student Fund, Member of the U.S. National Commission for the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, Member of the Board of Trustees of the

Washington Urban League, Member of the Board of Directors of the Center for National Policy, Member of the Chapter of the Washington National Cathedral, Member of the Board of Trustees of Williams College, Member of the Board of Trustees of the Democratic Forum, Member of the Executive Committee of D.C. Citizens for Better Public Education, Chairman of the Board of Trustees of Beauvoir School, Public Relations Staff of the Encyclopedia Britannica, and Reporter on the Rolla Daily News, Rolla, Missouri.

Awarded a B.A. from Wellesley College with honors in Political Science, she studied at the School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University, received a Certificate from the Russian Institute at Columbia University, and her Masters and Doctorate from Columbia University's Department of Public Law and Government.

Ambassador Albright is fluent in French and Czech, with good speaking and reading abilities in Russian and Polish.

Selected writings include Poland, the Role of the Press in Political Change (New York: Praeger with the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Georgetown University, Washington, D.C. 1983); The Role of the Press in Political Change: Czechoslovakia 1968 (Ph.D. Dissertation, Columbia University 1976); and The Soviet Diplomatic Service: Profile of an Elite (Master's Thesis, Columbia University 1968).

Ambassador Albright has three daughters.

For future correspondence, the Ambassador may be reached at either her Washington, D.C. or New York offices: Suite 6333, Department of State, 2201 C Street N.W., Washington, D.C. 20520-6319, or U.S. Mission to the United Nations, 799 United Nations Plaza, New York, New York 10017.

STATEMENT

COLONEL HARRY G. SUMMERS, JR., USA (RETIRED)
Distinguished Fellow, U.S. Army War College

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZATIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS
Committee on Foreign Affairs
United States House of Representatives

on

Tuesday, September 21, 1993

U.S. PARTICIPATION IN UN PEACEKEEPING ORGANIZATIONS

Introduction

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee: Thank you for the opportunity to testify on the issue of U.S. participation in United Nations peacekeeping operations. Within the past month, during my lectures on military strategy at the Army War College, Marine Corps Command and Staff College, Armed Forces Staff College, Inter-American Defense College and the Air University's Joint Flag Officer Warfighting Course, this has been an area of great concern among senior U.S. and allied military officers.

Those concerns were eloquently expressed by General Colin L. Powell, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, during the press conference on the Department of Defense Bottom-Up Review at the Pentagon on September 1, 1993.

"Let me begin," he said, "by giving a little bit of a tutorial about what an armed force is all about. Notwithstanding all of the changes that have taken place in the world, notwithstanding the new emphasis on peacekeeping, peace enforcement, peace engagement, preventative diplomacy, we have a value system and a culture system within the armed forces of the United States. We have this mission: to fight and win the nation's wars.

"That's what we do. Why do we do it? For this purpose: to provide for the common defense. And who do we do it for? We do it for the American people. We never want to lose sight of this ethic, we never want to lose sight of this basic underlying principle of the Armed Forces of the United States."

"We're warriors. And because we are warriors, because we have demonstrated time and time again that we can do this for that purpose for the American people, that's why you have armed forces within the United States structure."

The Corruption of an Army

A major concern within the military is that this basic underlying principle will be corrupted by overemphasis on peacekeeping and other such non-military operations. This concern is well founded, for an example is near at hand.

As Lieutenant Colonel John A. English of the Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry, then on the faculty of the National Defense College of Canada, wrote in his 1991 work, The Canadian Army and the Normandy Campaign: A Study of Failure in High Command (Praeger), that's exactly what happened to the Canadian military in the period between the world wars.

Their senior officers were corrupted not by money or power. They were corrupted by their desire to be loved, to be politically correct, in the anti-military climate of the times. To that end they involved themselves and their military almost entirely in good works in the civilian sector. Tragically, it was at the expense of maintaining their professional military skills and their battlefield expertise.

They paid for this error with the blood of the soldiers they had been entrusted to command. In Normandy alone the Canadians took 18,444 casualties, many through sheer military incompetence. As Colonel English concludes, "Those who had been paid excessively high wages to keep the military art alive, adopted instead the bankrupt policy of searching for other roles. They shamefully forgot that the main purpose of a peacetime military establishment is to prepare for the day when armed forces might have to be used against a first-class enemy."

During that same period the American military was also involved in such civil relief operations as the Civilian Conservation Corps, but they accomplished those tasks as an adjunct to, rather than a replacement for, their fundamental military duties. Given what has been called the long and proud tradition of American anti-militarism, they had no illusions about being loved. Their focus remained on the battlefield.

As T.R. Fehrenbach noted in This Kind of War (Macmillan), his masterful 1963 analysis of the Korean war, "Before 1939 the United States Army was small, but it was professional. Its tiny officers corps was parochial, but true. Its members devoted their time to the study of war."

"There was and is no danger of military domination of the nation," Fehrenbach continued. "The Constitution gave Congress the power of life or death over the military, and they have always accepted the fact. The danger has always been the other way around--the liberal society, in its heart, wants not only domination of the military, but acquiescence of the military toward the liberal view or life."

"Domination and control society should have....But acquiescence society may not have, if it wants an army worth a damn. By the very nature of its mission, the military must maintain a narrow and illiberal view of life and the world."

Thirty years after those words were written, General Powell addressed that very dichotomy. "Because we are able to fight and win the nations wars, because we are warriors," he said, "we are also uniquely able to do some of these other new missions that are coming along--peacekeeping, humanitarian relief, disaster relief--you name it, we can do it....but we never want to do it in such a way that we lose sight of the focus of why you have armed forces---to fight and win the nation's wars."

Hoisting America on its Own Petard

Not only are the underlying principles of the military in peril. So is the very foundation of American democracy, for there is a real danger that the current emphasis on operations other than war may end up hoisting America on its own petard.

In medieval siege warfare the enemy's fortifications were undermined by saps or trenches extended underneath the city or castle walls. A bomb (petard) was then exploded to cause a breach through which an assault could be made. But if extreme care was not taken, one could be blown up (hoisted) by one's own bomb. .

A powerful warning of such an eventuality was Air Force Lieutenant Colonel Charles E. Dunlap's award-winning 1992 National War College student essay, "The Origins of the American Military Coup of 2012" (Parameters: US Army War College Quarterly, Winter 1992-93).

Written from the perspective of a senior military officer about to be executed for opposing the coup, this takeover "was the outgrowth of trends visible as far back as 1992" including "the massive diversion of military forces to civilian uses."

Congress may very well be sowing the seeds of its own destruction, for among the examples Dunlap cites is the Military Cooperation with Civilian Law Enforcement Agencies Act of 1981 "which was specifically intended to force reluctant military commanders to actively collaborate in police work," deliberately undermining the Posse Comitatus Act of 1878 which had removed the military from such sensitive civilian activities.

In 1986, Congress "declared overseas humanitarian and civic assistance activities to be 'valid military missions' and specifically authorized them by law." In 1992 former Secretary of State James Baker pronounced that in airlifting relief supplies around the world, "We will wage a new peace."

"In truth," Dunlap wrote from the vantage point of 2012, "militaries ought to 'prepare for war,' and leave the 'peace waging' to those agencies of the government whose mission is just that. Nevertheless, such pronouncements--seconded by military leaders--became the fashionable philosophy. The result? People in the military no longer considered themselves warriors.

"Instead they perceived themselves as policemen, relief workers, educators, builders, health care providers, politicians--everything but warfighters.... it is little wonder its traditional apolitical professionalism eventually eroded."

The New Conquistadors

Those calling for the massive involvement of U.S. military forces in peacekeeping, nationbuilding, and other such operations other than war are unwittingly turning traditional American civil-military relations on its head.

"The ultimate objective of all military operations" emphasized the May 22, 1941 edition of FM (Field Manual) 100-5, the Army's basic operational manual, "is the destruction of the enemy's armed forces in battle...Concentration of superior forces, both on the ground and in the air, at the decisive point and time...creates the conditions essential to victory."

Abandoned during the Cold War, this fundamental principle which led to victory in World War II has resurfaced as the military's current statement of purpose. It has been ridiculed, however, by those who claim that it does not meet the demands of the post-Cold War world.

The critics, most of whom were vociferous opponents of our Vietnam involvement, would instead return to the statement of purpose that undergirded that tragic misapplication of American military power. "The fundamental purpose of U.S. military forces," said the politically correct 1968 version of FM 100-5, "is to preserve, restore or create an environment of order or stability within which the instrumentalities of government can function effectively under a code of laws."

This is precisely what some are calling for the U.S. military to attempt to do again. Growing out of civilian academic conceits that one can change the world with the tools of social science, this wrongheaded notion that political, social and economic institutions can be built with the sword flies in the face of not only our Vietnam experience, but also the centuries-old American model of civil-military relations.

In the British colonies of North America, the civilian government was always in charge and the military subordinate to civilian control. These civil-military provisions were later written into the Constitution of the United States. On the other hand, in the Spanish colonies in Latin America, the conquistadors established law and order and only then turned power over to the civilian government to run. This is more than ancient history.

In a recent lecture at the Inter-American Defense College a Chilean officer vigorously defended the 1973 overthrow of the Allende government as a legitimate exercise of military power in restoring a climate of peace and stability.

Incredibly, this conquistador model is the model of choice for those who would have the U.S. military intervene in Somalia and Bosnia to "create an environment of order or stability within which the instrumentalities of government can function effectively under a code of laws." In other words, they would encourage our military to do abroad what traditionally the military has been forbidden to do here at home. This way lies madness... and the prophesied American military coup of 2012.

A New Peace Corps

There is no doubt that America has a role to play in attempting to alleviate the terrible pain and suffering wracking much of the world. There is also no doubt, given the 211-199 vote in the House of Representatives on September 13, 1993 to deny creating a thirty million dollar fund for peacekeeping operations, that there is considerable public resistance to involving their armed forces in such endeavors.

Ironically, the solution to this seeming dilemma can be found in our Vietnam War experience. Although lip-service was given to the non-military dimensions of that war, it became obvious that by temperament and training U.S. military units were ill-suited for such operations.

In 1967, a new organization, CORDS (Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support) was created to deal with the war's political, economic and social dimensions. Headed initially by Ambassador Robert W. Komer, who was appointed as General Westmoreland's deputy commander, CORDS was composed of personnel from the State Department, the Agency for International Development (AID), the U.S. Information Agency (USIS), and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).

Although primarily a civilian agency, it also had a military component to provide security and logistic support. CORDS was one of the most successful innovations of the war, ensuring that U.S. economic aid was properly distributed and enormously improving the infrastructure of the South Vietnamese government. Over-shadowed by the 1975 fall of South Vietnam to the cross-border North Vietnamese blitzkrieg, those successes were soon forgotten and the lessons of how to provide for the non-military aspects of conflict were never learned.

Those lessons need to be resurrected and reexamined. To "wage peace" we need to create a new and expanded Peace Corps under the auspices of the Department of State. Like CORDS, it should be headed by a civilian, an ambassadorial-level Foreign Service Officer, to emphasize its non-military character.

And like CORDS, the majority of its personnel should also be civilian, including political and economic experts from State, AID relief workers, USIA communications specialists, and other such "peacemakers." The military would provide such back-up assistance as might be required, including moving the relief teams and their supplies into position and providing continuous logistical and other support. Security forces would also be provided as needed to guard against hostile attack. But, as with CORDS, the military would be in a subordinate role.

And that's important. U.S. military intervention abroad, even in the name of peacekeeping and humanitarian aid, raises host nation fears for their sovereignty and independence. A new Peace Corps would ease such misperceptions. If we're going to be the world's nanny, we at least ought to do it right.



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BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

An Army War College Distinguished Fellow who formerly held the War College's General Douglas MacArthur Chair, Colonel Harry G. Summers, Jr. is now a syndicated columnist for the *Los Angeles Times*, editor of *Vietnam* magazine, and is the 1993-1994 holder of the Marine Corps University's Brigadier General H. L. Oppenheimer Chair of Warfighting Strategy.

Twice decorated for valor on the battlefield and twice wounded in action, Colonel Summers is a veteran of the Korean and Vietnam wars. His award-winning critique of the Vietnam War, *On Strategy*, is used as a student text by the war and staff colleges and by many civilian universities. The American Library Association voted his *Vietnam War Almanac* as one of the outstanding source books for 1985 and his 1990 *Korean War Almanac* also won critical acclaim. The *New York Times Book Review* called his 1992 *On Strategy II*, "the best of any gulf war book to date."

Military analyst for NBC News during the Gulf War, Colonel Summers has made more than 200 television appearances, including ABC, CBS, CNN, and NBC Evening News; NBC's *The Today Show* and *Meet the Press*; National Public Television's McNeil-Lehrer News Hour, Fox Morning News and the Canadian Broadcasting Company's *NewsWorld*. He has been a frequent guest on Voice of America, National Public Radio, and on radio talk shows nationwide.

A prolific writer, Colonel Summers won New York University's Center for War, Peace and the News Media's 1990 Olive Branch Award, the Veterans of Foreign Wars 1991 News Media Award and the Vietnam Veterans of America's 1993 Excellence in the Arts Award. Formerly *U.S. News & World Report's* chief military correspondent and contributing editor for the late *Defense and Diplomacy* magazine, his articles and reviews have appeared in *American Heritage*, *The Atlantic Monthly*, *Harper's*, *Kansas City Star*, *Los Angeles Times*, *Newsday*, *The New Republic*, *New York Times*, *U.S. News & World Report*, *Wall Street Journal*, *Washington Post* and *Washington Times*.

A member of the Council on Foreign Relations and the International Institute for Strategic Studies, Colonel Summers has testified before the U.S. Senate and the House of Representatives on strategic military issues and has lectured at the White House, State Department, Central Intelligence Agency, Defense Intelligence Agency, National Defense University, Air and Marine Corps Universities, Naval War College, Army War College and Command & General Staff College, U.S. Military, Naval, and Air Force Academies, Canada's National Defence College and Royal Military College and at such academic institutions as Georgetown, Harvard, Stanford and Vanderbilt.

A graduate of the Army War College, Colonel Summers was awarded a Bachelor's degree in Military Science by the University of Maryland and also holds a Master of Military Arts and Science from the Army Command & General Staff College. Married since 1951 to the former Eloise Cunningham, their two sons are serving Army officers.

U.S. PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE TO THE UNITED NATIONS

AMBASSADOR MADELEINE K. ALBRIGHT

ADDRESS TO THE COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

CONFERENCE ON COOPERATIVE SECURITY AND THE UNITED NATIONS

JUNE 11, 1993

THANK YOU VERY MUCH ALTON. HAVING SPENT MANY YEARS ON THE OTHER SIDE OF THE PODIUM, I MUST SAY THAT I AM DELIGHTED TO HAVE MADE IT TO THIS SIDE. IT IS ALWAYS AN HONOR AND A PLEASURE TO JOIN DISCUSSIONS AT THE COUNCIL — NOT ONLY BECAUSE EVERY COUNCIL MEMBER IS HONORED TO ADDRESS ONE'S COLLEAGUES, BUT ALSO BECAUSE I BELIEVE THAT MY STIMULATING NEW LIFE HAS GIVEN ME SOME NEW INSIGHTS I AM DELIGHTED TO SHARE.

THE THEME OF THE COUNCIL'S CONFERENCE, "COOPERATIVE SECURITY AND THE UNITED NATIONS" IS INDEED ONE OF THE MOST PRESSING FOREIGN POLICY ISSUES FACING OUR COUNTRY — AND VERY MUCH IN NEED OF THE THOUGHTFUL ATTENTION OF PEOPLE LIKE YOU.

THE URGENCY COMES ABOUT FOR THREE REASONS:

FIRST, THE COLD WAR'S END HAS REMOVED THE RESTRAINING, STABILIZING EFFECT OF THE EAST-WEST NUCLEAR STAND-OFF. PENT UP, OFTEN VIOLENT, PRESSURES FOR CHANGE HAVE BEEN RELEASED -- PLACING THE UNITED NATIONS IN THE CENTER OF THE EFFORT TO GUIDE AND SAFEGUARD A SUDDENLY CHAOTIC WORLD.

SECOND, AS THE WORLD'S SOLE REMAINING SUPERPOWER, LEADING ECONOMY, AND FOREMOST DEMOCRACY, AS WELL AS THE BIGGEST DONOR TO UN PEACEKEEPING, IT IS THE UNITED STATES THAT WILL GREATLY INFLUENCE WHAT SECURITY ROLE THE UN WILL TAKE ON.

AND THIRD, IT IS ALSO A FACT THAT PEACEKEEPING COSTS -- ROUGHLY \$1 BILLION FOR US IN 1993 -- MUST HAVE DEEP SUPPORT IN CONGRESS AND IN THE PUBLIC AT LARGE IF THEY ARE GOING TO BE SUSTAINED. THAT MEANS WE MUST BE EXTREMELY CLEAR ABOUT HOW THE UN SERVES US SECURITY INTERESTS.

LET ME USE MY TIME THIS EVENING TO DISCUSS AS DIRECTLY AS I CAN TWO QUESTIONS THAT ARE AT THE HEART OF THE US RELATIONSHIP TO THE UN IN THE POST COLD WAR ERA: FIRST, WHY IS A STRONG UNITED NATIONS CRITICAL TO US SECURITY, AND SECOND, HOW AND IN WHAT DIRECTION SHOULD THE UN'S CONTRIBUTION TO GLOBAL SECURITY BE STRENGTHENED.

SO, WHY IS A STRONG UN CRITICAL TO U.S. SECURITY? THE COLLAPSE OF SOVIET COMMUNISM, APART FROM BEING THE MOST POSITIVE DEVELOPMENT OF THE 20TH CENTURY, HAS LEFT US WITH A DILEMMA. WE ARE BEING IMPORTUNED - BY ALLIES AND FORMER FOES ALIKE - TO INTENSIFY OUR GLOBAL SECURITY LEADERSHIP AT THE VERY TIME WHEN THE ENEMY IS MUCH HARDER TO IDENTIFY, WHEN OUR VITAL INTERESTS ARE THREATENED IN MORE SUBTLE AND REMOTE WAYS, AND WHEN OUR OWN BUDGET IS SO STRAINED.

AS A PROFESSOR, I AM WARY OF HISTORIC PARALLELS. SO LET ME INDULGE A BIT AND SAY THAT THE LAST TIME WE WERE IN THIS SITUATION WAS THE DECADE FOLLOWING THE FIRST WORLD WAR. THEN, THE LACK OF AN OBVIOUS THREAT HELPED US TO RATIONALIZE NON-PARTICIPATION IN THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS. OF COURSE, THE LEAGUE WAS STRUCTURALLY FLAWED ANYWAY. BUT OUR ABSENCE WAS SYMPTOMATIC: BEHIND IT WAS A CONCEPTUAL FAILURE TO EXPLAIN, AND A POLITICAL FAILURE TO SUPPORT, EFFECTIVE ENGAGEMENT IN A WORLD THAT SEEMED TO HAVE NO "CLEAR AND PRESENT DANGER".

THE CHALLENGE FACING US SECURITY POLICY TODAY IS UNCANNILY SIMILAR, AND LEAVES US WITH WHAT I CALL THE TWO OSTRICHES PROBLEM. ONE OSTRICH WOULD RATHER NOT SEE ANY PREDATORS AND PLUNGES ITS HEAD INTO THE SAND. THE OTHER HEARS THE CLAMOR OF FRIENDS IN NEED AND MISERIES TO ASSUAGE AND RUNS OFF IN ALL DIRECTIONS AT ONCE.

BETWEEN SELF-ABSORPTION, WITH RUINOUS CONSEQUENCES FOR THE REST OF THE WORLD, AND HYPER-ACTIVITY WITH EQUALLY RUINOUS CONSEQUENCES FOR OURSELVES AND OTHERS, THERE IS A THIRD ALTERNATIVE — AN ALTERNATIVE THAT HUSBANDS AMERICAN RESOURCES AND PROMOTES AMERICAN AND GLOBAL INTERESTS IN A JUST AND ORDERLY WORLD. IT IS CALLED MULTILATERAL ACTION. AS SECRETARY OF STATE CHRISTOPHER HAS SAID,

"WE CANNOT LET EVERY CRISIS BECOME A CHOICE BETWEEN INACTION OR AMERICAN INTERVENTION. THE WORLD LOOKS TO US FOR LEADERSHIP. THUS, THE ALTERNATIVES BOIL DOWN TO HOW THE UNITED STATES WILL LEAD: ALONE; AT THE HEAD OF A COALITION; OR WORKING MULTILATERALLY TO SHARE THE BURDENS WITH OTHERS."

A PRINCIPLED INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY

LET ME TRY OUT A THOUGHT WITH YOU: A PRINCIPLED INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY. COLLECTIVE SECURITY WILL MAKE IT POSSIBLE FOR US TO SHARE OUR GLOBAL SECURITY BURDEN. BUT THE IDEA OF COLLECTIVE SECURITY IS MORE THAN A FISCAL EXPEDIENT. IT FLOWS FROM A MUTUALITY OF INTERESTS -- COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, CULTURAL, ECOLOGICAL, POLITICAL AND SECURITY-RELATED -- THAT AFFECT OUR DAILY LIVES. IN SHORT, IT IS IN OUR INTEREST TO SHAPE A WORLD THAT IS MORE THAN AN AGGLOMERATION OF STATES, BUT IS IN FACT A PRINCIPLED COMMUNITY.

AS I SEE IT, THE OBLIGATION TO WORK TOWARD SUCH A COMMUNITY ISN'T SOMETHING WE ELECT TO DO BECAUSE WE ARE GOOD GUYS. IT IS FORCED ON US BY SEVERAL IMPERATIVES. LET ME MENTION FIVE TONIGHT.

THE FIRST REFLECTED IN THE TITLE OF THIS CONFERENCE, IS THE STRATEGIC IMPERATIVE TO COOPERATE. MANY THREATS ARE SO GEOGRAPHICALLY DIFFUSE THAT IT IS WELL BEYOND OUR OWN OR OUR ALLIES' RESOURCES TO COUNTER THEM. SUPPORTIVE ACTIONS FROM A VAST NUMBER OF COUNTRIES ARE ESSENTIAL, AND THIS IS EXACTLY WHAT THE UN SANCTIONS REGIMES AGAINST IRAQ, LIBYA, AND SERBIA-MONTENEGRO HAVE ACHIEVED. INDEED, WITHOUT THE TOURNIQUET ON IRAQI IMPORTS, I THINK IT IS SAFE TO SAY THAT IRAQ'S MILITARY FORCE STRUCTURE AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS POTENTIAL WOULD SOON AGAIN BE A SUBJECT OF GRAVE CONCERN.

THE SECOND IMPERATIVE IS LEGITIMACY. MOST COUNTRIES, MOST OF THE TIME, FIND THAT WHEN THEY RESPECT INTERNATIONAL LAW THE BENEFITS FAR OUTWEIGH THE COSTS. THUS WHEN THE SECURITY COUNCIL ADOPTS A MANDATORY RESOLUTION, OR THE IAEA AUTHORIZES AN INSPECTION UNDER ITS STATUTE, THE RESULTANT ACTIONS CARRY AN INCOMPARABLE MEASURE OF POLITICAL LEGITIMACY.

FOR EXAMPLE, WITHOUT VIRTUALLY OCCUPYING MUCH OF IRAQ IT IS INCONCEIVABLE THAT THE UNITED STATES COULD HAVE CONDUCTED THE KIND OF INTRUSIVE INSPECTIONS ROUTINELY PERFORMED BY THE UN MONITORING COMMISSION. IT IS EQUALLY INCONCEIVABLE THAT THE FRONTLINE STATES IN THE BALKANS, ESPECIALLY ROMANIA, BULGARIA, HUNGARY, ALBANIA AND NOW MACEDONIA, WOULD HAVE OPTED TO APPLY TRADE SANCTIONS ON SERBIA-MONTENEGRO, WITHOUT THE COMBINATION OF LEGAL PRESSURE AND POLITICAL SUPPORT CONFERRED BY SECURITY COUNCIL SANCTIONS RESOLUTIONS. AND IT IS VIRTUALLY CERTAIN THAT WITHOUT THE POLITICAL SUPPORT EXPRESSED IN THE USE-OF-FORCE RESOLUTION AGAINST IRAQ, SADDAM WOULD HAVE BEEN ABLE TO CARRY OUT HIS GRISLY TERRORIST THREAT AGAINST US SOLDIERS, CIVILIANS AND FACILITIES.

A THIRD FACTOR IS THE ECONOMIC IMPERATIVE OF BURDEN-SHARING. WE HAVE A NATIONAL SECURITY INTEREST IN CONTAINING AND, WHEREVER POSSIBLE, RESOLVING REGIONAL CONFLICTS. WHETHER MEASURED IN ARMS PROLIFERATION, REFUGEES ON OUR SHORES, THE DESTABILIZATION OF ALLIES, OR LOSS OF EXPORTS, JOBS OR INVESTMENTS, THE COST OF RUNAWAY REGIONAL CONFLICTS SOONER OR LATER COMES HOME TO AMERICA. IN 1993, THE UN WILL SPEND OVER \$3 BILLION TO STEM OR STOP THOSE CONFLICTS, AND WE WILL PAY ONE THIRD OF THAT. BUT WITHOUT THE UN, BOTH THE COSTS AND THE CONFLICT WOULD BE FAR GREATER.

YET A FOURTH IMPERATIVE, WHICH COULD BE CALLED THE APPROPRIATE-REDRESS-GRIEVANCE IMPERATIVE, HAS EMERGED IN THE LAST FEW YEARS. THE COLD WAR'S END FREED A HOST OF DISSATISFIED PARTIES — PARTICULARLY IN EUROPE AND EURASIA — TO PURSUE THE REDRESS OF ECONOMIC, NATIONAL, ETHNIC, RACIAL, RELIGIOUS AND OTHER GRIEVANCES. LEFT UNCHECKED, THESE FORCES WILL SURELY CONVULSE MUCH OF EUROPE AND EURASIA IN CONFLICT. THE POTENTIAL TO DESTABILIZE THE HEART OF EUROPE, OR TO TRIGGER USE OF NUCLEAR OR OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION, OR TO SPREAD GENOCIDE IS ONE WE CANNOT ACCEPT. THERE IS REALLY ONLY ONE ANTIDOTE. IT IS TO EXTEND TO ALL PARTIES THE PROMISE OF PRINCIPLED CHANGE AND TO SHARPLY PENALIZE THOSE WHO REFUSE. ONLY THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY HAS THE COLLECTIVE MORAL AUTHORITY, AND THE PHYSICAL AND FINANCIAL RESOURCES, FOR SUCH A CRITICAL TASK.

AND FIFTH, THE WESTERN DEMOCRACIES FACE WHAT I WOULD CALL A "FAIRNESS" OR AN "EQUITY" IMPERATIVE. THE EQUITY IMPERATIVE SAYS THIS: IF THE SECURITY COUNCIL IS TO SPEAK AND ACT ON BEHALF OF THE ENTIRE WORLD COMMUNITY, ITS EFFORTS CANNOT BE CONFINED TO ONLY THOSE ISSUES OF GREATEST CONSEQUENCE TO ITS RICHER MEMBERS. INDEED, THE UN'S AMBITIOUS ENGAGEMENT IN SOMALIA, SO CRITICAL FOR HUMANITARIAN REASONS, ALSO SENDS THIS IMPORTANT POLITICAL MESSAGE: WE MUST BE SELECTIVE, AND CAREFULLY SAVE THE UN'S RESOURCES, BUT NOT BY CLOSING THE SECURITY COUNCIL DOOR.

THE FACTORS WHICH I HAVE SET OUT MAKE IT CLEAR THAT THE PROCESS IN WHICH WE ARE ENGAGED IS NOT SIMPLY AN EXERCISE IN ALTRUISTIC MORALITY. TO ME, THERE IS NO SUCH THING AS DISINTERESTED INVOLVEMENT IN THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY. WE ARE AND WILL REMAIN INVOLVED BECAUSE WE MUST CONTINUE TO TRY TO BUILD AN INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM IN WHICH OUR EXPERIMENT IN DEMOCRACY AND SOCIAL PLURALISM CAN CONTINUE TO FLOURISH. AS WE PROCEED TO PRESERVE AND PROTECT WHAT WE HAVE, WE OUGHT TO MAKE CLEAR WHO WE ARE AND WHAT WE STAND FOR. THERE WILL ALWAYS BE A STRONG IDEOLOGICAL COMPONENT TO AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY. WE WOULD BE FOOLISH TO SUPPRESS IT. IT IS WHAT MAKES US DIFFERENT, AND WHAT OTHERS ADMIRE ABOUT US.

AT THE SAME TIME, AMERICA'S OVERRIDING INTEREST IN CREATING THIS NEW COMMUNITY DOES NOT MEAN IT IS AMERICA'S RESPONSIBILITY TO RIGHT EVERY WRONG IN THE WORLD. INSTEAD, OUR GOAL IS TO FOSTER THE DEVELOPMENT OF A COMMUNITY CAPABLE OF EASING, IF NOT TERMINATING, THE ABOMINABLE INJUSTICES AND CONDITIONS THAT STILL PLAGUE CIVILIZATION. BECAUSE ONLY IN SUCH A COMMUNITY CAN AMERICA FLOURISH. IF THIS IS CONSIDERED NAIVE IDEALISM, I PLEAD GUILTY.

HAVING LAID OUT TO YOU SOME REASONS WHY I THINK A STRONG UN IS CRITICAL TO U.S. SECURITY, LET ME LAUNCH INTO THE SECOND PART OF MY TALK: HOW AND IN WHAT WAY SHOULD THE U.N.'S ROLE IN GLOBAL SECURITY BE STRENGTHENED?

IF IN FACT A MORE PRINCIPLED INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY IS STARTING TO TAKE SHAPE, WHERE DO WE FIT IN? BECAUSE THIS INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY SO REFLECTS AMERICAN VALUES, IDEOLOGY AND ECONOMIC INTERESTS, WE HAVE A MOTIVE AND AN OPPORTUNITY TO ESTABLISH SOME "RULES OF THE GAME". THE UN IS THE BEST REPOSITORY OF THOSE RULES AND THE US IS THEIR MOST ABLE PATRON.

BUT RULES AREN'T RULES IF THEY'RE NOT ENFORCED. THIS DOES NOT REQUIRE THAT WE SERVE AS THE WORLD'S POLICEMAN, ONLY THAT THERE SHOULD BE POLICEMEN AND THAT WE TAKE A HAND IN ASSURING THEIR EFFECTIVENESS.

A CENTRAL FOREIGN POLICY GOAL OF THIS ADMINISTRATION IS THEREFORE TO HELP CREATE SAFEGUARDS FOR A PRINCIPLED INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY WHICH MORE EVENLY DISTRIBUTE THE BURDEN OF ITS DEFENSE WHILE PRESERVING OUR ROLE IN ITS LEADERSHIP. SO, WE IN THE UNITED STATES MUST WORK ENERGETICALLY TO STRENGTHEN THE CAPACITY OF THE UN AND OTHER MULTILATERAL ORGANIZATIONS TO CONDUCT PEACEKEEPING, PREVENTIVE DIPLOMACY, PEACEMAKING, PEACE ENFORCEMENT, HUMANITARIAN SECURITY AND SIMILAR OPERATIONS.

FIXING UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING

IN RECENT YEARS, UN PEACEKEEPING AND RELATED MISSIONS HAVE INCREASED AT A DIZZYING PACE. IN 1987, THERE WERE FIVE PEACEKEEPING MISSIONS, THREE OF WHICH HAD EXISTED FOR DECADES. THEY WERE STAFFED BY FEWER THAN 10,000 UN TROOPS OR MILITARY OBSERVERS AT A TOTAL COST OF \$233 MILLION. TODAY THERE ARE 13 MISSIONS, OVER 75,000 TROOPS, AND THE PRICE TAG IS OVER 3 BILLION. YET, AMAZINGLY, THERE ARE ROUGHLY THE SAME NUMBER OF PERMANENT HEADQUARTERS STAFF AS THERE WERE IN 1987.

THIS SMALL STAFF HAS DONE A REMARKABLE JOB OF ADJUSTING, BOTH TO THE NEW WORKLOAD AND THE CONCEPTUAL CHANGES IN PEACEKEEPING MANDATES. BUT THEY HAVE HAD TO RELY ON AD HOC ARRANGEMENTS. WE ALL BEAR A LARGE MEASURE OF RESPONSIBILITY FOR THIS SITUATION, BECAUSE WE HAVE FAILED ALL TO ENSURE THAT THE UN HAS THE CAPACITY TO FULFILL THE GREAT AND GROWING TASKS WE ASSIGN TO IT.

THROUGH HIS 1992 REPORT "AN AGENDA FOR PEACE" THE SECRETARY-GENERAL LAUNCHED THE UN COMMUNITY ON THE PATH OF PEACEKEEPING REFORM. AND, HE HAS BEGUN TO TAKE A NUMBER OF USEFUL ORGANIZATIONAL STEPS. THESE ARE MOST WELCOME. HOWEVER, TO ADDRESS THE SYSTEMIC CHALLENGES FACING PEACEKEEPING THE SECRETARY-GENERAL, WE NEED THE ACTIVE ASSISTANCE OF MEMBER STATES.

OUR GOVERNMENT IS NEARING COMPLETION OF AN INTERNAL REVIEW OF US SUPPORT FOR UN PEACEKEEPING, AND WE WILL SOON BE ABLE TO SHARE OUR PROPOSALS WITH THE SECRETARY-GENERAL AND OTHER MEMBER STATES. THIS SUMMER, WE WILL TRY TO BUILD A BASE OF SUPPORT FOR SEVERAL FAR-REACHING REFORMS THAT COULD BE PURSUED THIS YEAR.

BEFORE OUTLINING FOR YOU SOME OF OUR GENERAL THINKING, LET ME OFFER A BIT OF DIAGNOSIS. IF I HAD TO CHOOSE A SINGLE WORD TO EVOKE THE PROBLEMS OF UN PEACEKEEPING, IT WOULD BE "IMPROVISATION".

IT MAY SURPRISE YOU -- IT CERTAINLY SURPRISED ME -- TO LEARN THAT EACH TIME THE UN HAS CONDUCTED 28 PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS SINCE 1948, IT HAS STARTED FROM SCRATCH. A KIND OF PROGRAMMED AMATEURISM SHOWS UP ACROSS THE BOARD:

- IN THE NEAR TOTAL ABSENCE OF CONTINGENCY PLANNING;
- IN HASTILY RECRUITED, ILL-EQUIPPED AND OFTEN UNPREPARED TROOPS AND CIVILIAN STAFF;
- IN LIFT ARRANGEMENTS COBBLED TOGETHER ON A WING AND A PRAYER;

- IN PROCUREMENT PROCESSES THAT REQUIRE LONG LEAD-TIMES FOR URGENTLY NEEDED EQUIPMENT;
- IN THE ABSENCE OF KNOWLEDGE ABOUT AVAILABLE FORCES AND CAPABILITIES;
- IN THE LACK OF TROOP TRAINING STANDARDS OR STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES FOR TROOPS IN THE FIELD OR UNDER FIRE;
- IN THE LACK OF CENTRALIZED COMMAND AND CONTROL;
- IN THE ABSENCE OF STANDARD BUDGETING TECHNIQUES AND COST FACTORS;
- IN THE BYZANTINE AND DRAWN-OUT BUDGETARY DECISION MAKING PROCESS;
- AND IN THE LACK OF A DURABLE FINANCIAL BASIS FOR STARTING AND SUSTAINING PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS.

THE LIST COULD BE LONGER, BUT I THINK YOU GET THE POINT. THE PROBLEMS ARE COMPREHENSIVE EXCEPT IN ONE VITAL RESPECT: THE PEACEKEEPING STAFF, HOWEVER SMALL, IS SUPERLATIVE.

LAST MONTH, AT US AND RUSSIAN INITIATIVE THE SECURITY COUNCIL TOOK AN EXTREMELY IMPORTANT STEP BY REQUESTING THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO PRESENT A REPORT THIS SEPTEMBER CONTAINING SPECIFIC NEW PROPOSALS FOR REFORM. THE COUNCIL'S SUGGESTIONS INCLUDED:

- CREATION OF A PLANS AND CURRENT OPERATIONS DIRECTORATE;
- NOTIFICATION TO THE UN OF FORCES OR CAPABILITIES THAT MEMBER STATES COULD MAKE AVAILABLE FOR PEACEKEEPING OR HUMANITARIAN OPERATIONS;
- A RESERVE STOCK OF COMMONLY USED EQUIPMENT;
- AND STANDARDIZATION OF PEACEKEEPING PROCEDURES.

PERHAPS THE MOST IMPORTANT SENTENCE IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL STATEMENT WAS THAT ALL MEMBER STATES "MAKE PARTICIPATION IN AND SUPPORT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE-KEEPING A PART OF THEIR FOREIGN AND NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY." THAT IS THE KEY POINT: PREVENTING AND SETTLING INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT IS NOT A MATTER OF CASUAL INTEREST. FOR OURSELVES AND THE OTHER MEMBERS OF THE UN, IT IS A CRITICAL INTEREST.



I BELIEVE THAT THE TIME HAS COME TO COMMIT THE POLITICAL, INTELLECTUAL AND FINANCIAL CAPITAL, THAT UN PEACEKEEPING AND OUR SECURITY DESERVE. LET ME DESCRIBE A FEW PRIORITY AREAS FOR CHANGE.

OPERATIONS

THE UN HAS NEITHER THE RESOURCES NOR THE INTERNAL ORGANIZATION TO PLAN, PREPARE, ORGANIZE, DEPLOY, DIRECT AND SERVICE PEACEKEEPING MISSIONS. WE FAVOR A SUBSTANTIAL ENLARGEMENT AND REORGANIZATION OF THE PEACEKEEPING HEADQUARTERS STAFF -- AND THE CREATION OF A PERMANENT FOUNDATION FOR RAPID 24 HOUR COMMUNICATION, INTELLIGENCE, LIFT, RECRUITMENT, TRAINING AND THE FULL SPECTRUM OF IN-THEATRE LOGISTICAL SUPPORT.

BUDGET

PEACEKEEPING COSTS ARE BILLED BY THE MISSION, A TIME-CONSUMING PROCESS OUT OF SYNC WITH OUR OWN AND MANY OTHERS' LEGISLATIVE APPROPRIATIONS CYCLES. THIS MAKES PLANNING NEARLY IMPOSSIBLE, AND RESULTS IN A CASH FLOW CRISIS -- WHICH MEANS LATE DEPLOYMENTS, AND LONG DELAYS IN REIMBURSEMENTS TO CONTRIBUTORS. WE ARE STUDYING WAYS TO DEAL WITH THIS VEXING AND DANGEROUS SITUATION. ONE POSSIBLE SOLUTION IS TO CREATE A UNIFIED UN PEACEKEEPING BUDGET ACCOMPANIED BY AN ENLARGED CONTINGENCY FUND FOR UNFORESEEN MISSIONS. WHILE SUCH A FUND WOULD HAVE TO BE ADJUSTED ANNUALLY, IT WOULD GIVE THE SECRETARY-GENERAL A BETTER PLANNING BASIS AND REDUCE THE NEED FOR MEMBER STATES TO KEEP RETURNING TO THEIR LEGISLATURE FOR ADDITIONAL FINANCE.

COST CONTROL

AS THE NUMBER AND SIZE OF PEACEKEEPING MISSIONS HAVE GROWN, SO HAVE THE UN'S CASH REQUIREMENTS. YET THE UN DOES NOT HAVE THE RESOURCES OR SKILLED STAFF NEEDED TO MANAGE AND OVERSEE INCREASINGLY COMPLICATED PEACEKEEPING BUDGETS. THE US AND OTHER LARGE DONORS SHOULD SUPPORT CREATION OF A CADRE OF HIGHLY QUALIFIED BUDGET EXPERTS FOR THIS PURPOSE, AS WELL AS THE INTRODUCTION OF SPECIAL BUDGETING TECHNIQUES. WE ALSO WILL URGE THE UN TO IMPLEMENT ITS PLAN FOR A PEACEKEEPING INSPECTORATE TO MONITOR ACTUAL EXPENDITURES. THE UNITED NATIONS MUST INSTITUTE MORE REGULAR AND TIMELY COST ACCOUNTING PROCEDURES TO ENSURE THAT MONEY'S BEING SPENT WISELY.

FINANCE

AS PEACEKEEPING COSTS SPIRAL UPWARD, SOME MEMBER STATES RESIST PAYING FOR NEW MISSIONS: WHILE OTHERS, LIKE RUSSIA, CAN NO LONGER MEET EXISTING OBLIGATIONS. THE RESULT IS THAT WE ARE APPROACHING A CRISIS POINT, IN WHICH UN INTERVENTION DESIRABLE FOR POLICY REASONS CANNOT BE UNDERTAKEN FOR FISCAL REASONS. THAT IS WHY WE INTEND, OVER THE COMING MONTHS, TO WORK WITH OTHER MEMBER STATES TO EXPLORE THE FULLEST POSSIBLE RANGE OF STEPS TO PLACE PEACEKEEPING ON A SOUND AND DURABLE LONG-TERM BASIS.

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I WANT TO LEAVE TIME FOR YOUR QUESTIONS AND COMMENTS SO LET ME CLOSE BY RETURNING TO A POINT I TRIED TO MAKE IN THE BEGINNING. THE END OF THE COLD WAR HAS PROFOUNDLY BENEFITED AMERICANS IN TWO RESPECTS: OUR COUNTRY IS PROTECTED BY A WIDER MARGIN OF SECURITY THAN WE HAVE ENJOYED FOR MOST OF THIS CENTURY; AND THE EMERGING POST COLD WAR WORLD INCREASINGLY REFLECTS AND INDEED ASPIRES TO AMERICAN VALUES AND IDEALS. THESE TWO FACTS GIVE US THE MOTIVE AND THE OPPORTUNITY TO HELP SECURE A PRINCIPLED INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY FOR THE ENJOYMENT AND PROTECTION OF FUTURE GENERATIONS. YET THESE ALONE ARE NOT ENOUGH. IF WE WANT TO ENSURE THAT THE CAULDRON OF INSTABILITIES BUBBLING UP ON NEARLY EVERY OTHER CONTINENT DO NOT PREVENT US FROM PURSUING THE GLOBAL INTEREST THAT I HAVE DESCRIBED TONIGHT, THEN WE MUST ACT. FOR AS A PEOPLE WE MUST ALSO HAVE A VISION OF THE COMMUNITY WE WANT TO LIVE IN AND THE WILL TO BRING IT TO LIFE.

THANK YOU.

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